THE CHINESE IN CANADA

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Canada's Ethnic Groups  Canadian Historical Association
CANADA'S ETHNIC GROUPS

Published by the Canadian Historical Association with the support of the Multiculturalism Program, Government of Canada.

Ottawa, 1985

Booklet No. 9

Printed by Keystone Printing & Lithographing Ltd., Saint John, N.B.
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Distribution of the people of CHINESE ORIGIN in Canada, 1981

Source: Statistics Canada
THE CHINESE IN CANADA

I — The Chinese Background

Not all immigrants have been equally welcome to Canada but the Chinese were long the least popular and, over time, the most harshly treated. Before 1947 discriminatory immigration laws made it impossible for all but a handful of Chinese men to establish families while other discriminatory laws — often also experienced by other Asian immigrants — severely limited the economic opportunities of Chinese and deprived them of many civil rights. Only after World War II did Canada repeal these discriminatory laws. Thereafter, a very different Chinese society appeared. Chinatowns ceased to be run-down ghettos largely inhabited by single men, who allegedly gambled and smoked opium between working in low-paid seasonal and menial jobs, and became lively commercial districts, attracting tourists and catering to the trade of Chinese families who lived in various parts of the cities and whose breadwinners were as likely to be employed in business or the professions as in less skilled work.

The original Chinese migrants were part of a great overseas diaspora that resulted from the convergence of two major historical forces: a rural crisis in China and Western imperialism. The unprecedented population growth of the High Qing pax sinica put an enormous strain on the land. During the eighteenth century, China's population more than doubled in size to about 313 million; by 1850, it totalled 430 million. The population pressure was especially acute in the south. In the southeastern province of Guangdong, the origin of about 70 per cent of the overseas Chinese in the nineteenth century, the population reached 31 million by the end of the Qing dynasty (1911) and the average density was some 600 persons per square kilometer. The early emigrants to Canada came mainly from Sanyi (Sam-yap) and Siyi (Sze-yap) in the Pearl River delta in southern Guangdong. [For convenience's sake, the Pinyin transliteration of Chinese names is given followed by the traditionally used name in parentheses.] With the coastal lowlands largely comprised of swamps or salty plains and the rocky, hilly interior susceptible to drought and flooding, less than 10 per cent of the land was arable. Continual fragmentation of plots and unequal distribution of land aggravated the land shortage. Rather than employ landless peasants, landowners preferred to rent their land to tenant farmers to insure a more reliable return. Since the Chinese did not practice primogeniture, their plots became progressively smaller with each generation.

Western capitalist expansion, especially the tea and opium trades which drained the local economy of specie (silver), brought on deflation and a recession so severe that the south became fertile ground for the Taiping Rebellion. Moreover, the West's forcible opening of the Chinese market and the loss of Chinese tariff autonomy seriously upset the domestic textile industry. The influx of cheap, machine-made foreign cloth of good quality slowed the development of local industry and all but ruined the cottage industry which had provided peasant families with a source of extra income. Migration, whether it be to the new weaving centres of the cities or overseas, offered an opportunity to enhance the family economy.

As western pressures on China provided a “push” for emigrants, they also
provided a “pull”. The Qing government had long banned emigration but, under foreign pressure, China concluded emigration treaties with Britain and France in 1860 and with the United States in 1868 although it did not totally lift emigration restrictions until 1893. The desire of the western powers for cheap labour to replace slaves stimulated the infamous coolie trade. Strictly speaking, coolies were indentured labourers and they were not employed in Canada, but in common North American usage the term “coolie” applied to any cheap, unskilled labour. Although a few emigrants came to North America as “free” men, that is, they were not indebted to outsiders but had borrowed their passage and head tax money from relatives, the majority used the “credit-ticket” system. A labour contractor paid their passage in advance and recovered his investment by hiring out his gang of labourers. Despite the tumult in China, the Chinese emigrated with the intention of returning.

Overseas emigration was an economic enterprise in which the male members of the jia participated to improve its material condition and prestige. A highly malleable institution, the jia could comprise only the conjugal unit of a single household or could include the extended family living in more than one household or dispersed across the ocean. The overseas Chinese contributed generously to the building of schools, the construction of roads and the maintenance of public works. Even during his absence, the emigrant retained his sense of belonging to the family, his share of the corporate family property, and the opportunity to return to the care of the family upon retirement or in difficult times. Yet no matter how strong the bonds of kinship, they could not overcome the emigrant’s loneliness.

The emigrants left their villages while in their teens or twenties. They returned to marry and sire children, but the vicissitudes of emigrant life left many too poor to afford periodic visits home. Although a large number never saw their homeland again, they never stopped thinking of themselves as migrants. The few well-to-do with families in Canada frequently sent their children back to the villages for education. Indeed, if a prosperous “married bachelor” took a second wife in Canada, he could send his sons, legitimate in Chinese custom and law, back to his family. Until after World War II, the distinctive feature of the Chinese community in Canada was its overwhelming maleness. The head tax and the 1923 exclusion legislation made family reunification difficult and then, impossible. Elsewhere in the Chinese diaspora, emigrants might overcome loneliness by practising the socially accepted custom of concubinage, a form of cohabitation without benefit of marriage. But social pressure against conjugal unions with white women and the scarcity of Chinese women prevented most Chinese in Canada from taking this course. Even the number of Chinese prostitutes in Canada was small. In the few cases where Chinese in Canada did take second “wives”, serious complications arose if their original wives immigrated from China. Few Chinese women ventured overseas alone. In China, women were not brought up to lead an independent life. As daughters they were regarded as an economic burden and, in hard times, might be victims of infanticide or of sale into bondage as servant girls, concubines or prostitutes. Wives, in contrast, were always an economic asset. Village women might earn cash in cottage industries or in the weaving workshops but the main role of the wife, who might have been betrothed as young as eight, was to take care of her aging
parents-in-law, her children, and her household. Because of this narrowly defined role, few Chinese wives accompanied their husbands overseas. Those Chinese wives who came to Canada experienced a more difficult life than in China since they could not share household duties with in-laws or servants.

Although a wife might work in her husband’s business, a Chinese businessman was more likely to bring male relatives, especially sons or boys he claimed as sons, to assist him. These newcomers reinforced the ties of kinship and community which played a vital role in the immigrant’s life and the social organization of Chinatowns. Business partnerships and credit associations were often formed within the bounds of kin group and village. Because of the workings of chain migration, certain communities in Canada contained a preponderance of a particular clan. During the 1880s, the Lis of Taishan were concentrated in Victoria, Savona’s Ferry and Yale while the Zhous of Kaiping and Xinhui congregated at Quesnellmouth. Suspicious of an unsympathetic public, the Chinese preferred to resolve their problems themselves. During the late nineteenth century, the Zhigongtang (Cheekungtong or CKT), a secret society later known as the Freemasons, was largely responsible for keeping order and providing relief among the Chinese in British Columbia mining and railway construction camps. In 1884, as work on the Canadian Pacific Railway neared completion, Victoria merchants, with the help of the Chinese consul in San Francisco, established the Chinese Benevolent Association to deal with mass unemployment. Even after China began opening consulates in Canada in 1908, the Association continued to provide relief, work and schools, to aid those accused of wrongdoing, to supply return passage to China for the aged, and to defend the community against external threats.

The Chinese community was made up of a small merchant elite, a larger class of petty businessmen, and a substantial working class. Leadership came from the business classes who usually represented their compatriots before the government and the host society, looked after welfare needs, and organized mutual help associations, the earliest and simplest of which were the jiefang or street associations, ad hoc groups formed to organize special events or deal with specific issues. In smaller communities, the general merchant, who catered to both a Chinese and non-Chinese clientele, exercised enormous influence. As well as supplying staple and specialty foods, he was often a labour contractor. Like his counterpart in larger cities, he sometimes exploited his countrymen but he also grub-staked the hard-luck prospector, tided over the unemployed, provided credit for gamblers, and acted as a banker, deducting debt payments from pay packets, establishing future credits, and remitting money to families in China. Indeed, the exigencies of emigrant life and segregation from the wider Canadian society required co-operation among the Chinese, who formed their own trade associations and labour unions. Men with the same surname or county of origin established their own clan or district associations to provide lodging, assistance in finding employment, relief in hard times, and financial aid for burials. These associations eventually became constituents of such all-inclusive bodies as the Chinese Benevolent Association, while in smaller communities the CKT assumed many of the same responsibilities.

Although the Chinese community displayed solidarity in time of crisis, it was not monolithic. Local clan rivalries sometimes developed into bitter strife,
especially in smaller centres. Between 1880 and 1910, for example, the Lee clan of Heshan (Hok-san) tried to exclude other Chinese from Winnipeg. Where no clan was strong enough to dominate, as in the Maritimes, violence sometimes erupted. Political factionalism also created deep and lasting rifts. In Chinatown politics, personality was more important than ideology. The common man was little more than a spectator and he was wise not to associate too closely with a particular side since his livelihood might depend on his allegiance.

The Chinese keenly followed events in China. The shock of unexpected defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894-95, and the subsequent humiliation of making concessions to the treaty powers pushed China into a path of radical political change. How to accomplish national regeneration became a contentious issue. Revolutionaries, reformers, and Qing emissaries courted the overseas Chinese and, imbued with a deep sense of patriotism, the Canadian Chinese were receptive. Since the most prosperous and established Chinese in Canada were familiar with Western political institutions, they favoured the course advocated by reformers who wanted a Constitutional Monarchy. Before 1905, the Empire Reform Association enjoyed the support of the Canadian CKT, whose parent organization, committed to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, was outlawed in China. With the arrival of the revolutionaries, including Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), who visited Canada three times before the Revolution of 1911, the CKT broke ranks with the reformers, aligned itself with Sun’s movement and threw its weight behind the revolutionary cause. The CKT contributed heavily to Sun’s ventures and even mortgaged its Victoria headquarters and its Toronto branch to raise funds. The alliance between Sun and the CKT, however, deteriorated rapidly after the Revolution when the CKT felt betrayed by Sun as his new party, the Guomindang (KMT), seemed to reap the major share of titles and offices. The two parties broke ranks, and the CKT made common cause with the conservative Constitutionalist party (the former Empire Reform Association). This split intensified the competition for power, prestige and leadership within the Chinese community in Canada.

The 1911 Revolution brought official recognition to the overseas Chinese. By virtue of their number, their social, economic and political influence, especially their role in the overthrow of the monarchy, the Chinese government came to recognize the hua qiao, overseas Chinese, as a distinct entity. Once considered unfilial sons who, by abandoning their ancestral home, were unworthy of the Emperor’s protection, the overseas Chinese became an accepted part of Chinese society and their residence was officially approved and protected. Based on the concept of jus sanguinis, nationality by blood, the hua qiao was a Chinese national by birth and cultural heritage. Such a definition reinforced his sense of “Chineseness”, and raised questions about his loyalty to his adopted country.

II — The Chinese Community in Canada to 1923

A few Chinese may have visited Vancouver Island during the late eighteenth-century trans-Pacific fur trade but the first Chinese to stay were lured by the Fraser River gold rush. Some came in 1858 with the initial gold seekers from California; others followed from Hong Kong and China. Several hundred remained in Victoria supplying provisions to the gold fields or acting as labour contractors. By the summer of 1860, approximately 4,000 Chinese resided in the
new mainland colony of British Columbia, but their numbers fluctuated with the prosperity of the mines. By 1866 when gold fever was declining the governor estimated the Chinese population at 1,705. Most engaged in placer mining, an activity requiring limited capital investment, and confined themselves to diggings abandoned or sold by white men as being no longer profitable. Others provided such services as the growing and sale of fresh vegetables, the cutting of cord wood, and the operation of laundries and restaurants. In the colonial era the Chinese seldom competed with white men for jobs and, like the white miners, they were transients who moved about as they learned of new gold finds. Thus, they shared with the majority of white residents the image of being sojourners who had come to make their fortunes but not to stay. Although they mingled little with white society and experienced the anti-Chinese prejudices white men brought with them from California and Australia, in colonial British Columbia they enjoyed full legal equality.

As the gold fields petered out, the Chinese found employment as domestic servants, mainly in Victoria, as coal miners’ helpers at Nanaimo, and as seasonal workers in the new Fraser River salmon canning industry. Employers generally liked Chinese labour because it was cheap and reliable; the public did not. Responding to claims that the Chinese could not assimilate, were “unfair” competition in the work place, and drained money from the country, the provincial legislature in 1878 unanimously decided that henceforth Chinese should not be employed on provincial public works. This policy, introduced in anticipation of the immigration of thousands of Chinese to build the Canadian Pacific Railway, remained in effect until after World War II. The Chinese were in no position to protest politically; in 1872 the provincial legislature had disfranchised them, allegedly because unscrupulous politicians might exploit them as a bloc vote, particularly in the Cariboo where they formed a significant part of the non-native population. The prospect of an influx of Chinese railway builders after Confederation angered white British Columbians. One British Columbia Member of Parliament suggested forbidding the railway company to employ anyone whose hair was more than five and a half inches long (most Chinese wore a queue or pigtail prior to 1911 as a symbol of submission to the Manchus), but the government of John A. Macdonald permitted Andrew Onderdonk, a contractor for the C.P.R., to import Chinese workers. Between 1881 and 1884 as many as 17,000 Chinese came to British Columbia. Over half came directly from China; a substantial portion of the rest from the United States. About 1,500 died of disease or accidents, an unknown number crossed illegally into the United States, and many (about 1,000 in 1885) returned to China. Their herculean efforts in doing the basic pick and shovel work of building the railway through the difficult Fraser Canyon have become an esteemed part of Chinese Canadian history.

As the C.P.R. neared completion, the Chinese sought other work. Although Vancouver Island’s white coal miners had gladly employed Chinese helpers, in 1883, after the largest colliery hired Chinese strike-breakers, they began a long crusade to ban the employment underground of Chinese who earned less than half the daily wage of white miners. With limited and contradictory evidence, white miners claimed the Chinese were unsafe workers. Given the bitterness of the coal miners and the prospects of thousands of unemployed railway builders
roaming the countryside, the provincial government encouraged the Chinese to leave. In 1884 it imposed a $10 head tax on all Chinese; it banned such Chinese customs as the exhumation of bodies for shipment back to China and the non-medical use of opium; it attempted to force Chinese to adopt a more expensive standard of living by requiring dwellings to provide a minimum number of cubic feet for every resident; it denied Chinese the opportunity to acquire Crown land; and, it prohibited Chinese immigration. The legislators knew the courts were likely to declare these measures ultra vires but they succeeded in their goal of attracting Ottawa’s attention. Prime Minister Macdonald, who regarded the Chinese as “an inferior race”, appointed a Royal Commission which heard many lurid tales of immorality, filth and overcrowding in Chinatowns but could not agree on the desirability of halting the immigration of Chinese whose labour was desired by many employers. Nevertheless, the federal government, realizing that large numbers of Chinese were no longer required, imposed a $50 head tax on all Chinese entering Canada after 1 January 1886.

The head tax only temporarily reduced Chinese immigration to a few hundred per year. Employment opportunities in the expanding provincial economy in the 1890s and the possibility of entering the United States illegally drew several thousand immigrants annually. As the number of immigrants rose, so did opposition to them. In 1900 the Laurier government announced it would raise the head tax to $100 and appointed a Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, which concluded that the Chinese were “obnoxious to a free community and dangerous to the state”. In 1904, the government raised the head tax to $500, a sum which almost halted Chinese immigration until 1908 when an expanding economy, rising wages, and limitations on Japanese immigration made it worthwhile for labour contractors in Canada to advance head tax money to Chinese immigrants. Between 1913 and 1918, depression and war reversed the trend and encouraged many Chinese to leave Canada but, in 1919, partly in anticipation of a post war boom which did not develop, more Chinese entered than left. In 1923, in response to pressure from across Canada, the federal government replaced the head tax with a new Chinese Immigration Act which effectively prohibited Chinese immigration until its repeal in 1947.

By the early years of the twentieth century, Chinese were residing in all parts of Canada. In 1891, only 219 Chinese lived east of the Rockies; by 1911, about 30 per cent of Canada’s Chinese population of 27,774 lived there; and by 1921 the proportion had risen to 40 per cent of the total of 39,587. Despite the imposition in 1906 of a $300 head tax and regulations limiting the number of Chinese immigrants each ship could carry, a handful of Chinese even settled in Newfoundland. East of the Rockies the Chinese faced fewer civil disabilities than in British Columbia but their motives for moving eastward appear to have been largely economic since they found opportunities to establish small businesses or to work in the service trades. Because most Chinese were unencumbered by families, moving was easier for them than for the Japanese. By 1911 both Montreal and Toronto had recognizable Chinatowns with a population of about 1,000 each. Small numbers of Chinese also settled in Kingston, North Bay and other cities but the Chinese were most noticeable in prairie cities and towns where they often dominated the laundry and restaurant business. Where there were only a few Chinese, the white population was generally tolerant, if not
### TABLE I
**CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Chinese Immigration</th>
<th>% of Total Canadian Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858-85</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-90</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-95</td>
<td>11,237</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-00</td>
<td>15,108</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-05</td>
<td>16,384</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-10</td>
<td>7,101</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-15</td>
<td>24,858</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-20</td>
<td>7,385</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-25</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>11,143</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-60</td>
<td>9,747</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>11,785</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70*</td>
<td>33,618</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>56,713</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*After 1967 statistics were kept according to country of former residence or citizenship rather than by ethnic origin. Thus, by excluding many of the overseas Chinese, the statistics may underestimate the number of ethnic Chinese arrivals.

### TABLE II:
**PEOPLE OF CHINESE ORIGIN IN CANADA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Chinese Population</th>
<th>% of Canadian Population</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>4,383</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>9,129</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>16,375(^1)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>27,774</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>26,813</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>39,587</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>37,163</td>
<td>2,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>46,519</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>43,051</td>
<td>3,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>34,627</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>30,713</td>
<td>3,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>32,528</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>25,669</td>
<td>6,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>58,197</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>36,075</td>
<td>22,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>118,815</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>62,805</td>
<td>56,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(^2)</td>
<td>289,245</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>146,330</td>
<td>142,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. This figure was later adjusted to 17,312 by using the base on which 1911 and subsequent figures were calculated.

2. 1981 figures are based on a sample which allowed for multiple responses concerning ethnic origin.
hospitable, but as the Chinese moved eastward, Canadians became increasingly susceptible to anti-Chinese propaganda emanating from the west coast.

Antipathy to the Chinese was expressed in many ways ranging from petty insults such as the use of the derogatory term “Chink” and the refusal of public cemeteries to accept Chinese corpses, to violent incidents such as the 1887 Vancouver riot against the employment of Chinese land clearing crews, an 1892 mob attack on Calgary’s Chinese laundries after a smallpox outbreak, and the major 1907 Vancouver riot protesting all Asian immigration. The authorities usually attempted to protect the Chinese from physical violence but continued to discriminate against them. In statutes incorporating railway and mining companies, British Columbia regularly inserted clauses against the employment of the Chinese or Japanese. Saskatchewan disfranchised the Chinese in 1908. Provincial disfranchisement denied the Chinese the federal vote and the opportunity to participate in occupations such as law whose professional associations demanded that members be registered voters. In addition, at the turn of the century, the British Columbia government almost annually passed so-called Natal Acts, immigration laws with a language test designed to keep out Asians. Just as regularly the federal government disallowed them because they interfered with federal powers and upset Britain’s ally, Japan. Nevertheless, the federal government was prepared to limit Chinese immigration because China was so diplomatically weak. It would be misleading to single out Canadians for their antipathy to the Chinese. No matter where the Chinese went during the latter half of the nineteenth century, they were rebuffed. In the 1850s, the Australian colonies began erecting a “great white wall” to halt further Chinese immigration and the United States passed a Chinese exclusion act in 1882.

Few opponents of the Chinese ever expressed a simple reason for their belief that Chinese immigration should be halted. While many Canadians regarded the Chinese, other Asians and even certain Europeans as an economic and social threat to Canadian society as they wanted it to be, they had a special fear that they could easily be overwhelmed by unrestricted Chinese competition. This fear was stimulated by the fact that the number of Chinese immigrants often seemed greater than it actually was. Immigration did not occur at a steady pace but the public only seemed to notice when the influx was large. Moreover, the number of Chinese arriving at Vancouver and Victoria, the main ports of entry, was inflated by those en route to the Caribbean or returning from visits home. Many Chinese did not remain permanently. Although 55,787 Chinese paid the head tax between 1886 and 1911, the total Chinese population of Canada in 1911 was only 27,774. Many critics of the Chinese, especially in the nineteenth century, bitterly complained of these sojourning habits which, they claimed, drained money from the country. In fact, sojourning Chinese played a useful role as surplus labour in boom times, especially in seasonal or short term work such as fish canning, agriculture and land clearing.

Contrary to popular perceptions, the Chinese were not a docile work force. In 1881, railway construction crews rioted when a labour contractor tried to take a higher commission from their wages. Laundry workers also occasionally struck their Chinese employers for better wages and working conditions. Chinese also protested mistreatment by the white community. In 1878 they stopped work
after the provincial government attempted to require them to buy a $10 quarterly license just because they were Chinese. Similarly, after the 1907 Vancouver Riot, Chinese expressed their indignation by retiring for almost a week to Chinatown, thus depriving hotels, saloons, private homes, steamers, logging camps and lumber mills of their labour. Although individual Chinese also quit work to protest intolerable working conditions such as those often found during the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, on only three occasions did Chinese attack a white foreman who ignored their safety. Strikes of car loaders in the Nanaimo coal mines in 1867 and in the Cariboo gold mines and Victoria kitchens in the late 1860s and early 1870s had limited success but Chinese workers gradually recognized the importance of leadership, organization and discipline in using the strike as an effective industrial weapon. The formation in 1916 of the Chinese Labour Association, a non-partisan organization committed to workers’ rights and “the abolition of the capitalist system”, fused political radicalism and labour militancy. One of the most important tests of the new organization came in 1919 when Vancouver area shingle mill owners attempted to roll back wages. The Chinese, who dominated the industry, refused the pay cut, formed the industry-wide Shingle Workers’ Association and, after a forty day strike, preserved their wage levels. While most white workers saw the Chinese as a threat, a minority, especially those associated with such radical groups as the One Big Union, co-operated occasionally in campaigns for better wages and working conditions.

Although concern about uncontrolled Chinese immigration was nation-wide, most complaints about the “unfair” competition of cheap Chinese labour arose in British Columbia. Whether or not the competition was “unfair” is a matter of judgment. Chinese labourers usually earned less than whites, especially in the lumber industry which became the largest employer of Chinese in the province. To push Asians out of the mills, in 1926 a provincial Male Minimum Wage Act set 40 cents per hour as the minimum wage. Since that sum was several cents per hour more than the rates usually paid to Asians, who were perceived as less efficient workers, it effectively reduced the percentage of Asians employed in the industry. Traditionally, trade unions led much of the agitation against the Chinese. As early as the 1890s, labour organizations in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Brantford and Winnipeg joined their west coast brothers in protesting Chinese immigration. Until the 1920s the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada regularly passed anti-Chinese resolutions. As the Chinese moved into new lines of endeavour, new voices protested. Retail trade is a good example. Almost from their first arrival in British Columbia, Chinese farmers sold produce through Chinese door to door peddlers. As long as the trade was small, it was more a convenience for white housewives than competition for white storekeepers. During and after World War I, Chinese and Japanese opened small stores in white neighbourhoods in Vancouver and Victoria to sell fresh vegetables, often purchased from Chinese wholesalers and grown by Chinese market gardeners. Fearing that this process might be repeated across Canada and extended into other areas, the Retail Merchants Association of Canada lobbied for Parliamentary support of the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923.

Arguments for Chinese exclusion based solely on economic considerations
had a narrow base; moral arguments had widespread appeal. Ontario, Saskatchew an and Manitoba preceded British Columbia in forbidding Chinese to employ white women lest Chinese introduce them to opium and sell them into white slavery. Such laws, of course, also handicapped Chinese restaurateurs who operated western-style cafes. These laws, which were not always enforced, fitted well with the popular conception of Chinatowns as unsanitary, crowded places of iniquity.

For most white Canadians, Chinatowns were mysterious places. Apart from those who went there for nefarious purposes, the only white men to visit Chinatowns regularly were Christian missionaries, health and fire inspectors, police, and newspaper reporters looking for sensational stories. Christian missionaries, chiefly Methodists and Presbyterians but including some Anglicans and Roman Catholics, established social service agencies such as rescue homes for Chinese prostitutes, kindergartens and English language schools in the larger Chinatowns. Their work was often associated with overseas endeavours and the missionaries, some of whom had worked in China, developed a good rapport with their Chinese congregations. Chinese and white lay members of the same denominations, however, seldom came in contact and many self-proclaimed Christians were among the most active in calling for rigid regulations to keep Canada white. The Christian churches had limited success in making Chinese converts; in 1923 only about 10 per cent of the Chinese claimed to be Christian. The churches were equally unsuccessful in ending the reputation of the Chinese as gamblers and opium smokers.

Governments were also concerned about these evils. Although most gambling was illegal, the authorities may have recognized that the Chinese community used gambling profits to support social services, since police raids occurred infrequently and the fines imposed were more like license fees than punishments. Far more serious was the use of opium. When Mackenzie King, the deputy Minister of Labour, investigated Chinese damage claims after the 1907 Vancouver riot, he was shocked that the Canadian government would be obliged to compensate for damages to two legitimate opium factories. Despite a 1908 law prohibiting the non-medical use of opium, the drug trade continued and the Chinese seemed at its centre. In the 1920s, a national campaign against its evils and the corruption of young white people, especially women, led to stricter laws and enforcement and strengthened the campaign for Chinese exclusion. As well, throughout Canada, health and fire inspectors described Chinatowns as places where people lived "like sewer rats, a grave danger to the white man's health" and where laundries and restaurants were "filthy and unsanitary". However, apart from two smallpox outbreaks in 1892, few cases of disease were ever traced to the Chinese. Repeated inspections and the enforcement of building by-laws in the large Pacific coast cities gradually improved conditions, but the image of filthy Chinese, promoted in part by white laundry owners, contributed to the popular impression that low living standards enabled the Chinese to compete unfairly and endangered public health.

Evidence about uncleanness also fed the argument that the Chinese were incapable of assimilation. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what white Canadians did think about the Chinese by the twentieth century since much of their rhetoric was directed against Orientals (a derogatory term) or Asians in general.
Nevertheless, no white Canadian seriously questioned the notion that Canada must remain a white man's country. Canadians had long been aware of Social Darwinism and of popular ideas in the United States which suggested that, when two distinct races existed side by side, one would drive out the other or they would merge to form a bastard race in which the lower would dominate. H.H. Stevens, a long-time Vancouver Conservative Member of Parliament, believed the matter was essentially an economic problem but advised Parliament in 1922 that "the two races are distinct in type, in tradition, in ideas, in their whole outlook on life". The prevalence across the country of such attitudes led to the Chinese exclusion law of 1923, an event which the Chinese in Canada were to mark annually as "Humiliation Day".

III — The Era of Exclusion, 1923-1947

After 1923, hostility against the Chinese waned as the new immigration law effectively ended immigration. The Mackenzie King government had framed the 1923 act to satisfy exclusionists while making a minimal gesture towards protecting China's honour and preserving good relations for traders and missionaries. Thus, the Act permitted Chinese who had entered Canada under the head tax regulation to return after visits to China and allowed Canadian-born Chinese to return to Canada. The Act also provided special permits for diplomats, clergymen, teachers, actors, importers and exporters, and tourists but the qualifications were so stringent that only eight immigrants were admitted between 1924 and 1946. The virtual cessation of Chinese immigration, the aging of the predominately male population, and the permanent return of many to China, especially after the onset of the Depression, meant that xenophobic Canadians could no longer argue that the Chinese might take over the country. Moreover, despite the shortage of jobs and sporadic calls for better enforcement of laws preventing Chinese from employing white women, for the dismissal of Chinese seamen employed on Canadian subsidized lines, and for the strict application of marketing laws to Chinese vegetable growers, there was little overt objection to Chinese economic competition in the 1930s. Legislation, at least in British Columbia, had finally driven the Chinese out of the jobs in which they were most likely to compete with white men. As well, the trade unions, though not very strong in the 1920s and 1930s, decided that organizing Chinese workers would put them in a better position to bargain for higher wages. Changes in the federal Opium and Narcotic Drug Act in 1923 and stricter enforcement undercut a major source of allegations about Chinese immorality and demonstrated that the Chinese were not the only Canadians engaged in the illegal drug trade. Yet the decline in complaints about the Chinese brought them few immediate benefits. When some Chinese societies could not meet demands for aid during the Depression, the Chinese who applied to government relief agencies were refused assistance or granted it at a lower scale than white men.

Although the Chinese population still included a disproportionate number of older, single men, its composition was slowly changing. A small Canadian-born population, in which there was a normal distribution of the sexes, was growing up. They had been educated in Canadian schools and were fluent in English (or, in a few cases, in French). As well, many immigrants were also assimilating to Can-
adian society. Except in British Columbia where naturalization conferred few advantages, even if judges would grant it, the number of Chinese seeking naturalization increased. Many of the Canadian-born and the naturalized also adopted Christian religions; in 1941 about 30 per cent professed Christianity. Except in British Columbia, Chinese began to appear as white collar workers, skilled tradesmen and professionals as well as in the traditional service trades. Despite the apparent assimilation of some Chinese into the broader Canadian community, Chinese organizations remained active and many Chinese retained close links with their homeland. Family visits continued and the KMT government, through its consulates, took considerable interest in the Chinese in Canada by assisting schools and other cultural institutions and by arranging for Chinese from Canada to sit in the Chinese National Assembly, although not all Chinese favoured the KMT.

Ironically, World War II, which caused so much suffering in China, ultimately benefitted the Chinese in Canada. Sympathy for China had been developing since the Manchurian Crisis in 1931; after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it grew rapidly. Although only a few British Columbians initially joined local Chinese in boycotting Japanese imports, by 1938 the Red Cross and the League of Nations Society were collecting funds for the relief of Chinese victims of the Sino-Japanese war. Early in 1942, the provincial government returned firearms to Canadian-born and naturalized Chinese who, along with the Japanese, had been required to surrender them in August 1940 when racial feelings were high. Service clubs in several British Columbia centres organized Chinese appreciation events to show support for China's "gallant struggle" against Japanese aggression. Chinese and white women co-operated in raising funds for war relief. When Madame Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) visited Ottawa in 1943, she was treated as a heroine.

When the European war started in 1939, a few Chinese Canadians volunteered for service in the Canadian army but, lest they use war service as an argument for the franchise in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, the federal government decided not to call up any Asians. In 1941, a federal government Committee investigating racial tension in British Columbia concluded that the approximately 22,000 Chinese there did "not constitute a serious problem because their numbers were decreasing, because their economic competitive strength is restricted, because their nation was traditionally and is today particularly popular in North America, and because they accept discriminatory treatment with a minimum of expressed resentment". In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, some Chinese found it useful to wear badges or display signs in shop windows proclaiming they were Chinese, not Japanese.

During the war, racial prejudice became unfashionable. Many discriminatory practices were eliminated including such petty insults as a Vancouver Parks Board rule that Chinese could swim in the Crystal Pool only during a specified two hour period each week. The federal government allowed Chinese to claim dependents in China for income tax purposes; Saskatchewan restored the franchise to Chinese in 1944; a few Chinese volunteers were granted commissions in the Canadian army; and, in 1944, the army began calling up eligible Chinese for military service. In British Columbia, several Chinese organizations, notably the newly-formed China-Canada Association, successfully used compulsory mili-
tary service as an argument for the franchise. Early in 1945, British Columbia, without controversy, enfranchised all persons who had served in the Canadian armed forces in either World War. This included about 50 Chinese veterans of World War I and another 400 or so currently serving. Two years later, the provincial legislature enfranchised Chinese and East Indians and lifted the racial barriers to certain professions. Thus, by 1947, even in British Columbia, Chinese Canadians could become full-fledged Canadian citizens with almost all the rights of other Canadians.

The one serious limitation on Chinese concerned immigration. Since the 1930s the Canadian government had been reconsidering its exclusion policy, as exporters, transportation interests, Canadian diplomats, and Christian missionaries informed Ottawa that the exclusion act severely impeded trade and missionary work in China. In response, the government made it easier for merchants’ wives and students to enter. The Department of External Affairs also considered replacing exclusion with a reciprocity agreement. Since few Canadians desired to emigrate to China the arrangement would limit Chinese immigration without seeming discriminatory. Soon after the Pacific war began, Canada and China exchanged ministers and Department of External Affairs officials revived the idea of working out a mutually agreeable immigration arrangement but concern for public opinion in British Columbia and China’s opposition to any special arrangement delayed action. During the war Chinese organizations throughout Canada, individually but in an obviously co-ordinated campaign, petitioned for a new law to allow the entry of wives and children of Chinese living in Canada. The Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, a Toronto-based group composed of both Chinese and whites and closely associated with the United Church of Canada, joined Chinese groups in arguing that separating families was “contrary to all principles of humanity, morality and social welfare” and violated the human rights provisions of the United Nations charter.

Although some British Columbia Members of Parliament briefly opposed the relaxation of Chinese immigration restrictions, the provincial press and public generally welcomed the January 1947 announcement that the 1923 Act would be repealed. The Vancouver Province, praised the policy of removing “discrimination against a great and friendly nation” while reassuring its readers that because of the selective nature of the new Chinese immigration law there would not be a flood of new Chinese. The policy was indeed selective; only Chinese who were Canadian citizens could bring in their wives and minor children. Either because they saw themselves as sojourners or because they saw few advantages to naturalization, in 1940 only about five per cent of the Chinese in Canada were Canadian citizens or British subjects.

IV — The Chinese in Post-War Canada

The new Chinese Immigration Act and Order in Council P.C. 2115, which governed Chinese immigration policy from 1947 to the 1960s, underscored the government’s determination to maintain the racial character of Canadian society. Despite appeals from such disparate organizations as the Chinese Benevolent Association and the Canadian Labour Congress, the government only slightly revised the policy by raising the age of children eligible for admission
from 18 to 21 (or 25 in the case of unmarried children). For the Chinese this policy was hard to accept since Canada seemed to be opening her doors widely to immigrants from Europe and especially refugees from Eastern Europe. Moreover, after the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Chinese Canadians were uncertain about the welfare of their families and understandably anxious to get their relatives out of China. Canada still held out the promise of a better life but post-war immigration was no longer a means to an end but an end in itself. Since the material aspirations of many Chinese Canadians clashed with the collective ideals of the new regime in China, they realized that, for better or worse, their future lay in their adopted country.

To circumvent immigration barriers, some Chinese resorted to illegal schemes. Extensive investigations in Hong Kong uncovered an illegal ring working to get immigrants into the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some Latin American countries. On the morning of 24 May 1960, the R.C.M.P., assisted by the Hong Kong police, simultaneously raided Chinese homes, businesses and organizations across the country, seized records and documents, and arrested 28 persons, of whom 24 were Chinese. Eleven Chinese and one non-Chinese were convicted. The badly shaken Chinese community was much relieved to learn that the government did not intend to "prosecute or deport" those already in the country who had only helped their relatives gain illegal entry. The Chinese Adjustment Statement Program, introduced by the Diefenbaker government in 1962, offered amnesty to illegal immigrants who were not engaged in illegal immigration activity and who were of "good moral character". By 1973, when the program was discontinued, over 12,000 persons had had their status changed. By then the crisis had passed and the new immigration regulations eliminated the last vestiges of racial discrimination.

In 1962, concurrently with the Adjustment Statement Program, the government passed new immigration regulations reducing the importance of the applicant's country of origin. However, not until new regulations, introduced in 1967, screened potential immigrants on a "point system" primarily based on their probable economic contribution to Canada, were the Chinese put on an equal footing with other prospective immigrants. The new system allowed many Chinese families from South America, the Caribbean, southern Africa and Southeast Asia to adopt Canada as their home. With the recognition of the People's Republic in 1970, a few immigrants began to arrive directly from China. During the peak period of immigration, 1972-1978, the overwhelming majority, about 77 per cent, came from Hong Kong, though some may have stopped there only briefly en route from mainland China. Of the remainder, about nine per cent came from Taiwan, five per cent from Malaysia, four per cent from the People's Republic, and the remaining five per cent from elsewhere. The dominance of Hong Kong immigrants continues into the 1980s as the colony, a bastion of free enterprise, will be returned to China after Britain's 99-year lease expires in 1997.

Most of these immigrants were attracted to Canada rather than forced to leave their homelands. Canada was particularly desirable as a place to live, work, and raise families because of its political stability, high standard of living, relative lack of racial tension, and the openness of its educational system. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Atlantic Provinces</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Prairies</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
<th>Northern Territories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (-)</td>
<td>22 (-)</td>
<td>4 (-)</td>
<td>4,350 (99.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>14 (-)</td>
<td>36 (-)</td>
<td>97 (-)</td>
<td>8 (-)</td>
<td>8,910 (97.6)</td>
<td>41 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>138 (-)</td>
<td>982 (6.0)</td>
<td>629 (3.8)</td>
<td>107 (-)</td>
<td>14,201 (86.7)</td>
<td>258 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>233 (-)</td>
<td>1,578 (5.7)</td>
<td>2,766 (10.0)</td>
<td>3,629 (13.0)</td>
<td>19,568 (70.4)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>514 (-)</td>
<td>2,335 (5.8)</td>
<td>5,625 (14.2)</td>
<td>7,579 (19.1)</td>
<td>23,533 (59.4)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>602 (-)</td>
<td>2,750 (5.9)</td>
<td>6,919 (14.9)</td>
<td>9,108 (19.6)</td>
<td>27,139 (58.3)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>569 (-)</td>
<td>2,378 (6.9)</td>
<td>6,143 (17.7)</td>
<td>6,913 (20.0)</td>
<td>18,619 (53.8)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>883 (2.7)</td>
<td>1,904 (5.8)</td>
<td>6,997 (21.7)</td>
<td>6,770 (20.8)</td>
<td>15,933 (49.0)</td>
<td>41 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,399 (2.4)</td>
<td>4,749 (8.1)</td>
<td>15,155 (26.0)</td>
<td>12,533 (21.5)</td>
<td>24,227 (41.6)</td>
<td>134 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,145 (1.8)</td>
<td>11,905 (10.0)</td>
<td>39,325 (33.1)</td>
<td>20,990 (17.6)</td>
<td>44,315 (37.3)</td>
<td>200 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,210 (1.1)</td>
<td>19,260 (6.7)</td>
<td>118,540 (41.0)</td>
<td>50,780 (17.6)</td>
<td>96,915 (33.5)</td>
<td>420 (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chinese firmly believe that education is the means to upward mobility and success. Chinese children are sometimes seen as over-achievers in school, but often those from Chinese-speaking homes, even among the Canadian-born, initially need special language assistance, although after a few years in school, retaining their mother tongue becomes a problem. Many of the post-1967 immigrants had, in fact, been exposed to North American popular culture and lifestyle through television, film and the press and, if not already fluent, had at least a grasp of one of the two official languages upon their arrival in Canada. The post-1967 immigrants invigorated and enriched the Chinese Canadian community as a whole and gave it a cosmopolitan flavour. Most Chinese today do not reside in Chinatowns. Upwardly mobile, they prefer the middle-class lifestyles of suburbs such as the Agincourt district of Toronto where their concentration has stimulated the opening of Chinese restaurants and businesses and leads some residents to suspect the creation of another Chinatown.

Assuredly, not all the new arrivals had quite the same command of their situation. Their experience of adapting to Canadian society varied according to their social background, expectations, educational attainments, marketable skills and, to no small extent, the state of the Canadian economy. The so-called boat people who arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s are a special case and a very diverse group. Ethnically, they include Lao, Khmer, Vietnamese and other people as well as Chinese; economically, among them are urbane professionals, both men and women, once-wealthy businessmen and persons of influence in their own countries as well as poor, illiterate peasants and fisherfolk. Refugees from prolonged war and ethnic strife in Indochina, they often fled in unseaworthy vessels, uncertain of their final destination; untold numbers perished in rough seas or at the hands of pirates. When Canadians heard the desperate pleas of the survivors, thousands joined the government in sponsoring refugees in a touching show of human compassion. Indeed, the warm welcome the "boat people" received from many, but not all, Canadians, sharply contrasted with the reception given to Chinese in earlier decades.

The explanation lies partly in the more tolerant nature of post-war Canada but it also reflects the fact that the Chinese no longer live mainly on the west coast but are settled throughout Canada. Moreover, the nature of Chinese immigrants has changed. While some of the Chinese-speaking still use informal ethnic networks to obtain jobs in such traditional fields as restaurant work, market gardening and sewing, few labour in the primary industries of farming, fishing, lumbering, and mining. Indeed, a relatively large number of Chinese are professionals and self-employed entrepreneurs. The majority of the wage earners are employed in sales, services, and other white collar occupations. Consequently, as in the past, the majority of Chinese reside in large urban centres. In 1981, almost 90,000 lived in Toronto and Vancouver, and some 15-20,000 in each of Montreal, Edmonton and Calgary. Population growth has been most dramatic in Toronto where the Chinese population tripled during the 1970s. Immigrants with capital and/or professional skills prefer to establish themselves where the local economy is relatively resilient to recession and where business and job prospects are good.

With the rise of the welfare state, the government now provides most of the
major services the Chinese community once provided for itself. Community agencies staffed by Chinese-speaking volunteers and professionally-trained social workers help low income earners, the elderly, and new immigrants. While the more established organizations such as the Chinese Benevolent Association and the Chinese Community Centre of Ontario have not lost their relevance, they enjoy neither the pre-eminence nor the influence they once held by virtue of their function as "cultural brokers", and social activists, younger professionals and more recent immigrants have begun to challenge the legitimacy of their claim to speak for the Chinese community. In Vancouver, for example, the Chinese Cultural Centre accused the CBA of not holding "free and open" elections and demanded a voice in its affairs. More concerned with Taiwan's diplomatic relations with Canada than with local issues, the CBA had lost touch with its constituency and had failed to speak out on such pressing local matters as a late 1960s plan to build a freeway through Chinatown. By the late 1970s, the CBA had lost its place as the leading organization among Vancouver Chinese.

Similar situations occurred elsewhere, notably in Toronto and Calgary. In both cases, civic officials had difficulty in determining which group among contending factions truly represented its constituency. In Toronto, what was essentially a matter of private interest turned into an "ethnic" political issue after the city's Planning Department, on the advice of an informal steering committee composed mainly of social service leaders in Chinatown, rejected plans for a major development project. The investors secured the backing of the Chinese Community Centre of Ontario, which represented some 25 organizations with a combined membership of 10,000, and formed a coalition called the Chinatown Community Planning Association. The new Association persuaded the City Planning Department that the original steering committee lacked community support and got the department to re-organize the committee and to reconsider its decision. Similarly, in the early 1980s, disputes between the United Calgary Chinese Association and business-oriented groups such as the Chinatown Development Foundation and the Chinatown Ratepayers Association have raised questions of political leadership within the ethnic community. Where private interests are at stake, so-called ethnic leaders have not been above using the name of their constituency to further their own ends.

Despite internal disagreement, the Chinese community could unite in the face of external attack. In the fall of 1979, a television programme, "W-5", alleged that visa students were depriving qualified Canadians of places in universities. In one scene, the camera focused on Chinese faces in a pharmacy class and led viewers to believe they were foreigners. Actually, all were Canadian citizens and Ontario residents. Chinese across the country protested and forced the television network to apologize publicly for casting Chinese as foreigners. Nevertheless, the incident demonstrated how the popular mind still confused race and nationality.

Members of the Chinese community also have difficulties over the relative emphasis that should be given to race and nationality. As example of this ambivalence occurred in Toronto when a Canadian-born alderman of Chinese descent endorsed a proposal to erect a statue of Sun Yixian to commemorate the Chinese community's contributions to the city. Other Chinese deemed such a
statue inappropriate because the Chinese nationalist leader played little part in
the Chinese Canadian experience and suggested a statue of Chinese railway
workers. Despite these objections, the statue of Sun Yixian was approved.

Some older second generation Canadian-born Chinese are ill at ease with the
concept of hyphenated Canadianism; they think they cannot be equal among
other Canadians unless they think of themselves as Canadians first and Chinese
second. In contrast, for many of the younger Chinese born or raised in Canada,
whose ties with China are more sentimental than real, ethnicity is something to
be celebrated. Long removed by time and distance from the land of their ances-
tors, they feel a compelling need to understand the bicultural nature of their
heritage. Their interest in Chinese art, literature, history and chinoiserie is a
search for roots. The irony of the search is the discovery of the depth of their
assimilation, the realization that their values, customs, tastes and habits are
essentially North American. For them, the question of ethnic identity and the
larger issue of civil rights are intrinsically connected. The work of young
Chinese Canadian writers, poets and artists, which tends to be introspective,
expresses, sometimes stridently, a common theme in the affirmation of their
fundamental rights as Canadians. Through the process of history, the Chinese
have become woven into the ethnic tapestry of the Canadian social fabric.
Neither of European origin nor quintessentially “Chinese” in the cultural sense,
although they empathize with Chinese in other parts of the world, they are an
ethnic minority living their reality in a white society. They are Chinese Can-
adians.

V — A Comparative Perspective

Generalizations about the Chinese experience in Canada and comparisons
with other ethnic groups are difficult since the distinctions between the two
phases of Chinese immigration to Canada were so great. At times when Canada
was promoting and even subsidizing emigration from Great Britain, continental
Europe and the United States, only the Chinese had to pay an entry toll
(1885-1923) or had their immigration banned by statute (1923-1947). Indeed,
until 1962, Chinese immigration was governed by special legislation. Immi-
grants from India and Japan were no more welcome but “imperial reasons”
dictated that their entry be governed by regulations or a Gentlemen’s Agree-
ment respectively. Chinese Immigration Acts reflected the unequal relationship
between China and the western treaty powers. China did appoint a consul in
Canada in 1908 but he could do little to protect the interests of the Chinese in
Canada.

Before World War II the overwhelming maleness of the Chinese population in
Canada reinforced the image of the Chinese as sojourners. Sojourning, of
course, was common among other immigrants. In much the same way as the
Chinese remained loyal to their jia, the Italians maintained ties with their
paese. Although the Chinese emigrated of their own volition, they often entered
a debt bondage with a labour contractor who acted much as an Italian padrone.
Some Chinese did establish small businesses, suggesting a long term commit-
ment, but, like the first Portuguese entrepreneurs who arrived in the 1950s, they
too hoped to return to their native land upon retirement. Unlike many European
and Japanese immigrants, however, few Chinese before 1947 brought their fam-
ilies to Canada. The Canadian laws which made family reunification virtually
impossible strengthened the sojourner’s own sense of transience; the fact that he was a Chinese national *jus sanguinis* encouraged Canada to deny him many rights of citizenship.

Unlike other Asian immigrants before World War II, the Chinese did not remain almost exclusively at the Pacific Coast. Unlike any other immigrant group, the Chinese were almost entirely urban dwellers. Chinatowns existed in most large Canadian cities and, in the west, in smaller ones as well. Such distinctive neighbourhoods were not unique to the Chinese, as “Little Tokyo” in Vancouver, the “North End” of Winnipeg, the “Little Italys” of Toronto and Montreal, and “Africville” of Halifax attest. Like other ethnic neighbourhoods, Chinatowns served the special economic and social needs of their residents. The larger ones generated a bewildering variety of clan, locality, fraternal and trade associations. Initially, these voluntary associations bridged the gap between the Old World and the New and helped to protect their members against widespread anti-Chinese sentiment; today, the hostility of the larger society no longer binds the Chinese together but the associations continue to serve their traditional social functions and, in some cases, reflect political divisions within the Chinese community. Their number and variety has been a striking feature of the Chinese community in Canada. What the future holds for them is uncertain.

The post-World War II Chinese immigrant possibly had more in common with non-Chinese immigrants than with his fellow countrymen who had emigrated a generation earlier. The 1947 Chinese Immigration Act permitted family reunification; the 1962 legislation put Chinese on the same footing as any other prospective immigrant. Like many European immigrants, the post-war Chinese were fleeing repressive political conditions or simply seeking better economic opportunities. Unlike the early generations of immigrants who had come from rural areas of China, these new immigrants had been mainly urban dwellers. Many were well-educated with a good knowledge of English or French and they came from varied parts of the Chinese diaspora as well as from China itself. As in the case of other ethnic groups, whose migration to Canada occurred in different waves, tensions developed within the community between the old and new immigrants and between the younger and older generations, between those born and educated in Canada and their parents’ generation.

The Canadian society to which they came was also very different. Before the war, the white community expected that European residents, or at least their children, could learn Canadian ways and assimilate but few Canadians believed the Chinese could be “assimilated” or that such a process was desirable. Thus, while Canadians, especially in the Prairie West, pressed Europeans to send their children to English language schools, British Columbia school boards tried to segregate Chinese children. Many of the reasons for hostility to the Chinese applied to other immigrants. The Chinese shared with Italians and Slavs a reputation for cheap labour which undercut white wages; they shared with Eastern Europeans an image of living in filthy conditions; like the Blacks and southern Europeans they were suspected of immoral behaviour; they shared with other Asians the background of a home country with an overflowing population that, if unchecked, could overwhelm Canada. Yet, unlike the Japanese, they did not share the image of being ambitious themselves or of having an aggressive mother country. Indeed, during World War II, China was a respected ally
against the Japanese Empire.

Post-war Canadian society has been much more liberal in its outlook. While isolated incidents do occur, institutional racism has disappeared. Immigration of Chinese is governed by the same legislation and regulation as affect all would-be immigrants; laws and customs restricting the civil rights and social and economic opportunities of Chinese in Canada had ended by 1950. Yet, while law and custom permitted integration, the federal government through its Multiculturalism programme encouraged Chinese — like all other Canadians — to make pluralism a legitimate fact of Canadian society and to preserve and celebrate their ethnic identity — to be both Chinese and Canadian.
Suggestions for Further Reading

