Then and Now: 1848 and 1948

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1948

The past six months have witnessed a variety of centennial celebrations of the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe that offer an enlightening commentary on the political climate of our times. Thus in Hungary a special session of Parliament was convened to enact a bill to commemorate the War of Independence of 1848. Among the distinguished guests whose presence on this occasion was more a proof of solidarity under Soviet direction than of historical mindedness, were Marshal Voroshilov, the chief executive of the Ukrainian Republic, The vice-premier of Poland, and the ministers of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On March 15 the BBC broadcast a message to the Hungarian people from the British foreign secretary, Mr. Bevin, in which he paid tribute to the heroes of Hungarian independence and to Louis Kossuth in particular for whom, he pointed out, Britain had been a safe refuge in the hour of danger. Mr. Bevin then added significantly "Now too, England is the friend of liberty and is fighting against tyranny from whatever source it may draw inspiration or whatever interests it may serve." The political overtones of his remarks were too much for the controlled Hungarian press which published the text of the message with appropriate bitter and sarcastic remarks. The Communist newspaper Szavad Nep declared that the broadcast displayed "complete contempt of the truth and hypocrisy of the highest degree." "Does Bevin think," it asked angrily, "that we have forgotten not only 1848 but 1938."

Distracted and divided Germany was not permitted to have a single centennial celebration. The Russians insisted that the anniversary should be observed in Berlin on March 18 to commemorate the riots which forced the king of Prussia, temporarily, to merge his kingdom into Germany. Under their supervision, a demonstration in honour of the "Day of Freedom" was accordingly staged. In Frankfort, where the German National Assembly met in 1848, the Americans were very much to the fore. The United States military governor proclaimed a half-holiday on May 16, the anniversary of the day when 330 members of that Assembly walked solemnly in procession to St. Paul's Church. He carefully drew attention to the fact that President Polk had been the only head of a state to send an official greeting to the Frankfort assembly and also remind his wards that the United States had been the refuge of thousands of Germans after the failure of the Revolution. By tremendous efforts the bombed-out church was reconstructed for the occasion. At the ceremony, the principal speaker was Chancellor Hutchins of the University of Chicago. Both he and the lord mayor of Frankfort drew attention to the influence of American ideas on the men of
1848. Prominent among the special display of works of art and historic documents were photostat copies of the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution.

In Paris, the centenary was, from our point of view, most appropriately observed by the convening of an international congress of historians at which papers were read on the events of 1848. The type of representation epitomized the political status of France today. There were no historians present from the two super-powers. British historians were there as private observers, but not as delegates - not a bad reflection of the British attempt at semi-detachment from a continent which dominates their destiny. The smaller European countries were well represented but of the delegates from behind the "Iron Curtain" only the Hungarians were on time. The Czecks were one day late and the Poles three. Professor Taylor of the University of Manchester, who was one of the few British historians present and to whom I am indebted for this summary, describes the general views expressed as follows:

The countries of Western Europe repeated the French version of 1848 - that is their delegates talked almost exclusively of national independence and individual liberty. The Hungarians contributed something new in a social analysis of their revolutions; this infuriated the Czeck who insisted on the national conflicts of 1848. The Czecks, in fact, clung to an old fashioned Western approach; the Hungarians are preparing to be the equal partners of the Russians, as they once were of the Germans and before that of the Hapsburgs. There was only one Austrian, who remained silent. Apart from him the Germans were not represented; and it would have been possible to sit through the Congress almost without becoming aware that there had been an earth-shaking revolution in Germany in 1848. . . . The Italians claimed, as it were, equality with France and Great Power status. Indeed they went further and asserted the primacy of the Italian revolutions of 1848. In their view the spirit of 1848 was most clearly expressed by Mazzini and it was his doctrine of nationalism which carried the day in Eastern Europe. [1]  

As has been indicated, the Italians were the first to revolt in 1848. Although Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw were all to experience riots and bloodshed, it was Milan on January 3 which witnessed the first clash between soldiers and civilians when five were killed and sixty wounded. "The Mourning of Lombardy" as D'Azeglio described it in his famous pamphlet of that name, aroused patriots everywhere, but only impelled the local authorities to issue a harsh imperial rescript that had been held in reserve for some time. The Milan demonstrations had been anti-Austrian and pro-Italian, a portent of the emotion which Mazzini had been cultivating for fifteen years. But the first successful revolt, announced in advance, took place in Palermo, Sicily on January 12. Here the rebels demanded freedom from the hated Neapolitans and the "English constitution of 1812." Their success induced middle-class liberals in Naples to clamour for the constitution of 1820 and thereafter an epidemic of constitution-making spread up the peninsula. The demonstrators of Palermo and Naples hated each other and were indifferent to the sufferings of Venice or Milan under the Austrian yoke. In that harsh fact is one of the basic reasons for the failure of 1848 in Italy. Local liberalism and Italian nationalism did not always stand on common ground. Similarly, the Italian sentiments of Pope Pius the Ninth, of which there is ample evidence, conflicted with the international role of the Papacy. Papal
troops might proceed northward from Rome and link up with other forces eager to free Lombardy-Venetia from the Austrians but the Pope, as a temporal sovereign, as his Allocution of April 29 demonstrated, would not declare war on Austria. Even a Liberal Pope could not be a patriot king. As His Holiness declared "We, though unworthy, represent on earth Him who is the author of peace and lover of concord, and, according to the order of our supreme Apostolate, we seek after and embrace all races, peoples, and nations with an equal devotion of paternal love." The most Pope Pius could do was to write a personal appeal to the Austrian emperor exhorting him "with paternal affection to withdraw your arms from a war which can never reconquer for your empire the minds of the Lombards and Venetians" and begging the "generous German nation" to recognize the Italian nation "as a sister."(2)

The resulting reaction against the Pope's decision, coupled with the disappointing military leadership of the king of Piedmont, stimulated Mazzini's cult of republicanism and gave him the opportunity to direct the affairs of the Roman Republic. Of that beleaguered city, Garibaldi became the flashing sword. To him could fittingly be applied Macaulay's description of Chatham's leadership in the Seven Years' War - "The ardour of his soul had set the whole kingdom on fire." Incidentally, Garibaldi's famous remark to his followers when he was obliged to flee Rome, "I offer neither pay nor quarters, nor provisions; I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battle and death," may well have been the inspiration for the Churchillian remark on May 13, 1940, "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat." The conflicts within Italy of regionalism and nationalism, of republicanism and monarchy, of nationalism and universalism, of fusion and federation, combined with incompetent military leadership, an oft-recurring motif in Italian history, made 1848 a year of failure for Italian unity. But out of failure came what Croce has described as "dazzling memories of heroic leadership" and "experience of the life of liberty" as well as a consolidation of opinion. Papal leadership of an Italian federation, once Gioberti's panacea, was discredited. Mazzini's dream of an Italian republic had been shattered and its author was to become one of the unhappiest of types-a frustrated exile. Anti-Austrian feeling had grown and correspondingly with it the prestige of Piedmont and Piedmont's king who had failed, but with honour. As Daniel Manin, the hero of the Venetian Republic was to write in 1856 . . . "the Republican Party ... says to the House of Savoy, 'Make Italy and I am with you. If not, . . . no'." "We will begin again" was the saying in Piedmont and a new shrewd leader, Cavour, was anxiously waiting his cue in the wings. He knew that King Charles Albert's boast of 1848 "L'Italia fara da sé" had proved unreal and was waiting for the moment to find his ally against Austria in the very France that has smashed the Roman Republic. Cavour's model for the Italy of the future was to be Britain, of whom he said in 1859, "From England I have learned the greater part of the political notions which have guided me."
In the Italy of 1948 the Republicans have prevailed. It is presumably some of their historians who dusted off Mazzini's reputation for the edification of the Paris Congress. In the recent elections, with a tremendous turnout at the polls, the Monarchist vote was less than 3 per cent. The Papacy's leadership was exerted this time against Communism with the blunt reminder, "Who is not for Me is against Me." By some observers the influence of the Church has been ranked as the strongest single factor in defeating Togliatti and his followers. The other powerful factor was the influence of the United States, as expressed in the arrival of food ships, the proposed relaxation of the Peace Treaty, and by letters from Italo-Americans to the folks back home. Such an influence could not have been paralleled in 1848, even though American bluestockings like Margaret Fuller, who happened to be in Rome during the days of crisis, ardently encouraged the republican movement. But, in the rejoicing over the Communist set-back in April, it must not be forgotten that eight million Italians defied both Church and Mammon to vote for the Popular Front, and that they represent not merely the influence of the U.S.S.R. but a deep-seated social protest against wretched social conditions that have never been satisfactorily redressed. As a Canadian observer wrote from Rome after the elections, "The desperate Calabrian share cropper did not see why he could not be a good Catholic and a Communist at the same time." In 1948 Italy, in common with Western Europe is a battle ground between two ideas that are locked in as yet undetermined conflict. The One World of Communism confronts the United States of Western Europe of which perhaps "Western Union" is the forerunner. The next four years of the European Recovery Program may throw some light on which way Europe is moving.

In the France of 1848 currents of protest, strengthened by the lean harvests of the two previous years which had caused 1847 to be christened the year of dear bread, merged in general demonstrations against the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe. His régime with its determined inertia, its cautious foreign policy, that bored the French just as forty years of peace was soon to bore the English, and its concentration upon money making, which made two critics as diverse in outlook as Karl Marx and Alexis de Toqueville agree in likening it to "an industrial company in which the operations are carried out for the benefits that the members can derive from them" was despised by all but those who directly profited from it. Among the victors over the citizen king were those like Lamartine, who looked back upon the first French Revolution with child-like adoration, and believed that France would live happily ever after once the new Republic had been consolidated. "We are making together the sublimest of poems," said Lamartine, joyfully. Elsewhere the poet-politician was prudent enough to declare that in the new republic charity would be diffused among the different classes in so far as it was compatible with "the liberty of capital and the security of property."
If Lamartine and his fellow idealists looked to the revolution of the past, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, and the followers of the various Socialist cults that had multiplied since 1820 were determined to establish the new social revolution in which the Second French Republic would be an agent of social justice. As Heine, an exile in Paris vainly warned the readers of his despatches, "Communism is the sombre hero for whom is reserved a huge, if transient role in the tragedy of our times." Indifferent to both protest groups were the great majority of France, the peasants whose agrarian revolution had long since been completed and for whom the best government was the one that taxed the least. Consequently, it soon proved impossible to stabilize such a republic directed by the uneasy coalition of bourgeois reformers with proletarian revolutionists. As early as May, while in Paris, Emerson was writing in his journal "The boulevards have lost their fine trees which were all cut down for barricades in February. At the end of a year we shall take account and see if the revolution was worth the trees." Six weeks later rural France had conquered working-class Paris and the way was paved for Louis Napoleon to win the presidency with promises of peace, order, and glory. Like his uncle before him, Napoleon III transformed a republic into an empire, but he lacked the former's physical vitality and military capacity to make the Second Empire as glorious as the first. What survived both the Second Republic and the Empire was universal manhood suffrage, which idealists were to learn did not guarantee democratic government, as Hitler was again to demonstrate, a distrust of the "strong silent man" and a separation of classes and of Paris from the country that the Commune of 1871 was only to intensify.

Of the resulting hate and bitterness Syndicalism and Marxian Socialism were to be the residuary legatees in France before the First World War, and Communism after it. As recently as December last a leader writer in the *Manchester Guardian* (December 4) wrote in an editorial on "The French Struggle" that "The Communists are exceedingly anxious to appear to be leading a working-class movement defending itself against such proceedings as those which made the streets of Paris in 1848 the cockpit of a dreadful battle." Two months ago the editor of the French newspaper *Combat* wrote an article for American consumption in which he commented that "In France the class struggle has been not an imported ideology, but the dire experience of proletarian families for over a century."[4]

The history of France since 1940 has been the story of a divided people still grappling with the unsolved problems of 1789 and 1848. At the opening of the decade they were led by an octogenarian soldier who detested the ideas of '89 and replaced the motto of the Third Republic, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" with the safer slogan "Work, Family, Fatherland." Pétain was succeeded by another soldier, General Charles de Gaulle who seems to have thought of himself as a combination of a contemporary Joan of Arc saving France from the foreigner and a reincarnated Louis IX crusading
against the Anti-Christ of Communism. Since his voluntary retirement from office in January, 1946 it has remained for Socialists like Auriol, Blum, and Ramadier and Catholic Democrats like Bidault and Schuman to attempt to save the Fourth Republic from the vague corporatism of De Gaulle and the equivocal communism of Thorez. But the middle way of Blum's "Third Force" has not been illumined by the fierce glare of publicity and propaganda that dazzles the traveller on the super highways of Capitalism and Communism. Meanwhile, in France, the peasant, the factory worker, the bourgeois, and the clerical have changed astonishingly little since 1848. There remains still that attitude which the French call "frondeur," that suspicion of authority, evasion of law, and dislike of collectivism that makes administration inefficient and undisciplined at a time when such luxuries are too expensive for an enfeebled country.  

While Frenchmen have changed little, the position of France has changed tremendously. The strength of France, in a demographic, a diplomatic, or a military sense is far from what it was a century ago. Then it was the rising in Paris, not the riot in Palermo, that touched off the chain reaction of revolution in Europe. "When France sneezes Europe has a cold" Metternich once complained. It was to France that both Marx and Mazzini looked for sympathy and encouragement in 1848. Today France, like Italy, faces a crisis of civilization, uneasily and angrily aware that the great decisions will be made in Washington or Moscow and not in Paris. The claim of Jacques Soustelle that she "can play the rôle of a spiritual guide to the benefit of all the European Countries" does not carry conviction.

When G. M. Trevelyan observed that "The year 1848 was the turning-point at which modern history failed to turn," he had particularly in mind the tragedy of the failure in Central Europe. If, in that fatal year, Germany had been successfully united on democratic lines, the course of history might have run in far different channels and perhaps two world wars might have been avoided. These are sweeping but not fantastic speculations which a glance at the record may help to explain. At first sight it would appear that revolution in Germany had an easier task than in Austria or Italy. As a country, Germany was incomparably more homogeneous than the former while it was free from the incubus of an efficient army of occupation such as finally prevailed in the latter. It had nothing like the class bitterness between worker and bourgeois that operated so disastrously in Paris. True, Engels might tell Marx hopefully that in the Rhineland "one is always falling over Communists." Bad harvests and the "unfair" competition of machines with hand-looms might embitter artisans and impell Count Galen, to write from Kassel in 1847, "Misery, spiritual and physical, traverses Europe in ghastly shapes - the one without God, the other without bread. Woe if they join hands." But the fact remains that the industrial revolution had scarcely affected Germany. In 1846 its largest state, Prussia, was 72 per cent rural as against 73.5 per cent thirty years before. Dissatisfied workers were radicals rather than class conscious proletarians. Occasionally it was the radicals who hastened
action, as in Berlin, but invariably it was the middle-class liberals who took over at that point and set to work to realize the ideas of constitutional reform of which they had been balked after Waterloo. When the king of Wurttemberg explained to the Russian minister in his capital that he could not ride down ideas he expressed the dilemma of the petty German pricelings everywhere. With the Austrian Emperor encouraging Metternich to leave Vienna for England and the King of Prussia declaring on March 21 that Prussia is henceforth merged into Germany, it looked as though a liberal constitutional Germany with universal suffrage was in the making. That was the bright promise of what the romantics called the "Völkersfrühling" when the Frankfort Assembly met in May. In its ranks were some of the noblest and best-educated figures in Germany - but only one peasant, a Pole from Silesia, and no working class spokesmen. "Too much of a university and not enough of a political stock exchange," was the verdict of one German historian on the Assembly. It spent precious time in debating the fundamental rights of the German people, with even the very first words of the Constitution "Every German" provoking a discussion lasting for hours as to the meaning of the word "German." One disgusted member calculated that at the present rate of speed the end of this discussion might be about April, 1930. The Assembly displayed a fiery German nationalism leaving, as one orator said, "the misty heights of cosmopolitanism from which one's own fatherland is no longer visible," which reflected the disappointed aspirations of the men of 1815. The eagerness to create a German navy, the anger at the demonstrations of Czech nationalism in Prague, the desire to incorporate Schleswig-Holstein in Germany at the expense of Denmark, the disapproval of Polish requests for national autonomy in Posen were indications of a rising sentiment which Conservatives and militarists could and did later use for their purposes. It is easy to be too harsh in judging the German intellectuals of 1848, to point to the ludicrousness of some of their actions, and to compare them, as did the Russian exile, Herzen, to the playfulness of a cow "when that excellent and respectable animal, adorned with domestic kindliness, takes to gambolling and galloping in the meadow, and with a serious face kicks up her hind legs or gallops sideways whipping herself with her tail." But it should be remembered that the men of Frankfort never found a leader with the ruthlessness of a Cromwell or the boldness of a Danton and never acquired an army which was loyal to them. Many of the ablest of Germans despised their efforts and held aloof. In some instances, like Bismarck they were Prussian chauvinists, not German patriots, who were eager to see the Frankfort experiment fail and the era of "blood and iron" inaugurated. "Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain," said the self-described "terrible Junker." "... I hope to God we shall remain Prussians long after this piece of paper has been forgotten like a withered autumn leaf." When the Hapsburgs regained a grip on their Empire, and when Frederick William IV of Prussia, "all nerves and muscle," refused to stoop to the gutter and pick up the crown offered him, the prospects for a liberal Germany vanished and have still to return.
What the middle class liberal and worker radical failed to accomplish by persuasion in Germany was achieved by force of arms. The prophecy of Prince William of Prussia in May of 1849, "He who is to govern Germany must conquer her," was soon fulfilled. Meanwhile, the Liberals of '48 emigrated by the thousands to the United States to play a worthy part in the struggle for freedom there, or returned to their laboratories and classrooms, or became admirers of force and realpolitik. The new class of industrial capitalists that speedily appeared never experimented with Liberal policies as did the Cobdens and Chamberlains; the new industrial proletariat promptly turned to Marx and the Social Democratic party and repudiated any alliance with bourgeois liberals such as the workers of Britain found to their advantage in the days of Gladstone and Asquith. What professor Valentin calls the authoritative state took over in Germany and taught its subjects to rejoice in their political incompetence. "Since 1848," he writes, "Germans have suffered from political inferiority complexes. They had lost confidence in themselves and never found it again." (9)

For the triumph of the cult of force and the denial of political responsibility, Germany and the world have paid dearly. A Germany built by Bismarck showed no consideration for Frenchmen, Danes, and Poles in the conquered provinces and inaugurated the period of armed peace in Europe that was shattered by the First World War. A Germany ruined by the Kaiser and the German General Staff found no great leader to guide the Weimar Republic which succumbed in days of economic depression to the senile treachery of another Prussian soldier, Hindenburg, and the cunning of an Austrian spell-binder. Again political immaturity in Germany was dislodged by nationalism and force, with a fictitious veneer of State Socialism, and again force destroyed Germany and Europe - this time more thoroughly. The men of 1948 in Germany have still to be given a third chance to remould their country. Will they be able or be allowed to profit by the mistakes of their forebears of 1848 and 1918?

In 1848 the Austrian Empire was a medley of discordant nationalities (10) some of whom, like the Italians, Poles, and Hungarians, regarded themselves as historic nations or master races, while others, like the Czechs, Croats, Rumanians, and Ruthenians were either regaining or achieving national consciousness. At the centre of the Empire was the imperial administration under the aged and pessimistic Metternich whose favourite metaphors for describing the state of society were "powder magazines, influenza, and cholera." (11) Obeying his master's directive he operated on the principle of changing nothing and admitted "J'ai gouverné l'Europe quelquefois, L'Autriche jamais." As elsewhere, economic discontent was increasing in the Empire with the peasant particularly resentful at the survivals of serfdom and feudal restraints. Yet there was no deep sense of proletarian solidarity. In March the mob which attacked property in Vienna destroyed factory machinery which, in Luddite fashion, it
regarded as the enemy. (12) In fact, as Professor Taylor has pointed out, in Western and Central Europe it was the two most industrialized countries, Britain and Belgium, which were least affected by the events of 48. (13)

What was resented in Vienna by the students, some middle class, and radical workers was the police state atmosphere so well described in a pamphlet entitled Austria and her Future published anonymously in 1843 by a certain Baron Victor von Andrian-Werburg. "The citizen," commented the noble official, "may be as jolly as he likes, get drunk, tell obscene stories, read a snippet theatrical journal, even found a cotton factory - but he must show no interest in his parish, his province or the state, or in the important questions of the day, however nearly they may affect his pocket or menace his very existence - he must ignore all this for fear of causing the gentlemen of the government any inconvenience." (14)

The fall of Metternich on March 13, attacked by reformers and abandoned in true Hapsburg fashion by those he had served so long, was the signal for demonstrations and uprisings from Berlin to Budapest and from Prague to Milan. For three months the imperial régime gave ground before the flood tides of liberalism and nationalism. "What remains standing in Europe?" was the gloomy question Czar Nicholas I addressed to Queen Victoria on April 3. In Italy Marshal Radetzky withdrew to the Quadrilateral, in Germany an Austrian archduke became temporary administrator of the proposed new German state, in Budapest the Hungarians achieved full autonomy, and in Prague, to the disgust of the Germans, a congress of Slav peoples was convened which was to adopt a resolution favouring "an alliance in defence of nationality . . . where such rights are enjoyed, and for conquering them where they are not." But there was no unity of policy among the new autonomous groups, there was a sad lack of effective leadership, (15) and there was no tolerance of one nation by another. The Magyars insisted upon their hegemony at the expense of the Croats, Slovaks, and Rumanians. The Polish gentry were still bitter at the memory of the unholy alliance of Ruthenian peasant and Hapsburg official in 1846. The Germans and Czechs could not find enough common ground in Prague. All agreed in disliking the Italians and willingly fought under Radetzky to recover imperial authority in Lombardy-Venetia. A loyal army, (16) except in Hungary, the appearance of able Conservative leaders like Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg and the elevation to the throne of Francis Joseph, of a lad of eighteen free from the physical and mental weakness of his uncle and quite prepared to break his solemn promises when convenient, combined to redress the balance. At the same time the peasants in all parts of the empire were bought off by agrarian concessions which were among the few lasting reforms of the period. There were isolated instances of solidarity in revolt as when Vienna rose in October to try to prevent German regiments from being sent to
Budapest. There were heroic struggles to the last as in Venice, or in Hungary where the Czar of Russia intervened, only too eager to pour out Russian blood to prevent workers from governing Europe or a centre of insurrection from appearing right at his door. But the end product was the same. By 1850 the Hapsburg empire had been restored intact, more efficient, more centralized, and, as its ambassador told Louis Napoleon in 1858, more devoted to the principle "the respect due to the imprescriptible rights of sovereigns and non-recognition of the claim of nationalities to set up as political States." Yet everywhere nationalism had been stimulated by defeat. [17] Kossuth and Mazzini had failed but Deik, Bismarck, and Cavour were to achieve success in the next two decades, each profiting by a foreign war into which the Hapsburgs were ensnared. The Slav peoples were left still in bondage but their turn was to come in 1918 when the Hapsburgs were successful in their third attempt at state suicide.

Today the greater part of the former Hapsburg possessions has passed into the Soviet sphere of influence. The follies, of an Austrian German who hated the Hapsburgs because they were not true German patriots and merged his homeland into the German fatherland have left Central Europe a vacuum into which Slav power has rapidly penetrated. The Republic of Austria cannot claim to be the spiritual heir of Austria-Hungary, Imperial Austria, or the Holy Roman Empire but it has become, as a thousand years ago, the Ostmark which is an outpost of the West against the East. Michael Bakunin, who advocated in 1848 a federation of Slav peoples from the Urals to the Adriatic has been vindicated by a Soviet régime which champions Slavs, proletarians, and even peasants who may soon be encouraged to learn the virtues of collective farming. The Czech historian, Francis Palacky, who declined an invitation to attend the Frankfort parliament and added "When I direct my gaze beyond the frontier of Bohemia . . . I turn it not towards Frankfort but towards Vienna," may well be read with mournful interest today by those students of Prague who are now too politically unreliable to attend lectures in the national university.

It is obvious from what has been said that the men of 1848 were far from successful in securing their political and social objectives. As Crane Brinton has pointed out, they left much unfinished business on the European agenda. [18] Although Europe then felt a certain sense of community, Russia and the Balkans excepted, it was to be largely preoccupied for a century with completing the process of nation building that the peacemakers of 1815 had blithely flouted. In the same period it was to be likewise concerned with the "Condition of the People" question that Dickens and Disraeli, or Carlyle and the Chartist were ventilating in England. But in spite of failure in '48 the European remained an optimist. Mazzini never lost faith in his belief that nation-states were instruments of God which would serve all humanity. Marx, whose influence on the events of 1848 was almost nil, but whose Communist Manifesto was the most
important event of the year, was equally convinced that victory was on the side of the proletariat and was not far distant. In his eagerness for the future he assumed too readily that "complete laissez-faire and complete collectivism exhausted the alternatives" and, as we know only too well, terribly underestimated the dangers of totalitarianism. (19) Victorian England, free from Revolution, was entering upon its golden era of prosperous capitalism and was soon to open its Great Exhibition with a hymn to material progress. Across the Atlantic a young and exuberant American republic was convinced that it had found the ideal form of government and had achieved a fully democratic society, even though a few radicals inveighed against the contemporary alliance of the Slave Power and the Money Power. In his farewell address President Polk dwelt proudly "on the sublime moral spectacle presented to the world by our beloved country." Not long after, Secretary of State Daniel Webster was to tell the effete Hapsburgs who had disliked American enthusiasm for the Hungarian revolution that "the power of this republic at the present moment is spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface." Science had begun in Europe its enunciation of universal laws and development of the scientific method which, as Whitehead has demonstrated, made the nineteenth century rival the seventeenth in accomplishment. In short, the western world was living in what had been called the "Century of Hope."

No such cheery phrase can be applied to the world of our time. On the contrary, Arnold Toynbee has described it as the "Time of Troubles," an age in which the idea of progress has been replaced by the fatalistic belief that change may only bring decay and destruction. Europe has more nearly attained the nation-state than at any time in its history but it has also learned at a frightful cost what a hellish force nationalism based upon racialism may become. It knows that nationalism cannot be exterminated unless the nation is groping for a wider conception which may harmonize cultural and social expressions of nationalism with a larger political and economic unit than the nation-state. With its European Economic Commission of eighteen states, including the U.S.S.R., established in Geneva, its organization for European Economic Cooperation for seventeen states including Western Germany in Paris, its Permanent Organ of the Consultative Council of five states of Western Europe located in London, the troubled continent is entering upon an era of consolidation that will certainly not come as quickly as its most ardent advocates would wish but is in the making. The Congress of Europe which assembled in the Hague a few weeks ago, was more accurately a congress of Europeans, as one observer pointed out, but it was more than a meeting of visionaries and exiles. With a Churchill as honorary chairman and political leaders from a dozen countries participating in its discussions, its resolutions reached a certain measure of importance that can not be casually dismissed. What
impelled the men of the Hague to debate the federation of Europe was not only a sense of community but a feeling of desperation. The five million ghosts of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and the Ghetto of Warsaw, the unfortunates of London or Hiroshima obliterated by a V2 or an atom bomb, are silent witnesses to the thin crust of our civilization. It is no wonder that science which once gave man a sense of exhilaration and excessive self-confidence has now made him the most uneasy of animals. He has begun to feel as the French scientist, and Nobel Prize winner, De Broglie has said that "the progress of our civilization, like our individual lives, seems to resemble a daily struggle with the certainty of final defeat." If Science no longer offers comfort, even to its own, Communism has also no gift of consolation except for those who have surrendered all power of analysis and criticism. Those who claim to be the only true heirs of Marx direct a state which, far from withering away, has become the Great Leviathan of our time. What Leon Blum calls their "idolatrous fanaticism" has made the Soviet Union the exponent of a new imperialism which Prime Minister Attlee charged in a broadcast with being far more intolerant of opposition than the kings and emperors of a century ago. Apparently Soviet rulers do not believe that individual liberty and social justice can walk arm in arm and in the name of the latter destroy the former. As a result of their present tactics, of which the manifestos issued by the Cominform are an illustration, men of the most widely different points of view are being unwillingly driven into the same camp. Bevin and Franco, the Pope and Bertrand Russell, the President of the National Association of Manufacturers in the United States and Professor Laski are unexpected comrades.

And yet the man of 1848 and the man of 1948 have much in common. Both are conscious of injustice and eager to remedy it. Both refuse to be passive victims of a society which does not offer them the good life to which they feel man is entitled. In the struggles of 1848 the lack of wise leadership and the absence of unity of purpose brought to naught the hopes and aspirations of millions. Will that be the verdict of the future historian upon the struggles of our time?


3. M. Halton, "Victory for the Vatican" (Maclean's Magazine, June 1, 1948, 60).


10. A contemporary writer estimated the racial percentages about 1850 as follows: German 23, Czechoslovak 19, Magyar 14, Italian, Ruthene and Rumanian 8 each, Polish 7, Serb 5, Slovene and Croat 4 each. Namier, *1848*, 101.


15. Trevelyan has commented on Kossuth that "it may be doubted whether any man since Robespierre did so much injury to the Liberal cause."

16. Croce quotes the saying of the Austrian poet that "Austria was in Radetzky's camp" as an exact definition and historical condemnation of the empire. See Benedetto Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1934), 186.

17. As Namier puts it "... nationality, the passionate breed of the intellectuals invades the politics of Central and East-Central Europe and with 1848 starts the Great European War of every nation against its neighbours." Namier, *1848*, 33.
