Ladies and Gentlemen, - We are met here, it seems to me, under very happy auspices, and we are under a double obligation for this to Dr. Doughty. Not only have our transactions been printed under the auspices of the Public Archives of Canada, but we have the privilege of holding this meeting of the Canadian Historical Association in the headquarters, the counting-house - in this room, one might almost say, the treasure chamber - of Canadian history. Last year many members of the Association found their way as far afield as Winnipeg. The year before, as many of us will recall, the Association was fairly launched upon a new era of usefulness at the University of Toronto; though I must confess that when my own name, representing at that time, I suppose, Western Canada, went forward as Vice-President in Professor Wrong's office at Baldwin House, I little thought that the mills of the gods would grind so exceeding small. We are happy in having here, as one would expect in this place, the largest and most representative gathering we have ever had.

A secret memorandum on Confederation drafted by Sir Edmund Head for Lord Grey in 1851 was published in the transactions of the Canadian Historical Association of last year. It has occurred to me that a brief survey of Head's correspondence upon this project from 1851 until 1858 when it was definitely launched into practical politics might serve a double purpose. It might discharge the somewhat perfunctory obligations of a presidential address without requiring in the transactions space to which, after the last two issues, I do not feel entitled; and secondly, it might serve as an introduction to two other brief memoranda of Head's, and to one of the most interesting minor problems of Canadian history. Do these memoranda mark the point where Confederation became an inescapable issue in the old province of Canada? Do they forecast the crisis in practical politics which became the causa causans of Confederation, the mainspring which drove it forward (and many of the fathers of Confederation with it) until it became an accomplished fact? Is Head in that sense the grandfather of Confederation? I cannot hope to answer these questions to my satisfaction, but I think it will be possible to raise them in such a way that an answer will become necessary.
The significance of the earlier memorandum of 1851, it seems to me, lies not in the fact that it antedates by seven years the resolutions of Alexander Tilloch Galt, but in the fact that it follows almost immediately upon the concession of responsible government, the vast implications of which Head's hard, cold, empirical intellect was among the first to grasp. Since the American Revolution there had been half a dozen projects of federation, all of them, perhaps, inspired by antipathies both to the form and to the temper of the American Union. The loss of the first Empire was attributed to the weakness of the executive and the strength of popular institutions fused at last into a Continental Congress. It became the policy of the second Empire to concentrate the executive and to disintegrate the nascent powers of the provincial Assemblies. The old province of Nova Scotia was broken into four fragments, and William Knox projected yet a fifth on the St. Croix. The old province of Quebec was divided into Upper and Lower Canada, and for the first time a Governor General was appointed for the North American provinces. To this scheme of things all the early projects of Confederation seem to have been attuned. A federated British American Empire, in a very literal sense, was to be set over against a federated American republic. Chief Justice Smith in 1790 proposed a "General Government for the Colonies" in which the "Governor and Board of Council" should be, not "shadows" as they had been in the first Empire, but dominant realities. The only central representative body was to represent not popular electorates but the provincial legislatures. Colonel Robert Morse in 1784 believed that "a great country may yet be raised up in North America." Chief Justice Sewell, thirty years later, brought forward again the traditional project of his father-in-law, Chief Justice Smith; and twelve years later, in 1826, Richard John Uniacke, the aged Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, left with Horton in the Colonial Office the most elaborate project of Confederation up to that time. The old colonial system, he reflected, "gave rise to a new nation. . . I saw their first Congress assemble at Philadelphia." The British provinces that were left were still destined" for some great mighty purpose, and . . . the time is come for laying its foundation." Like the project of Henry Sherwood in Canada twelve years later, however, Uniacke's contemplated no "change in the principles of the existing constitution." It was not until the twin principles of federation and self-government were combined in Roebuck's fantastic scheme (a copy of which in manuscript Durham brought with him on his Canadian mission) and in Durham's own project of a union for all the British provinces, that "something like a national existence" (to use Durham's phrase) came within the range of political speculation. In the presence of responsible government, federation becomes a new creature. It is no longer to be an artificial bulwark of executive power capable of being held against the United States, but the panoply of a sentient nation capable of standing upon its own feet. This, if I am not mistaken, is the significance of Head's first memorandum of 1851; for while
Elgin was still obsessed in Canada with the problems of self-government alone, his old friend and colleague in the placid province of New Brunswick, was projecting a federation of British provinces with attributes of nationhood unattained, in some respects, to this day: "a powerful and independent State" under the British Crown that "would at once secure the interests of England and the ultimate prosperity of the Colonies themselves;" a nation with a uniform currency, and "a mint of their own;" a flag too of their own, preferably "the Union Jack with a modification of some sort;" above all with "a joint pride in the name of 'British North America' as their common country." In a later memorandum which I cannot submit here there is a still surer touch and a deeper faith: -

"Let the forms and the substance of our Constitution come to maturity in this part of America . . . They should stand in conscious strength and in the full equipment of self Govt. as a free people bound by the ties of gratitude and affection."

What is the record of Head's interest in Confederation during the eventful years from his first project of 1851 to the Galt resolutions of 1858? Above all, what is his attitude towards the dominant issue which forced Confederation into practical politics in Canada and drove it irresistibly forward?

The first of these questions is easily answered for the period from the memorandum of 1851 to the summer of 1857. Head succeeded Elgin as Governor General in September, 1854. During the interval between 1851 and that date Johnston in Nova Scotia had introduced the first formal resolution in a British legislature in favour of British American Union. - an occasion made doubly memorable by the speech of his rival, Joseph Howe, on the organization of the Empire. The advocacy of both, however, was as yet tentative and academic, unstirred by "the great winds of reality" that afterwards, as we shall see, descended upon the issue in Canada. To this same period of academic advocacy belongs a long series of projections admirably traced by Professor Trotter in his Canadian Federation: projects by Henry Sherwood in 1851 and by Lieut.-Colonel Sleigh in 1853, both however still based upon 'a centralization of power'; by Peter Hamilton of The Acadian Recorder in 1855 and 1856; by A.A. Dorion in 1856, perhaps the first breath of the 'great winds' I have referred to; of J. C. Taché in July of 1857 in Le Courrier du Canada, and of Alexander Morris, in March, 1858, in his lecture on Nova Britannia. On March 2, 1856, Head sent to Henry Labouchere of the Colonial Office, a confidential memorandum on the Hudson's Bay Territories, suggesting the organization of the whole area from the Rockies to Lake Nipigon and from the north branch of the Saskatchewan to the United States boundary, as a territory under the name of Saskatchewan, with a Lieut.-Governor and a partially representative Council. Eventualy the old province of Canada was to "take charge of the whole territory of Saskatchewan and to provide for the fair representation in Parliament." Labouchere was a member of the Select Committee of the British House of Commons appointed to inquire into tile whole position of the
Hudson's Bay Company. Their monumental Report was presented in the following year,(5) and it is noteworthy that both of their chief recommendations were in agreement with the known views of Sir Edmund Head in 1856. They recommended that the fertile districts on the Red and Saskatchewan rivers should be 'ceded to Canada on equitable principles', and that the district west of the Rockies should be united with Vancouver Island to form a Crown Colony.(6)

Six months after the memorandum on the Hudson's Bay Territories Head drafted another "Private and Confidential" despatch to Labouchere on the Maritime Provinces and the Hudson's Bay Territories (September 3, 1856), with apologies for "taking this liberty" but pleading that 'both of these - more especially the former - had long occupied my thoughts."(7)

"I may say shortly (he wrote) that I do not now believe in the practicability of the federal or legislative Union of Canada with the three 'Lower Colonies.' - I once thought differently but further knowledge and experience have changed my views - I believe however that it would be possible, with great advantage to all parties concerned to unite under one Government, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and New Brunswick. . . . The process of such an Union would be a long one and . . . I can have no personal interest in the matter."

It is clear therefore that the earlier project of 1851 for a union of all the provinces had been abandoned by September, 1856, on the grounds of "practicability," but that Head was now busy upon a less ambitious scheme. He contemplated a leave of absence in 1857 in order to "communicate the results of my consideration either by word of mouth or on paper as circumstances permit." He sailed eventually from Quebec on June 20, 1857, and did not return to Canada until November. He was undoubtedly in London in July when the Report of the Select Committee on the Hudson's Bay Company was finally submitted to the House of Commons.

A third letter to Labouchere, dated at the Athenaeum Club, London, July 29, 1857, brings the record, so far as I have been able to trace it with certainty, down to that date. Referring to a note which he had received from the Hon. J. W. Johnston, Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, then also in London, Head adds the following commentary: -

"You are, sir, aware of the fact that a project of the kind was mooted some time ago and has been often talked of since.
"I am induced to solicit the attention of Her Majesty's advisers to the matter simply because I am impressed with its importance and because I have the honour of holding Her Majesty's Commission as Governor General. . . .
"It may be that an Union of all the four Colonies including Canada, would be impracticable, or would not be received with favour by all - It may be, on the other hand, that a Legislative union of the three Lower Colonies, i.e. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, would be more practicable in itself, and would be desired by those Colonies. Such a step would not in any way prejudice the future consideration of a more extensive union."

Head returned to Canada, as we have noted, in November, and it seems clear that he had tentatively given up his project of 1851 for a Union of all the provinces, in favour of three preliminary regional unions: a union of the Maritime Provinces and possibly
Newfoundland, a vaster union of the whole central area of British America with the old province of Canada as the core, and finally a union of Vancouver Island and the mainland area west of the Rockies. The last of these was the only one which was brought to pass. The province of British Columbia was created in the following year and came into Confederation with its present boundaries in 1871.

The second question I have raised is not so easily answered. What was Head's connection with the dynamic issue which drove Confederation from its anchorage of academic discussion and launched it irretraceably upon the high seas of practical politics before the "great winds of reality"?

The disaster which threatened the Canadian Union was foreseen by Durham himself in the stipulations which he made, but made in vain, against the principle of equal representation for the upper and lower sections of the province. "To make the representation equal at the outset," notes Head in one of the most discerning of these memoranda, "was to admit a federal principle as existing after the Union. The time predicted by Lord Durham has nearly arrived. Upper Canada is conscious of her own strength and exults in the fact that she has outgrown her sister." Lower Canada had waived representation by population in the day of her adversity. Would Upper Canada be content to waive it perpetually in the day of her unquestioned ascendancy? Here was the "unsound spot in the Union," the "poison of disunion" which could no longer be "passed by or overlooked." Representation by population in the hands of George Brown and the "Clear Grit" party was a project to which in the long run there could be but one conclusion. The time came when Macdonald himself conceded the issue. "It is certain," he said in the Confederation Debates of 1865, "that in the progress of events representation by population would have been carried."(8)

But with representation by population was combined a still more dynamic policy, doubling its momentum and accelerating its speed. The cause of the frontier and of expansion in the West was championed in the Globe by George Brown with prophetic insight into the repercussion of the West upon Canadian policy. Deadlock was bad enough. The Union, already stricken with a creeping paralysis, was hobbling forward upon the twin crutches of coalitions and double majorities. But worse lay beyond. What would happen when deadlock came to an end, as come it must, before the onward march of westward expansion reinforced by the adoption of "representation by population"? Dorion saw the danger in 1856 and sought to raise a barrier for his countrymen in the expedient of a federal union between the two provinces. But Brown, like the hero in Ossian, was bent upon riding out the storm, and it can scarcely be gainsaid that among all the political vicissitudes of that day his were the best chances of making port in safety at the end.
While Brown therefore had everything to gain politically and little to lose by riding out to the storm, his opponents were not yet prepared to admit that they had everything to lose and little to gain. Macdonald and Cartier drew much of their support from the credit centres of population as distinct from the frontier. Governments long in office, too, are traditionally conservative, traditionally intent upon eking out the slender resources of political power. Neither party, perhaps, in the throes of political deadlock, was in a position to gauge disinterestedly the national disaster that lay ahead. Beyond political deadlock, as Head now wrote, lay "rivalry of race, language & worship," without compromise and without quarter. Escape lay only in local government for both Upper and Lower Canada within a broader federation of the British provinces; and the force of that argument was never relaxed until Confederation became an accomplished feat.

One may hazard the guess that this truth came home first, perhaps, to two men who must have been singularly akin to each other; both of them, by a curious coincidence, untrammelled by active partisanship. One of them, Alexander Tilloch Galt, was non-partisan by choice, the other, Sir Edmund Head, ex officio. Every instinct and economic interest of these two must have led them to forestall the impending conflict of race, language and religion. The one had the cold independent intellect of the financier, the projector of enterprises national in their scope but too empirical for the conventions of party. The other was also an empiricist, a Peelite whose cold analytical mind played unceasingly upon the two gravest problems that ever concerned the British provinces, the practical working out of responsible government and the destiny of British North America. Galt's place in Canadian history is secure, but I cannot help thinking that Head's has been obscured, largely perhaps by the brilliant qualities of his predecessor Lord Elgin, and still more effectually, I am inclined to think, by his own self-effacing modesty.

II

It would be hard to find a more concise and prophetic forecast of the peril which now threatened the Canadian Union than the four pages of the Head Memoranda which I have designated (A)\(^9\). Unfortunately, however, these are without a date, without pagination, and without even a watermark. They precede immediately in the Head Papers a resolution (B)\(^{10}\) which Head must have drafted during the session of 1858. This however may be a coincidence all too slight to warrant any decided conclusion without further proof, and it may be necessary to begin by exploring less conclusive evidence.

On July 7, 1858, Galt, then an independent member of the House, moved his well-known resolutions based squarely upon the preamble "that in view of the rapid development of the Population and resources of Western Canada, irreconcilable
difficulties present themselves to the maintenance of that equality which formed the basis of the Union of Upper and Lower Canada." The resolutions of July 7 never went to the vote. One other member only spoke unequivocally in favour of them; the party leaders took no part in the discussion, and it has been generally conceded that had a division taken place the resolutions would have been lost. But the sequel, it seems to me, is very significant, and I state it in chronological order just as it stands.

On July 29 the Macdonald-Cartier ministry resigned. The Brown-Dorion ministry lasted two days. Head then called upon Galt, an untried independent member of the House who had never held a cabinet position in his life, to form a government. When Galt declined, the Governor General called upon Cartier to form a government, with Galt as Inspector-General, and with a "federal union of the British North American provinces" as an avowed policy. The Cartier-Galt-Macdonald ministry took office on August 6.

In the Head Papers is a draft resolution evidently intended, from internal evidence, for the Canadian legislature - an original draft in Head's unmistakable handwriting, advocating a conference of two delegates from each of the British provinces to meet at Toronto in the month of October for the purpose of "preparing the draft of a definite scheme or plan" of Confederation to be submitted to the provincial legislatures. Whether a bulky but fragmentary project in the Head Papers - far too bulky for publication here - was intended to be such a "draft of a definite scheme or plan," can only be conjectured. Head's draft resolution, so far as I know, was never introduced - very fortunately, as we shall see, for Head's official relations with the Colonial Office - but its existence would seem to be prima facie evidence of the first importance. In proroguing the House on August 16, however, Head used the following words in the Speech from the Throne:

"I propose in the course of the recess to communicate with Her Majesty's Government, and with the Governments of the sister Colonies, on another matter of very great importance. I am desirous of inviting them to discuss with us the principles on which a bond of a federal character, uniting the Provinces of British North America may perhaps hereafter be practicable."

On September 9, there is a Minute of Council which Head afterwards admitted was "suggested by myself," urging upon "the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the propriety of authorizing a meeting of delegates on behalf of each colony, and of Upper and Lower Canada respectively, for the purpose of considering the subject of such federative union." The conference was to "meet with as little delay as possible" (Section 4), and the report to be placed "before the Provincial Parliaments with as little delay as possible" (Section 5).

Early in October, Galt, Cartier (Premier) and Ross left for London. On the 23rd they addressed a memorandum, based clearly upon the Minute of Council of September 9,
to Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton at the Colonial Office. The immediate result is well
known. It became clear that Galt was its only active advocate on the other side, and
Sir Edmund Head on this. The Colonial Office declined to authorize the meeting of
delegates from the provincial Executive Councils on the grounds that such action
would 'commit them to a preliminary step towards the settlement of a momentous
issue, of which they have not yet signified their assent in principle.' It is fair to add
that even in Canada the English-speaking party men like Macdonald and Brown on
both sides were as yet thoroughly unconvinced, the one no doubt intent upon keeping
office, the other upon getting it; while even Dorion and Cartier acquiesced only
insofar as federation promised to safeguard their compatriots in Lower Canada against
Brown's twin policies of "rep. by pop." and westward expansion.

But while the Colonial Office received Galt with great courtesy and sent him away
with fair words, the reception they gave to Sir Edmund Head's share in the project was
not so generous. Lytton himself wrote bluntly in September that it could not be passed
over "without remark." "The federation of the Colonies" was a subject which
"properly belongs to the executive authority of the Empire and not that of any separate
province to initiate." The reply was a statement by Head himself, strictly truthful no
doubt as it stands, but drafted with a certain deftness of phrase which is defensible
perhaps only when it is recalled that Head was writing in self-defence. Denying that
he had brought the 'subject under the notice of the Canadian Parliament for the first
time' in his Speech from the Throne on August 16, he remarked that "it was before
them at that very time."

"Early in the last Session, Mr. Galt, then unconnected with the ministry, put in the votes a notice for the
consideration of it which was not yet disposed of.
"When Mr. Galt, therefore, came into office it was natural that the question of an Union of the Colonies should at
once be discussed. I found him and several of the gentlemen about to assume office deeply impressed with the idea
that in some such union alone could be found the ultimate solution of the great question which had been made a
ground of agitation by Mr. Brown and his friends at the general election, viz. - the existing quality of representation
of Upper and Lower Canada, and the alleged injustice inflicted on the former by such equality.
"This question I need not say, is one which threatens to touch the root of the present union .... and might imperil its
existence by reviving all the old antagonism of race and religion.
"Mr. Galt and Mr. Cartier, on taking office, were naturally anxious to offer to the Legislative Assembly some
indication of the policy by which they hoped to meet this difficulty, more especially as Mr. Galt's opinions on this
subject were already known and had been recorded on the journals or the House.....
"The intimation of the ministerial policy, to be of any use, had to be made at once before Parliament separated; I did
not think that I could under these circumstances refuse to announce to the Legislature that I would correspond with
Her Majesty's Government and with the other Colonies."

Such is Sir Edmund's apology for the Speech from the Throne of August 16, 1858. Fortunately he was not called upon to explain the earlier resolution drafted by his own
hand for the Assembly before the session closed, and calling upon himself to
"transmit without delay . . . to the Secretary of State for the Colonies" a series of
resolutions more comprehensive, more adroit, more urgent, than Galt's, for the
Confederation of the British Provinces. In this draft for the first time appears the project for an interprovincial Conference for the discussion of a British federation. For the first time he fixed a date and place - 'at Toronto in the month of October'; he proposed to have the delegates selected forthwith, ad hoc, by the Canadian Assembly and Legislative Council, and to have them charged with the task of "preparing the draft of a definite scheme or plan', to be offered for the approval of delegates from the other provinces. What that 'definite scheme or plan' was to be may perhaps be conjectured, as we have already noted, from the context. Following the draft resolutions in the Head Papers are pages of minute detail upon the separation of federal and provincial powers, the revenues and expenditures chargeable to each, the judiciary and municipal government.

I cannot help thinking that this and the preceding memorandum on the approaching disaster to the Union represent the inner mind of Sir Edmund Head in 1858. If the earlier memorandum of 1851 was perhaps the first detailed project of Confederation, orientated to the dynamics of responsible government, these memoranda of 1858 may entitle Sir Edmund Head to share with Galt the honour of gauging for the first time the inescapable forces which eventually proved the causa causans of Confederation.

Text

A(*)

No immediate occasion for action of any kind presents itself at the present moment but, it is on that account more desirable to cast our eyes forward & look steadily at the questions which seem likely to arise here after.

There is a remarkable passage in that report (Ld Durham's.) which has not been sufficiently considered & which shows great foresight & wisdom with reference to the conditions of the Union of U. & L.C. It is as follows - p. 116.

Ld Durham thus appreciated the danger which wd. ensue from adopting the provision of equal representation for U. & L.C. He foresaw that U.C. the population of wh, was then insignificant in numbers would afterwards outstrip L.C. and that the principle of equal representation would thus form a ground of quarrel between the two. If U.C. then inferior in numbers had acquiesced in an even vote of representation, L.C. would have had no ground of complaint if, in after years, the increase of population secured with it the legitimate recompense of increased representation. The equal representation was as Ld D. says eminently calculated to defeat the purpose it was intended to secure. To make the representation equal at the outset was to admit a federal principle as existing after the Union.
The time predicted by Lord Durham has nearly arrived: U.C. is conscious of her own strength & exults in the fact that she has outgrown her sister. Gratitude for past indulgence or forbearance is no bond in politics: Men in Parl are pressed forward by the craving for popular excitement & the impatience of agitators or enthusiasts.

This unsound spot in the Union cannot be passed by or overlooked: the difficulty must be faced. The crisis may come sooner or later but the dualistic relation, if I may so call it, of U. & L.C. will be in constant peril. L.C. was content to acquiesce in equal powers being given the smaller population but she will not readily waive her own rights and instruct her representatives to assume voluntarily a subordinate position.

Had the representation at first been according to the population of the two sections & had Lower Canada enjoyed the privilege of an elder brother whilst U.C. was as it were in her minority - then the former cd. hardly have complained if the political rights of the latter had grown with her growth & strengthened with her strength.

But the federal principle - the assumption that two communities each holding a sort of quasi independence were going to live together was implied by the previous giving equal representation to each. The poison of disunion was left in the political system ready at any moment to influence to the utmost the rivalry of race language and worship which would at any time be kept down only by the greatest tact on the part of the Govt. & the utmost forbearance on the pt. of all.(14)

It may of course be said almost with certainty that without this provision of equal representation the Union would have been impossible - that Upper Canada wd. not have submitted to the immediate superiority of the Lower Province in the United Parl. & would not have consented to wait for the slow & tardy process of acquiring a right to equal legislative powers by the increase of her population.

Whatever may be one's opinion on this point the vicious element in the constitution of the Union is not now less real because it may have been unavoidable.

There may be modes of escape from the embarrassment as it at present exists.(15)

If the Eastern townships were to advance very rapidly & if that district & the English population of Montreal & its neighbourhood were to feel strongly & unanimously the importance of the Western trade then they might throw their weight into the side of U.C. and render resistance on the part of the French population impossible.

The fear at present is that unscrupulous partizans will endeavour to force on this question before the country is ripe for its peaceable solution.
1. That the Queen's dominions in Brit N.A. united as they are by their allegiance to the British Crown would derive great & signal advantages from a closer union among themselves.

2. That such union might be secured by the establishment of a Central Govt. for B.N.A., leaving in the hands a local Govt. in each Province such powers as may be necessary for managing its own affairs & transferring to the Central Govt. such powers as would provide for control and regulation of their common interests.

3. That it is premature to discuss the limits or precise character of such central or local Govts. until the principles of its expediency shall have been recognized by H.M. Govt, & by the several Provincial legislatures.

4. That with a view to ascertain the sentiments of H.M. Govt. & of the Legislatures of the several Provinces on this important matter an address be presented to H.E. the G.C. praying him to transmit without delay a copy of these resolutions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

5. That in the event of the relinquishment by the H.B. Company of any portion of the territory now held or claimed by them it would be expedient that the Red River Settt. & its territory shd form a part of H.M. Dominion in B.N A. to be united on the principles herein before recited.

6. That in the event of H.M. Govt. & the Govts. of the several Provinces enumerated above, acquiescing in the principle of an Union, it wd be desirable that two delegates from each Province (to be named by the Leg. Council & Assembly) should meet at Toronto in the month of October next in order to digest & prepare the outline of a scheme for consideration of the several Legislatures on their re-assembling in the ensuing year.

7. That supposing such a conference is deemed expedient by all parties and be delegated on behalf of U.C. & Messrs. and on behalf of Lower Canada as the representatives of this Legislature - but that no powers of any kind except those necessary for conferring with the other delegates & preparing the draft of a definite scheme or plan be given to such delegates.
* I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. W.M. Whitelaw for helping to decipher some of the difficulties of Head's handwriting and for valuable suggestions in the field of Maritime Union, the theme of Mr. Whitelaw's forthcoming book.


4. He proposed "Manitoba" as an alternative name, adding however that "Manitoba" is the most easily pronounced and spelt - but may be though ill - omened as I believe it means "evil spirit." *Confidential Drafts*, 1856 to 1866.

5. Head was in London at the time.


8. *Confederation Debates*, p. 27.

9. See below.

10. See below.

11. See below under (B).

12. Head to Lytton, Oct 22, 1858.

13. Sir Edmund does not explain why he asked Mr. Galt to take office.

* Undated, without pagination or water-mark, but immediately preceding the draft resolution below, (B), in the *Head Papers*. Head's handwriting is probably the worst in the *G. Series*.

14. 'Our present business is to do the best we can from day to day and delay this crisis' crossed out here.

15. 'Every day however tends to increase it. The supposed right of U.C. to increased representation will grow as her population grows more and more in excess of that of L.C.', crossed out here.
* Undated; but the watermark is 1855, and sections 6 and 7 would seem to fix the date as between August 6, 1858, when Galt and Cartier took office, and August 16, 1858, when the House was prorogued.

16. 'and to the Govr. or Lt. Govr. of the Following Colonies', crossed out here.

17. 'with the approval of the Govr; or Lt. Govr. of each', crossed out here.