The picture on the cover is of Howard Palmer, who died before this booklet had appeared in print. All historians of Canada owe Howard a considerable debt for his pioneering efforts in the field of ethnic studies. We will miss him greatly.

CANADA'S ETHNIC GROUPS

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ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN CANADA SINCE CONFEDERATION

HOWARD PALMER

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University of Calgary
TABLE I
ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE CANADIAN POPULATION, 1871-1981


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,485,761 (100.00)</td>
<td>5,371,315 (100.00)</td>
<td>8,787,949 (100.00)</td>
<td>14,009,429 (100.00)</td>
<td>24,092,500 (100.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>2,110,502 (60.55)</td>
<td>3,063,195 (57.04)</td>
<td>4,868,738 (55.41)</td>
<td>6,709,685 (47.89)</td>
<td>9,674,245 (40.17)</td>
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<td>French</td>
<td>1,082,940 (31.07)</td>
<td>1,649,371 (30.71)</td>
<td>2,452,743 (28.61)</td>
<td>4,319,167 (30.83)</td>
<td>6,439,100 (26.74)</td>
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<td>Dutch</td>
<td>29,662 (0.85)</td>
<td>33,845 (0.63)</td>
<td>117,505 (1.34)</td>
<td>264,267 (1.89)</td>
<td>408,240 (1.70)</td>
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<td>German</td>
<td>202,991 (5.82)</td>
<td>310,501 (5.78)</td>
<td>294,635 (3.35)</td>
<td>619,995 (4.43)</td>
<td>1,142,365 (4.74)</td>
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<td>Italian</td>
<td>1,035 (0.03)</td>
<td>10,834 (0.20)</td>
<td>66,769 (0.76)</td>
<td>152,245 (1.09)</td>
<td>747,970 (3.11)</td>
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<td>Jewish</td>
<td>125 (*)</td>
<td>16,131 (0.30)</td>
<td>126,196 (1.44)</td>
<td>181,670 (1.30)</td>
<td>264,025 (1.10)</td>
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<td>Polish</td>
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<td>219,845 (1.57)</td>
<td>254,485 (1.06)</td>
<td>264,025 (1.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>607 (0.02)</td>
<td>19,825 (0.37)</td>
<td>100,064 (1.14)</td>
<td>91,279 (0.65)</td>
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<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>1,623 (0.05)</td>
<td>31,042 (0.58)</td>
<td>167,359 (1.90)</td>
<td>283,024 (2.02)</td>
<td>282,795 (1.17)</td>
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<td>Ukrainian</td>
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<td>106,721 (1.21)</td>
<td>395,043 (2.82)</td>
<td>529,615 (2.20)</td>
<td>529,615 (2.20)</td>
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<td>Other European</td>
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<td>23,811 (0.44)</td>
<td>214,451 (2.44)</td>
<td>346,354 (2.47)</td>
<td>346,354 (2.47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4 (*)</td>
<td>23,731 (0.44)</td>
<td>65,914 (0.75)</td>
<td>72,827 (0.52)</td>
<td>464,470 (1.93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian and Inuit</td>
<td>23,037 (0.66)</td>
<td>127,941 (2.38)</td>
<td>113,724 (1.29)</td>
<td>165,607 (1.18)</td>
<td>413,380 (1.72)</td>
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<td>Other and not stated</td>
<td>29,405 (0.84)</td>
<td>49,121 (0.91)</td>
<td>39,727 (0.45)</td>
<td>188,421 (1.34)</td>
<td>1,574,760 (6.54)</td>
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<td>Multiple Origins3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,838,615 (7.63)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Data for 1871 is incomplete, particularly in the treatment of small numbers of those from central Europe, 1891 is omitted because of insufficient data.

2. For 1871 includes the population of the four original provinces of Canada only: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario. Newfoundland is excluded until 1951.


* Percentage lower than 0.01.
ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN CANADA SINCE CONFEDERATION

Howard Palmer

I — ETHNIC POLITICS: THE EARLY PHASE, 1870-1920

Most analysts of Canadian society have tended to equate ethnicity and politics in Canada with English-French relations. While this central duality has profoundly shaped the evolution and current dynamics of Canadian politics, the relationship between ethnicity and politics in Canada is far more complex, reflecting Canada's historical experience as a country that for well over a hundred years has received large numbers of immigrants from all over the world. Like all other aspects of Canadian society, political structures and ideas have been affected by this diversity, just as the political behaviour and beliefs of immigrants, both as groups and as individuals, have been affected by Canadian political institutions.

The study of ethnic politics can be viewed in two ways: as internal politics within the ethnic group, and as political involvement of ethnic groups in the larger Canadian society. Not surprisingly, the first generation's interest in developments in the homeland is stronger than that of their children. Some immigrants who came to Canada were political refugees and they often maintained a lifetime interest in their homelands, supporting political movements and trying to influence Canadian foreign policy. Even though these political refugees constituted only a small portion of those who came to Canada, many of those who came for other reasons also brought with them ideas and experiences that affected their political adjustment. Many immigrants tried to pass on their political perspectives to their children and grandchildren. They formed organizations to articulate and press for the interests of their group on the local, national, and international scene. The Canadian-born generation, while often joining the groups started by their parents, also developed new organizations to express their own unique perspectives. Ethnic politics is thus partly an expression of immigrant adjustment to Canada, but it also is an expression of the needs and interests of many of their Canadian-born descendants.

The role of ethnicity in the Canadian political process has changed over time. As economically deprived non-British, non-French minorities evolved from their entrance status in the late 19th and early 20th centuries on the social and economic margins of Canadian society, their political power slowly increased. Close ties gradually developed between many ethnic groups and politicians because the groups wanted to protect or enhance their status and interests and the politicians tried to secure and hold the allegiance of new groups. Ethnic groups gradually attempted to involve their own representatives in the political process and political parties began recruiting candidates from these groups. The speed with which this occurred varied with party, ethnic group, and region of the country.
In the 19th century, individuals such as Jewish politicians, Ezekiel Hart in Quebec (elected in 1808 but not allowed to take his seat because of his Jewish background) and Henry Nathan in Victoria (first Jewish Member of Parliament, elected in 1867) or Polish immigrant Aleksander Kierzkowski (also elected in 1867), played a part in the political process, but they did so as individuals rather than as representatives of an ethnocultural group. They were middle class, well educated and engaged in trade and commerce. Since those of non-British, non-French origin, made up only eight per cent of the population in 1867, the political behaviour of people of other than British or French origin did not become an important part of the political scene in Canada until their numbers increased substantially during the period of large-scale settlement of the Canadian west between 1890 and the First World War.

Since the Atlantic provinces received comparatively few immigrants after 1867, immigrants played only a minor role in local politics. By the 1870s, the sizable German group in Nova Scotia, who had been in the province for over a century, was largely assimilated. The Blacks in Nova Scotia were residentially and socially segregated and their poverty, isolation, and the prevailing racism of the larger white society kept them on the fringes of Nova Scotia’s political life. Only among the immigrant coal miners and steel workers in the Glace Bay/Sydney area of Cape Breton after the turn of the century, were newcomers concentrated enough to have an impact on local politics. During the first four decades of the 20th century, many of the political cross-currents affecting “other ethnic groups” in other parts of the country had reverberations in industrial Cape Breton: Jewish, Croatian, and Ukrainian radicalism, Italian fascism, and the Black nationalism of Marcus Garvey and his “back to Africa” movement all found supporters. But these movements did not affect the mainstream of Cape Breton politics.

Until the 1930s the political potential of minority ethnic groups also remained relatively unimportant in Quebec and Ontario. Immigration emerged as a public issue in Quebec after 1900 as French-Canadian nationalist critics of Laurier such as Henri Bourassa and Olivar Asselin charged that the new immigrants threatened the delicate ethnic balance in Canada between French and English, and might adversely affect both the Canadian economy and social morality. The nationalists’ opposition to Laurier had many other grounds, but the nativism they aroused may have contributed to the erosion of support for the Liberals in Quebec in the 1911 federal election. Although by 1911 Montreal had the largest number of Jews and Italians of any city in Canada, these groups were still too small, and socially and economically insecure to have a strong impact on the political system and the prejudices of both French Catholics and English Protestants limited their political involvement. The Catholic Italians did develop tentative alliances with French-Canadian politicians and Jews formed a large enough minority to elect their own representatives at both the provincial and federal levels, beginning with Liberal Peter Bercovitch in the provincial legislature in 1916. The organized Jewish community attempted to improve Jews’ legal and
educational status throughout the early part of the 20th century, but the community was split between the more established and financially secure and the more recent immigrants over the degree to which Jews should integrate into the larger society.

In Ontario, from Confederation until the 1920s, those of non-British, non-French origin made up just over 10 per cent of the population. The Germans were by far the largest group. Although their proportion in the population declined as Jews, Italians, Finns, and central and eastern Europeans made their presence felt in the province's large urban centres and in resource towns in northern Ontario, the Germans formed over three-quarters of the population in the Berlin area in the late 19th century, and were courted by the main political parties. Berliners elected Hugo Kranz, a German immigrant, as their mayor in 1869, and as the first German born Member of Parliament in 1878. Over time, the Conservative party came to represent the British in the Berlin area and the Liberals emerged as the dominant force among those of German background. These trends were heightened by the intense anti-German sentiment of World War One, as the British element in the population, supported by some Germans, forced the town to drop its German name and become Kitchener. Despite anti-German feeling, people of German background continued to control the municipal government until the inter-war era. In the emotion-charged conscription election of 1917, ex-mayor W. D. Euler, a Liberal of German background, won handily through his outspoken defence of German-Canadians.

The new immigrants from central, eastern, and southern Europe who came to Ontario in the late 19th and early 20th century were too few and too dispersed to play a significant role in the political process. They concerned themselves with economic issues and protecting themselves from discrimination. In Toronto, starting in 1907, the Conservative party backed an Italian newspaper and in 1910 helped organize a Hebrew Conservative Association. But prior to the 1920s immigrants in urban Ontario were seen basically as "foreigners" who were outside the political mainstream. New immigrants might concern themselves with local municipal issues but few ran for office, and fewer still were elected. Outside of municipal politics, the non-British, non-French "other ethnic groups" were an insignificant factor in Ontario politics until after the Second World War.

In contrast, intense, competitive ethnic politics first emerged on the prairies at the turn of the century with the mass migration of immigrants to the region. By 1911, over 30 per cent of the population in each of the prairie provinces was of non-British, non-French origin. For a variety of reasons, the two major national parties, which were dominated by people of British origin, responded awkwardly at best to the needs of the new immigrant farmers and workers in the West. The Liberals, as the national government when most of the newcomers arrived in Canada in the boom years between 1896 and 1911, were able to gain the support of many immigrants, while the Conservatives alienated most of the newcomers with their British-Canadian nationalism.
Many of the newcomers gradually turned to new left-wing labour and farmer parties that emerged in the West, promising economic security and social acceptance. This was partly because of ethnic, class, and regional biases in the two major national parties, which predisposed them to ignore the needs of new immigrants. Many of the latter were recruited as farmers or as part of an immigrant labour force in a resource economy. They often experienced exploitation, discrimination, and difficult or even dangerous working conditions, which the existing political elites seemed either to ignore, condone, or profit from. Nonetheless, from the beginnings of non-British, non-French immigration to the prairies in the 1870s, the major political parties made some efforts to attract the new immigrants. During the 1880s in Manitoba, the Conservatives and Liberals supported Icelandic-Canadian newspapers that presented their points of view and encouraged participation in the political process. The editorial policy of Heimskringla (first published in 1886) was to favour the Conservative party; Logberg (begun in 1888) took the side of the Liberal party. Often combining political and religious polemics, the two papers helped split Icelandic Canadians into different camps. Before the 1890s, however, the other ethnic groups on the prairies were too few and too scattered to constitute a political force. Migrants from Ontario dominated the political life of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, and their main concern was to establish a British Ontario way of life on the prairies.

When the largest wave of immigrants in Canadian history began arriving on the prairies after the Liberals came to power in 1896, the Liberals stood to gain the most politically. Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior, was also the Liberals' chief political organizer in western Canada. Through support for ethnic newspapers and judicious patronage, the Liberals appealed to the immigrants. They cultivated influential people within ethnic groups, at first as unofficial intermediaries and later, in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba just before the war, as candidates for provincial political office.

Before the newcomers could vote, the Conservatives played upon public unease about the possible long-term social impact of central and eastern European immigration, and the perceived threat to British values and Canadian identity which the newcomers represented. Once the new settlers could vote, the Conservatives followed the Liberal lead by supporting ethnic newspapers and establishing ethnic political clubs. However, a good deal of damage had already been done and the Liberals recalled the negative Conservative comments about central and eastern Europeans. The Conservatives' lack of success among the newcomers contributed to more anti-immigrant sentiment, which further alienated ethnic voters. Tory frustration over these patterns, combined with their desire during World War I to enforce conscription, eventually led the Conservative government under Prime Minister Robert Borden to remove the vote of those who came from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the War Time Elections Act of 1917. This measure sealed the unpopularity of the Conservatives among the other ethnic groups on the prairies and contributed to their weakness in this region until the 1950s.
The one exception to Liberal dominance on the prairies was the period of Conservative rule in Manitoba from 1899 to 1916. Although the Conservatives had come to power in Manitoba partly by appealing to the prejudices of the dominant Anglo-Canadian group through their attack on the federal Liberals’ immigration policy, they gradually gained support among the other ethnic groups through their defence of bilingual schools, their resistance to compulsory education and their opposition to prohibition. During the First World War, the provincial Liberal party became a vehicle for a reform movement among Anglo-Canadians who demanded the abolition of bilingual schools, prohibition and women’s rights legislation. The reformers showed a scarcely concealed contempt for central and eastern European immigrant males whom they saw as abusers of both alcohol and women. Ethnic support for the Conservatives did not, however, last long after their defeat by the Liberals in 1916 because of the unpopularity of measures taken by federal Conservatives including the Wartime Elections Act and their harsh repression of the Winnipeg Strike in 1919.

By the 1910s the growing proportion of other ethnic groups in the population and their block settlement made it possible for a few of their candidates to run for office. Given their recent arrival, inexperience with Canadian politics, language difficulties and discriminatory attitudes toward them, few were successful. In Alberta, for example, in the period from 1905 to 1921, whereas the Ontario-born in the population (15.37 per cent in 1911) made up 56.2 per cent of those elected, the European or Asian-born (12 to 16 per cent of the population) were only 5.7 per cent of the provincial legislators.

The Ukrainians in the prairie provinces were the group most concerned with having their own elected representatives. They were sufficiently numerous and concentrated, and their political perspectives sufficiently distinctive for them to field candidates and try to influence public policies through organized lobbying. When Ukrainian Liberals in Alberta became disenchanted with the failure of the provincial party to respond to their demands for a greater role for the Ukrainian language in the public school system, four of them ran as Independents in the 1913 provincial election. Though all four were defeated, a Ukrainian Liberal, Andrew Shandro, captured a seat and became the first Ukrainian MLA in Canada.

Although in western and central Canada the “other ethnic groups” chiefly supported the mainline parties, a radical political movement emerged after the turn of the century among a variety of new immigrant groups, particularly Jews, Ukrainians, and Finns. A minority of each group had brought with them strong Marxist ideals. Many Finnish loggers, miners, tailors and domestics in British Columbia and Ontario, Jewish tailors and garment workers in Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg, and Ukrainian labourers, miners, and farmers in the three prairie provinces shared a sense of exploitation and grievance. They believed that a new socialist society in Europe and Canada would right old wrongs. The abortive Russian revolution of 1905 led to the influx into Canada of political refugees who helped energize the left wing within each group. The high literacy rate,
residential concentration, and political background of Jews and Finns facilitated radicalism; the radicalism of Ukrainians emerged because of their political background, concentration, and the intense discrimination and exploitation they faced.

Finnish and Ukrainian workers both affiliated at first with the Socialist Party of Canada, but broke with the SPC because of its ideological rigidity and lack of openness to ethnic affiliates. In 1910, they helped form the Social Democratic Party of Canada. Within the SDPC, Ukrainians, Finns, and Jews had their own branches, but worked together in common causes, such as organizing unemployed workers. Each group had its newspaper; Robochyi Narod supported the Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats and the Winnipeg Courier was the voice of Jewish members of the SDPC. By 1915, the SDPC had 5,300 members, largely eastern Europeans and Finns; 20 per cent of the party members were in Winnipeg’s North End where Jewish and Ukrainian radicals were both prominent. Despite wartime repression, the radicals maintained an active network of organizations across the country. Indeed, government repression and popular hostility further radicalized them. During the 1920s the newly constituted radical wings of each group, the Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC), the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), and the Jewish Labor League (later renamed the United Jewish People's Order), supported the Communist Party of Canada (CPC).

Ethnically based left-wing groups provided a political vehicle and an array of social and cultural activities, including cooperatives, dance, theatre and sporting groups, and language schools. The left-wing Finnish Workers’ Sports Association of Canada and the ULFTA joined the Workers’ Sports Association of Canada, established to encourage working class solidarity through sports. Left-wing parties also defended the immigrants’ civil rights, condemning deportations, vote restrictions and press censorship during World War One.

Immigrant radicalism coloured public attitudes toward immigration and the political left. Central and eastern European immigrants gradually came to be seen as dangerous revolutionaries rather than as cheap labour or hard-working farmers. Many left-of-centre parties, though they were usually led by British immigrants, were seen as un-Canadian partly because of their “ethnic” support. Near the end of the war, government leaders worried about immigrant support for radical organizations, including the Social Democratic Party, and the Industrial Workers of the World. In 1918, Prime Minister Borden appointed C. H. Cahan, a Montreal lawyer, to the position of Director of Public Safety to investigate radical organizations. On the strength of Cahan’s recommendations, the government banned several left-wing organizations with ethnic affiliations, suppressed a number of ethnic newspapers, and outlawed all meetings conducted in “enemy” or “bolshevik” alien languages.

The connection between immigrants and radicalism was cemented in the public’s mind by the Winnipeg General Strike, which had considerable support
among Slavic and Jewish immigrant labourers. A series of strikes in Winnipeg in 1918 and 1919 culminated in riots against non-British immigrants, who were blamed for fomenting radicalism and causing unemployment. The social unrest and revolutionary propaganda that accompanied the June 1919 strike aroused fears that Canada was on the verge of revolution. Opponents of the strike alleged that it was the work of aliens and demanded that immigrant radicals be deported. In Toronto, the press singled out Jews as radicals; Saturday Night magazine suggested that all Jews were Bolsheviks. The federal government responded with new laws that denied radicals entry into Canada and deported some immigrant radicals. The "Red Scare" of 1919 crystallized all the fears about the political behaviour of central and eastern Europeans.

Three things must be remembered about immigrants on the left. First, left-wing parties were minority parties, some of them short lived and attracting only a few thousand supporters. Second, Ukrainians, Finns, and Jews were deeply divided politically and only among the Finns did the majority support the left. Even on the left there were divisions. The Jewish left was split between revolutionary Marxists, two varieties of left-wing Zionists (those who wanted a socialist homeland for the Jews wherever it might be, and those who wanted Palestine as a homeland) and anarchists. Third, support for the left varied from one immigrant group to another: while left-wing Jews, Finns, and Ukrainians preferred Marxism, Scandinavian farmers favoured democratic socialism. Partially because of their religious ties, few Poles or Italians supported the left, though their socio-economic conditions were no better than those of the more radical groups.

While both the mainline and fringe political parties in the rest of Canada were beginning to appeal to immigrant voters, in British Columbia for decades all the parties led campaigns to limit or prohibit the entry of Asians, to deny them the right to vote, and limit their ability to compete economically. Rather than seeking the Asian vote, the major parties tried to outdo each other in opposing Asians.

Anti-Asian sentiment was strong in British Columbia from the 1870s to the 1950s. Asians were regarded as alien, inferior, and unassimilable because of their race and their distinctive culture. Organized labour, a major force in British Columbia, alleged that they took jobs from white workers and lowered living standards. Veterans, patriotic groups, farmers, and small businessmen also demanded government restrictions on Asians. Between 1878 and 1899 the British Columbia legislature passed 26 statutes aimed at restricting or preventing the settlement of Asians. When the federal government disallowed most of this legislation as unconstitutional, provincial politicians mounted a partially successful campaign to convince the federal government to pass restrictive immigration legislation of its own. While anti-Asian sentiment was most intense in British Columbia, it was also present in other provinces; Quebec, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia also passed legislation prohibiting white women from working in restaurants, laundries or other businesses owned by Chinese and Japanese.
Excluded by law from participating in politics, the Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians (commonly known as East Indians, referring to people with origins in the Indian sub-continent) turned their attention to building their own community structures. Even in the provinces where they could vote, the Asians focused their attention on community and homeland politics. Political life in Canada’s Chinatowns was particularly active, because developments were so far-reaching in China and because the Chinese-Canadian society was a bachelor society in which men spent a good deal of time and energy in organizational competition. Contending Chinese political factions fought for support among Chinese Canadians and several leading Chinese politicians, including revolutionary leader Sun Yat Sen, made tours of Canada to elicit moral and financial support. Many Chinese Canadians hoped to see a strong and united country emerge out of the warring factions in China. They believed that a strong China, with world prestige, could further the interests of the Chinese in Canada. Because Japan was a world power and an ally of Great Britain, Japanese Canadians were not treated as harshly as Chinese Canadians by Canadian authorities. The unsuccessful efforts of Chinese Canadians to stop restrictive immigration laws showed their powerlessness.

Although the Chinese, Japanese and South Asians in British Columbia (who between 1901 and 1931 made up from 8 to 10 per cent of the population) organized to protest discrimination, the groups were as isolated from each other as from the larger white society. Lacking the vote, they had to go cap in hand to politicians, pleading for respect, fairness, and most of all, the right to make a living and (in the case of Chinese and South Asians) to be re-united with their families who were kept out by restrictive immigration laws. Some Chinese-Canadian and Japanese-Canadian organizations also fought discrimination in the work place. The Chinese Labour Association used strikes and boycotts to fight discrimination. The mildly socialist Japanese Camp and Mill Workers Union, organized in 1920, advocated ties with white labour, and in 1927 affiliated with the Trades and Labour Congress. The TLC finally realized it needed to bring Asians into its ranks to achieve working class solidarity.

The South Asians (almost all Sikhs from the Punjab), although the smallest of the three Asian groups, were the most vociferous in demanding their rights as British subjects. Before World War One, a nationalist movement sought to remove discriminatory immigration restrictions and convert Indian immigrants to Indian independence. The suspicions of the British and Canadian governments concerning the loyalty of local leaders subsequently drove many of the latter into coalitions with the nationalists. The federal government countered with deportation or refusal to readmit those who had gone home to India to visit their families. By 1912 most of the leaders of the community were members of the Socialist Party of Canada and in 1913 they organized the Ghadar revolutionary party to help bring about Indian independence and a socialist state in India. In response, British officials, working together with Canadians, infiltrated the movement and used police informers to crush it. Disillusioned with their treatment
in Canada, and hoping to effect change in India, many Ghadar leaders returned to India.

II — ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS

The inter-war years saw the arrival of many new political refugees, and attempts by foreign governments to influence their countrymen in Canada. These factors, coupled with severe economic and social stress in Canada, contributed to the polarization of a number of European ethnic groups, including Italians, Hungarians, Finns, Ukrainians, Croatians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Non-Anglo-Saxons were more vulnerable than most Canadians during the great depression of the 1930s. Consequently, both the left and right found new recruits. A lively ethnic press, which engaged in fierce polemics, fed the divisions between left and right.

Although the attention of many groups was focused on events abroad, there also was a growing interest in Canadian politics among groups that had been in Canada for a generation or more. This coincided on the prairies with the emergence of protest parties that were more open to non-Anglo-Saxons than the mainline parties. With the success of the protest movements, many more Ukrainians, Scandinavians and others were elected to the provincial legislatures, and even a few to Ottawa. However, the political power of these groups had definite limits. Their significance as voters was recognized, but those elected were from “ethnic” ridings such as the predominantly Ukrainian riding of Vegreville in Alberta or heavily Jewish neighbourhoods in Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg. The influence of the MPs within their own parties was also limited. Although the first Ukrainian MP in Canada, United Farmers of Alberta member Michael Luchkovich, supported an open immigration policy, his party advocated a restrictive policy. Regrettably, during the 1930s the views of the two Liberal Jewish MPs, Sam Jacobs from Montreal and Sam Factor from Toronto, on the question of Jewish refugees from Nazi persecution, were ignored by the Liberal government, which stoutly resisted allowing in these refugees.

The limited influence of ethnic politicians on government policy shows that nativist attitudes continued to have a strong impact on public policy during the 1920s and 1930s. Provincial politicians in British Columbia pressured the federal government to stop all Chinese immigration, which it did in 1923, to reduce the number of Japanese immigrants to a token number, which it did in 1928, and to eliminate Japanese fishermen from the fishing industry. The government limited the number of licences given to Japanese, restricted the use of power engines on boats, and during the Second World War confiscated the boats of those still remaining in fishing. The depth of the hostility to Asians in British Columbia is revealed by the Liberals’ printing the CCF stand in favour of giving votes to Asians as anti-CCF propaganda in the 1935 federal election. In Alberta, opposition to Mennonite immigration was so strong in 1929 that the provincial government refused a federal government request to allow more
Mennonites to settle there. In Saskatchewan, the Ku Klux Klan, which gained up to 20,000 members in the province in the late 1920s, opposed Catholics, French Canadians, and immigrants and, through its tacit support for the Conservative party, helped bring down the Liberal government in the 1929 provincial election. In addition, during the depression, anti-radical nativism and anti-semitism surfaced across the country. Immigrants were often blamed for unemployment, and local bigots pressed politicians to deport immigrants to reduce relief rolls and curb the growth of radicalism. In Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg, right-wing groups drew on assumptions underlying existing patterns of social discrimination, shaping them into a vicious and sometimes violent anti-semitism.

In the nationalistic atmosphere of the inter-war era, a number of European governments sought to influence their nationals abroad. During the 1920s, the Polish government provided advice, literature and funds to some political associations, and the Horthy regime in Hungary established organizations designed to foster closer ties with immigrants. The German Nazi and Italian fascist consuls in Canada also tried to gain support among their countrymen, with varying degrees of success. Between 1934 and 1939, the German government supported three different groups with links to the German Nazi party. The largest organization, the Deutsche Bund Canada, launched a national campaign to convince Canadians of the “truths of National Socialism” by means of films, rallies, speeches and propaganda from Germany. However, the widely scattered and extremely diverse German community was far removed from an attachment to Germany and the Bund had little success: at its peak in 1937-38 it had a membership of about 2,000, mostly young, recent immigrants. Only a small minority of people of German origin in Canada were from Germany itself; most had lived in Canada for decades, and seeing themselves as German Canadians, were indifferent to the appeals of National Socialism.

In contrast, fascism received a good deal of support among Italian Canadians in Montreal, Toronto, and elsewhere. In the early 1920s, newly arrived immigrants, including many war veterans, helped establish fascist clubs. Italian consuls, with support from Catholic clergy and businessmen, consolidated fascist influence with patriotic appeals which made fascism synonymous with Italian nationalism. Although there was lively opposition from older community leaders and from the few Italian communists and anarchists, through the consulates the fascists played a large part in the life of the communities. Support for Mussolini did not seem disloyal at the time. Many English and French Canadians admired Mussolini, and the Pope’s pacts with Mussolini seemed to give him the church’s blessing. Many Italian Canadians regarded Mussolini as the champion of the middle classes against Bolshevism and as the leader who had won respect for Italy in the world. This support for fascism would come back to haunt them with the outbreak of World War Two when the Canadian government interned hundreds of Italians who had been involved in fascist organizations.
Ethnic support for the extreme right wing was, in fact, very limited. Canadian fascist parties, including the National Social Christian Party, the Canadian Union of Fascists, and the Canadian Nationalist Party, because of their anti-communism and anti-semitism, attracted a few Italians, Germans, and Ukrainians. Some voices within the Mennonite press also expressed pro-Nazi sentiments in the 1930s because of Hitler’s anti-communism and because of the Mennonites’ German cultural roots. Nonetheless, the Mennonites’ pacifism limited their support for Hitler. When Mennonites became politically active in western Canada, they were much more likely to be drawn either to the Liberals who had allowed them into Canada in the 1920s, or to Social Credit, which carried a Christian message. In sum, the economic and social stress of the 1930s did not lead to strong right-wing views among the non-British, despite the efforts of both European governments and Canadian fascists to attract them.

The left was more successful in attracting ethnic support. The Communist Party reached its peak among immigrant workers during the depression. It welcomed foreign-language affiliates, used foreign-language organizers, and established newspapers to reach Bulgarian, Croatian, Finnish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Jewish workers in their own languages. It remained strongest among the Ukrainians, Finns, and Jews who had been radicalized before the war. The Finnish left was given added impetus at the end of World War One by the arrival of political refugees who had lost in the bitter civil war fought between “White” and “Red” Finns. Included were 50 Red Guard leaders who feared imprisonment or execution, among them the former socialist prime minister, Oskari Tokoi. During the 1930s, left-wing Russians united in a Federation of Russian Workers and Farmers Clubs, which achieved its maximum expansion by 1935-36 with 60 clubs and about 2,500 members. By 1939 over one-tenth of the 16,000 strong CPC consisted of Yugoslavs, mainly Croats. At the end of the 1930s the left-wing press made up 38.5 per cent of the total Finnish language press circulation, 41 per cent of the Hungarian, 31 per cent of the Ukrainian and 13.8 per cent of the Polish.

The largest group affiliated with the Communist Party was the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association which by 1939 had 201 branches across the country, 113 temples (halls) and 10,000 members. The ULFTA was strongest in urban and industrial areas and in resource-extraction communities, but was to be found also among marginal farmers in northern Alberta and Manitoba. Its membership, both male and female, supported strikes sponsored by the communist-affiliated Mine Workers’ Union of Canada and the Farmers’ Unity League. The ULFTA was only a small segment of the Ukrainian community, but it was well organized and vociferous.

Although not as numerous in Canada as Ukrainians, the Finns were equally important in the Communist Party. The Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC) made up over half of the CPC’s membership during the 1920s and by 1930 had 74 branches, over 6,000 members, and published its own weekly newspaper. Half of the Finns in Canada were in northern Ontario. During the 1920s and 1930s many of
them threw their energies into labour activities, particularly in organizing northern Ontario bush workers into the militant Lumber Workers Industrial Union of Canada. Finnish radicals also organized domestics, west coast fishermen and the hardrock miners of northern Ontario. Yet, in spite of the close affiliation between the Communist Party, the ULFTA and the FOC, there was also tension. The Communist Party grew worried that the workers' main loyalty was to their ethnic organizations. In the late 1920s, the party reduced the autonomy of the foreign-language affiliates, stressed working-class assimilation into the larger party, and expelled or censured leading members of the ULFTA and FOC.

Notwithstanding these internal divisions, the Communist Party provided a channel for immigrant grievances and its few electoral successes were in predominantly central and eastern European immigrant neighbourhoods. In 1926, ULFTA leader William Kolisnyk became a Winnipeg alderman, the first avowed Communist elected in North America. Overall, North Winnipeg preferred democratic socialist candidates like Jewish MP, A.A. Heaps, who represented first the Independent Labour Party and later the CCF in Parliament during the 1920s and 1930s; nonetheless, the Communists established a strong base of support in Winnipeg's north end.

In many male-dominated ethnic minorities, women played a minor political role, but the ethnic left was often supportive of women's political and labour activism. Finnish, Jewish, and Ukrainian women all became active in women's affiliates of the FOC, ULFTA and Jewish Labour League, which were tied to the Communist Party. In addition, during the 1920s and 1930s, in the radical Women's Labour League, predominantly communist in character and composition, Finnish, Ukrainian and Jewish leagues outnumbered English-speaking ones. These women participated in labour struggles, joining picket lines and confronting strikebreakers and police in strikes in the Alberta coalfields in 1922 and 1932, and in the struggle to unionize gold miners in Northern Ontario. They also served as support troops in relief and unemployment march protests in the early 1930s. Women in the Jewish Women's Labour League (Yiddishe Arbeiter Foren Fareyn) in the cities engaged in a wide range of activities including supporting communist candidates in local elections, collecting food and clothing for families of striking coal miners, providing picket-line support for strikers in the garment trades, and starting summer camps and schools to pass on their class-conscious views to their children. Jewish organizers such as Annie Buller and Becky Buhay were leaders in the women's department of the CPC for three decades. The police jailed Finnish socialist organizer Sanna Kannasto and Jewish organizer Annie Buller for their political activities.

Finnish women were among the most politically active, often drawing on their experience as socialists in Finland. The first Finnish socialist women's sewing circle was in North Wellington B.C. in 1894 among wives of coal miners. As their activities spread across the country, Finnish women wrote handwritten newspapers, discussed political issues, staged political plays, established summer camps for youth, and raised money to construct halls, and purchase equipment,
books and musical instruments. Radical Finnish women also raised money to help socialist causes in Finland and aid strike victims elsewhere in North America. They also supported their own newspaper, *Toverit*ar which had 3,000 subscribers, until it was banned by the Canadian government in 1929.

Though more politically active than women in most other groups, Finnish, Ukrainian and Jewish women's activities were still mainly supportive of men's political activity and they were often disappointed by lack of male support for their projects. Their activity was also constrained by family obligations and time restraints. They struggled to gain equality with their male counterparts, and made important advances, but their goal of equality remained elusive.

The growing class consciousness of many immigrant workers during the 1930s found expression in a variety of left-wing causes. Many immigrants, both men and women, supported strikes in a number of industries including mining, lumbering, grain, and sugar beets. Some immigrants, particularly Ukrainians, Finns, and Hungarians, even became part of the Mackenzie-Papineau battalion which left Canada in 1937 to fight on the Republican side in the Spanish civil war. Left-wing immigrants faced the constant threat of arrest and deportation. In 1931, the government arrested the major communist leaders on charges of sedition. After their prison terms, some who were not native born (like Tomo Cacic, the editor of the left-wing Croatian newspaper *Borba*) were deported. Of the 400 Croatians who participated in a strike in Rouyn-Noranda mines in 1934, 16 leaders were arrested and jailed and 100 others deported. Those deported included not only male radicals but radical women such as Sophie Sheinen, a left wing Jewish organizer in Calgary who was deported to the Soviet Union in 1932 following a jail term for her political activities. Overall, the government deported about one hundred Finns annually during the 1930s, as radicals or as indigents. Some Finnish Canadians also moved voluntarily to Soviet Karelia during the 1930s, hoping for a more congenial political atmosphere.

Although Canadian authorities regarded immigrants' support for the left with suspicion and hostility, conservative and nationalist organizations within their own groups were even more hostile. Among Ukrainians, the conflict derived partly from disagreements about conditions in Ukraine and the desirability of an independent state, but Ukrainian nationalists were also worried that the image of "radical foreigners" would damage all Ukrainians. The same conflict divided many other central and eastern European groups.

Radical protest among immigrant workers in industrial and resource communities was paralleled by a growing agrarian revolt in the prairie provinces. But while support for the communists subjected immigrants to official harassment, support for agrarian protest parties brought immigrants into the political mainstream on the prairies. Farmer-based parties such as the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) challenged the established political parties, banks, railways and grain companies. In their quest for power, the new political movements appealed to all voters. The UFA organized a "foreign-born committee" as an advisory council to its executive,
printed literature in several languages, and appointed "foreign-speaking" organizers. In Saskatchewan, the Farmer-Labour Party, a predecessor of the CCF, in its first attempt at electoral politics in 1934, nominated ethnic candidates, printed pamphlets in several languages and had speakers address immigrant voters in their own languages. The UFA, the United Farmers of Manitoba, and the Farmer-Labour Party in Saskatchewan all made inroads, but cultural barriers limited their support among central and eastern Europeans. The leaders of the farm movement were almost all from Ontario, Britain, or the United States. In addition, the Progressive movement had been closely allied with the Protestant churches and the prohibition movement and had been unsympathetic to bilingual schools and to open immigration. It stressed common economic problems and a "melting pot" approach to community solidarity. Consequently, some ethnic groups preferred to stick with the Liberals throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

There were, of course, differences among ethnic groups in their support for the new movements. Scandinavians, having experience with cooperative movements in Scandinavia and with populist politics in the American mid-west before they moved to Canada, were among the strongest supporters of the new farmers' parties. The CCF took longer to win adherents among central and eastern Europeans in rural Saskatchewan because of the opposition of the Catholic church to socialism, the anti-communism and anti-socialism of conservative eastern Europeans, and the conservatism of the desperately poor.

The interwar period was one of change and conflict for a number of groups. It was a period of new departures, of support for political movements of both the left and right, and of growing polarization within many European groups. Despite this flirting with the extremes of left and right, if one notes the growing number of legislators of non-British, non-French origin and the growing diversity of the voting patterns of the groups they represented, it becomes apparent that political integration was gradually occurring.

III — THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR TWO AND POSTWAR IMMIGRATION

At the outbreak of World War Two, European immigrants were far more aware of many European issues than English or French Canadians. Several minorities from eastern Europe, including Macedonians, Armenians, and Ukrainians, had developed strong organizations to support the liberation of their homelands. These groups hoped that somehow the events of the war might make possible the establishment of independent states. The war also gave Zionism an even stronger base of support, as Canadian Jews became desperately concerned about the plight of European Jewry, and mounted a strong lobby, with support from non-Jews, to convince the government to press Britain to allow more Jews into Israel.

Nativism toward European minorities was not as strong during World War Two as during World War One. Many groups had been in Canada for decades
and had become more established. Several ethnic groups, whose homelands were Allies, such as Poles and Chinese, also achieved a new level of respectability as many Canadians came to see their attachment to their homelands as part of the war effort. On the other hand, the legacy of attempts by foreign governments during the 1930s to win support in Canada cast suspicion on ethnic groups associated with enemy powers. With the outbreak of the war, the police arrested and interned over 800 Germans and German-Canadians and 700 Italian Canadians. In June 1940, the Canadian government banned all Nazi and Italian fascist groups, as well as several left-wing ethnic organizations and newspapers. Besides crushing what it considered extremist right and left-wing ethnic organizations, the government also encouraged ethnic umbrella organizations, which it hoped would assist in the war effort. The Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services helped bring together rival factions of various groups and helped form the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Polish Canadian Congress, which have continued to the present day.

Unity within individual ethnic groups did not come just through government prodding. The homelands of many were occupied by foreign troops, and friends and family needed food and clothing. The war helped bring together, at least temporarily, groups that had very different ideologies: despite the bitterness of the depression years, left-wing and right-wing Hungarians and Croatians cooperated temporarily in relief efforts. Some traditional ethnic rivals, like the Serbs and Croatians, also cooperated in wartime relief for Yugoslavia.

While the loyalty of Germans, Italians, and some eastern Europeans was occasionally questioned during the war, Japanese-Canadians bore the brunt of wartime nativism. The Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor ignited an intense wave of anti-Japanese sentiment. In response to public pressure, the government on 24 February 1942, ordered all Japanese-Canadians to abandon their homes, farms, and businesses and leave the Pacific coast. Following the relocation of 22,000 Japanese-Canadians from the coast, the government sold their property. Toward the end of the war, the federal government, again under pressure from British Columbia politicians, also encouraged Japanese to seek voluntary deportation to Japan. After an intense fight, civil rights groups finally forced the government to drop the deportation orders (1947), to partially compensate property losses, and to end the restrictions which prevented Japanese from returning to the coast (1949).

Despite wartime nativism, several developments during and after the war undermined prejudices against various ethnic groups and enabled them to play a greater role in the political process. The revulsion against Hitler and Nazism extended to a reaction against the concept of a superior race and against public expressions of racism and anti-semitism. Political support for openly discriminatory measures in Canada's immigration laws and in franchise restrictions began to crumble. Canada's signing of the United Nations Charter in 1944 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 brought into glaring focus Canada's discriminatory policies. Following intense lobbying by Asian groups
and an increasingly sympathetic white public, South Asians and Chinese were given the vote in 1947 and Japanese in 1949. In 1947, after lobbying from a committee of whites and Chinese, the federal government repealed the Chinese Immigration Act. In 1951 the government allowed small quotas of immigrants from India, Pakistan and Ceylon. More liberalized immigration and enfranchisement did not mean, however, that Asians were becoming an important political force. Because of relocation, the Japanese were widely scattered while the Chinese, enjoying greater economic and social mobility, were also increasingly spread out across Canada.

The liberalizing of attitudes toward immigration made possible a new wave of immigrants in the postwar years. Business interests in English-speaking Canada believed that increased immigration would promote economic growth, and that new sources of labour were needed. Unions, once opposed to large-scale immigration, now favoured it. In French Canada, the traditional hostility to immigration decreased, even if it did not entirely disappear. Many ethnic and religious groups in Canada also pressured the federal government to respond to the plight of their countrymen and co-religionists in Europe. The latter were often in desperate circumstances because of forcible wartime uprootings, economic distress, food shortages and the threat of repatriation to communist-dominated areas.

Between the end of the war and 1961, over 2,100,000 immigrants arrived in Canada. They helped increase the proportion of those of non-British and non-French origin to one fourth of the Canadian population. As new and undecided voters, primarily in Canada’s large urban centers, the postwar immigrants helped reshape ethnic politics in Canada. During the 1950s, central, eastern and southern Europeans (particularly Italians) formed sizeable blocs of voters in Toronto and other large Ontario cities and helped determine election results in a number of key ridings. In addition, the Canadian-born descendants of the immigrants that had settled the west and worked in the cities of central Canada were often better educated and economically more secure than their immigrant parents. Jews, Ukrainians, and others began pushing for more recognition of their needs and interests, both within Canada and abroad.

Responding to these new political realities, the Conservatives began to define themselves as something more than a party of British-Canadian nationalism, and by the late 1950s began competing fiercely with the Liberals for the votes of the newcomers. The rising economic status of those of non-British, non-French origin, combined with declining ethnic and racial prejudice, and several other factors reduced the appeal of the far left among many eastern European ethnic groups. Ethnic politics gradually shifted from the margins of Canadian politics, where ethnic and working class protest coincided, to the mainstream of Canadian political life.

Over 200,000 of the new immigrants were political refugees from central and eastern Europe and they revitalized anti-communism as a political force in the
early 1950s. These political refugees were mostly urban, educated people fleeing the threat of Soviet occupation and communist domination. They included many former government officials, members of army officer corps, and middle-class professionals as well as workers and farmers. Often highly politicized, they felt they had a unique perspective since they had experienced communism at first hand.

The new immigrants set up organizations which combined nationalism and anti-communism. Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Croatians, Slovenes, Slovaks, Macedonians, and Armenians all hoped not only that their homelands could be freed from communist domination, but also that these homelands would be independent. Their organizations, like the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine or the Estonian Central Council, combined cultural and political activities and had youth affiliates through which the refugees tried to pass on their ideology to their children. Many of the refugees saw Canada as a temporary asylum; they would return to Europe once conditions changed. Despite concerted lobbying efforts, the eastern European groups were unsuccessful in getting Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent to take up the cause of the liberation of their homelands. Ukrainian organizations achieved only one minor victory with External Affairs during the 1950s. Following intense lobbying by Ukrainian organizations and by John Decore, a Liberal Ukrainian MP from Alberta, the department agreed in 1951 to a radio program on the international service of the CBC directed toward Ukrainians in the USSR. External Affairs soon regretted its support for the broadcast and tried to restrain programming they considered out of step with Canadian foreign policy. Although the CBC and External Affairs wanted the Ukrainian section of the International Service eliminated, neither the St. Laurent nor the Conservative Diefenbaker government were prepared to risk alienating the Ukrainian vote by discontinuing the programming.

Though their impact on Canadian foreign policy was limited, the arrival of right-wing anti-communist refugees played a role in the decline of the ethnic left in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Bitter controversy raged between the newcomers and the left, which charged the newcomers with being Nazi collaborators, if not war criminals. The government itself contributed to the shift to the right by banning as security risks former leftists, whether communists or left-wing socialists, but allowing in rightists. In the context of the cold war, the Gouzenko affair, and Canada’s participation in the Korean War, public opinion both in the larger society as well as within ethnic communities was running against the left. Some leaders of the Ukrainian and Jewish left also became disillusioned with Soviet communism during the 1950s because of Russification in the Ukraine and anti-semitism in the Soviet Union, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and Khrouchev’s confirmation of the atrocities of the Stalin era. Among the Yugoslavs, radicalism declined because almost 2,000 pro-Tito Croatians, Serbs, and Slovenes returned to Yugoslavia at the end of the war to help establish a communist state. The economic prosperity of the 1950s also blunted the radicalism of many
immigrants who had been attracted to the left during the 1930s.

One dramatic symbol of changing opinion was the heated contest in Ontario in the 1955 provincial election between two Jewish politicians: Conservative Allan Grossman, a Toronto city alderman, and the sitting MPP, veteran Communist J.B. Salsberg. Grossman believed the campaign was a contest between good and evil and that the presence of a Jewish communist in the legislature was an embarrassment to all Jews. With the support of anti-communist Hungarians and Ukrainians, Grossman defeated Salsberg and began a political career spanning 20 years in the legislature and 15 years as a cabinet minister. As an intermediary between ethnic minorities and the provincial government, Grossman, along with Ukrainian M.P.P. John Yaremko, helped keep provincial Conservatives aware of immigrant voters and attracted immigrant support.

At the federal level, the Liberals had a number of electoral advantages over the Conservatives until the advent of John Diefenbaker in the late 1950s. Many groups had traditional ties with the Liberal party, dating from the Laurier years and reinforced by the frequent anti-immigrant posture of the Conservatives. The Liberals were once again in power during the relatively open immigration of the late 1940s and early 1950s and many newcomers showed their appreciation. Many immigrants also gravitated to the federal Liberals at the national level, since it made sense to have ties with those in power. Several prominent Liberal cabinet ministers with strong regional power bases, such as C.D. Howe in Port Arthur and Paul Martin in Windsor, had polyethnic ridings, which made them aware of immigrant voters. Paul Martin gained support among groups such as the Serbs and Italians in Windsor through close ties with community leaders and careful attention to individual immigration cases. The Liberals’ attempts to assert Canada’s autonomy from Great Britain also won support from non-British immigrants: in 1947, the Liberals introduced a new Citizenship Act which for the first time gave Canadians their own citizenship, separate from that of British subjects. The Liberals were, however, vulnerable. The party did not reflect the ethnic diversity of Canada at its higher levels. By 1957 there were still no Jewish or Ukrainian cabinet ministers. Most ethnic groups were also underrepresented as judges and senators, and in the highest ranks of the civil service. Individuals of Jewish, Ukrainian, and Icelandic background were appointed to the Senate during the 1950s, but groups such as the Italians and Poles were still campaigning in the late 1950s for their first Senate appointment.

By 1957 the federal Tories were ready to make a major breakthrough among ethnic voters. Their opening came with the choice of John Diefenbaker as party leader in 1956. In the west, voters were tiring of the seeming futility of supporting third parties nationally. Diefenbaker’s experience with a polyethnic constituency in Prince Albert made him sensitive to the feelings of discrimination and second-class citizenship felt by many ethnic groups in the west. His vision of One Canada, and his Bill of Rights, stressed the need for equal treatment and acceptance for all. In addition, Diefenbaker’s strident anti-communism contributed to his
success among central and eastern Europeans. In 1956, at the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Diefenbaker expressed his sympathy for the liberation of Ukraine from Russian communist domination. As Prime Minister, he highlighted his anti-communism with a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, denouncing Soviet imperialism and oppression of subject minorities.

The attempts by Diefenbaker and the Conservatives to overcome decades of hostility on the part of many ethnic groups took many forms. They enthusiastically recruited newcomers to the party. Diefenbaker appointed Michael Starr, the former mayor of Oshawa, as minister of labour, making him the first Ukrainian-Canadian cabinet minister. Starr spoke in predominantly Ukrainian communities across western Canada and helped swing many Ukrainians to the Conservatives. Diefenbaker also extended his appeal to other groups. In the 1957 federal election, Douglas Jung ran successfully as a Conservative in Vancouver, becoming the first Chinese-Canadian M.P. The Conservatives also courted the leaders of the ethnic press associations in Ontario and Manitoba. The national director of the party encouraged Conservative candidates to cultivate parish priests and get what he called “ethnic cooperators” to do “undercover” work in ethnic groups. In 1962, the Conservatives changed Canada’s immigration regulations to remove almost all elements of discrimination. Diefenbaker also attended national celebrations, presented copies of the Bill of Rights to leaders of ethnic groups, and appeared at ethnic rallies on behalf of Conservative candidates.

By 1962, Diefenbaker’s support had begun to wane. Italians interpreted the Conservatives’ move in 1959 to tighten the sponsorship system as being directed against them. In 1959 and 1960, the government launched a crackdown on illegal Chinese immigration that included widespread raids on Chinese organizations; the extent and severity of the police operation and the damage to the reputation of the Chinese community alienated many Chinese-Canadians. Economic recession and growing unemployment further eroded Conservative support. The constant reiteration of the anti-communist theme, when combined with little concrete action, also began to diminish enthusiasm for the Conservatives. However, Lester Pearson, the Liberal leader, had difficulty capturing the hearts of ethnic voters, particularly in western Canada. Many of them saw Pearson as eastern, WASP, and remote; in addition, Pearson had set up the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism whose terms of reference, activities, and recommendations many found offensive. The Commission, with its talk of two founding races and its focus on French Canadians, was widely perceived by Ukrainians and other central and eastern Europeans as relegating them to second-class status.

During the 1950s and early 1960s ethnic politicians became more important at the municipal and provincial levels. Several cities with large numbers of people of non-British, non-French origin elected mayors from these backgrounds. Among prominent Ukrainian-Canadian mayors were Michael Starr, elected in Oshawa in 1949, William Hawrelak, elected in Edmonton in 1951, and Stephen
Juba, elected in Winnipeg in 1956. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Toronto had two popular Jewish mayors, Nathan Phillips and Philip Givens. Ukrainian, Jewish, and Scandinavian MLAs also began receiving cabinet posts. The first Ukrainian cabinet minister was appointed in Saskatchewan in 1952 (CCF), in Manitoba in 1955 (Liberal), in Ontario in 1958 (Conservative) and in Alberta in 1962 (Social Credit). The variety of parties represented suggests that Ukrainians were gaining political power by supporting the party in power. In addition to growing cabinet level representation, the number of members of minority ethnic groups represented in provincial legislatures also increased dramatically, particularly on the prairies. These political successes reflected a variety of social and economic forces: their growing numbers, and increasing integration with a rising socio-economic status, and the maturing of a Canadian-born and educated second generation. The groups involved, particularly the Ukrainians, took great pride in elected officials as a sign of their growing acceptance.

IV — THE COMING OF MULTICULTURALISM, 1968-1989

After the introduction of official bilingualism in 1969, the Liberals were made increasingly aware of the dissatisfaction among non-British and non-French ethnic groups. The federal policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, announced by the Trudeau government in October 1971, emerged from a variety of political and policy considerations. Among these were the Liberal weakness in western Canada, where the federal policies of bilingualism had been seen as showing undue favouritism to French Canada and ignoring the western historical experience. In addition, the Liberals were well aware of the importance of the ethnic vote in urban Ontario, especially Toronto, and felt that multiculturalism could help them maintain this support.

Multiculturalism may indeed have softened opposition to official bilingualism in western Canada, though it was less successful in winning support for the Liberals. During the intense debate over official bilingualism in Manitoba in the early 1980s, the leaders of the non-British and non-French ethnic groups supported Franco-Manitobans and the provincial NDP government in their efforts to restore the language rights guaranteed under the original Manitoba Act of 1870. But the multiculturalism policy did not achieve a high profile in western Canada, at least during the 1970s. Groups such as the Ukrainians continued to see Trudeau's policies as favouring French Canadians and his efforts at multiculturalism as halfhearted or insincere. Central and eastern Europeans also were alienated by Trudeau's efforts at rapprochement with the Soviet Union and what they saw as his refusal to show sufficient sympathy for Ukrainian dissidents there.

The policy of multiculturalism provided a focal point for ethnic politics throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Foreign policy and immigration policy continued to concern many organized groups, but the creation of a multiculturalism program within the Department of the Secretary of State (1971) and a Minister of State for Multiculturalism (1972) provided new programs and a lever for pressing the
government to provide still more. The existence of these programs gave legitimacy to a wide range of ethnic concerns previously viewed with suspicion or indifference by many government departments and politicians. The federal government helped establish national organizations for several groups, including the Chinese, Italians, and South Asians. Opposition parties also began routinely developing policies in national election campaigns to appeal to ethnic groups. The Minister of Multiculturalism also made his party aware of ethnic concerns and provided a focal point for efforts to win crucial seats in cities with large numbers of immigrants, particularly Toronto. It is no accident that from 1972 to 1990 six of 11 ministers of multiculturalism represented Toronto ridings. Multiculturalism at the federal level spurred several provinces to introduce similar programs; the three prairie provinces and Ontario were the first to do so. As at the federal level, provincial advisory councils generated community input into policy and rewarded or curried favour with ethnic leaders.

Although both Liberal and Parti Québécois governments in Quebec rejected the federal policy of multiculturalism, successive Quebec governments have dealt with a diverse immigrant population in the postwar period, particularly in Montreal, which attracted a large post-war immigration. With the growing awareness among Québécois of their declining birthrate in the 1960s, and the tendency of immigrants to send their children to English schools, came intense nationalist pressure to integrate immigrant students into Francophone schools. Indeed, one of the reasons for growing support for the independence movement was continuing agitation over the issue of language choice for immigrants’ children. Conflict between immigrant parents and nationalists on this issue led in 1968 to violence in the streets in the Montreal suburb of St.-Leonard. Successive Quebec governments studied, and then passed legislation to encourage and then force immigrants to send their children to French-speaking schools. Bill 22, passed in 1974 by the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa, severely limited the rights of immigrant children to English schooling. Bill 101, passed in 1977 by the Parti Québécois government, removed these rights altogether. In addition to these measures on the educational front, Quebec nationalists from the 1960s on demanded that Quebec acquire full control over all aspects of immigration and Quebec governments gradually expanded their jurisdiction in this area.

There were some in the PQ who thought it might be necessary to force immigrants to become part of French-speaking society, but others felt that hope for immigrant integration into a French-speaking society and support for an independent Quebec required a more tolerant approach. The PQ began making an effort to appeal to French-speaking groups such as the Haitians, Vietnamese, and North African Jews and also to the Spanish, Italians, Portuguese, and Latin-Americans who shared a common Catholic heritage. Intellectuals and politicians in the PQ, including in particular the minister of immigration and cultural communities, Gerard Godin, developed their own policy of "interculturalism" that took into account ethnic diversity in Quebec and gave support to many of the same activities as the federal government’s multiculturalism policy.
By the early 1980s the PQ began to make inroads among the Greeks, Italians, Portuguese and the French speaking Sephardi Jews, though the majority in these groups remained loyal to the Liberals.

The varying regional responses to multiculturalism reflected the ethnic composition and ethnic relations in different regions of the country. At the national level, the policy of multiculturalism demonstrated the growing political influence of several ethnic minorities, particularly Ukrainians, who had been its strongest advocates. The policy itself contributed to the influence of ethnic groups, through government funding of activities which gave further political legitimacy to ethnic organizations and leaders.

One sign that supporters of multiculturalism had partially solidified their position was the insertion in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 of Article 27, which stated that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada”. When the Meech Lake Accord was signed by the Prime Minister and all the premiers in 1987, it specifically stated that the Accord would not affect Article 27. Several leaders of ethnic groups argued nonetheless that the interpretive framework of the Accord, with its emphasis on English and French speaking Canadians and its recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, took Canada back to the notion of two founding peoples and a bicultural vision of the country. Consequently, some opposed the Accord, and their opposition played a factor in the Manitoba government deciding not to ratify the Accord unless it was amended.

Multiculturalism policies introduced several new elements to ethnic politics. One other major new element was the arrival of many new groups in the wake of the liberalization of Canada’s immigration regulations in 1967. Over half of Canada’s immigrants now came from the Third World, and they provided new political perspectives on events in Chile, El Salvador, South Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, India, Vietnam and many other parts of the globe. Refugees coming to Canada included all shades of the political spectrum. The bulk were still anti-communist, including Czechs, Soviet Jews, Poles, and Vietnamese, but Canada now also received refugees from right-wing regimes, including Chileans, South Africans, Haitians, and central Americans. Canadian immigration policy, bound in the early post-war years by a double standard which welcomed refugees from communist regimes but rejected refugees from right wing regimes, gradually became more even handed.

Besides providing new perspectives on world affairs, Third World immigrants gave a new impetus and rationale for multiculturalism and shifted the policy in new directions. The non-white Third World immigrants were concerned about racism and discrimination. Consequently they lobbied for more government emphasis on human rights. In the early 1980s, this concern from “visible minorities” led to a parliamentary committee, whose report, *Equality Now* (1984), contained 80 recommendations, including several for affirmative action.
Although Canada's new visible minorities are becoming organized and vocal, there have been few studies of their voting patterns. In most of the country, newcomers from Hong Kong and the Asian subcontinent appear to have supported the Liberal party at least in the early 1980s: it was in power when many of them came and they perceived Trudeau to be a strong leader who commanded respect internationally. There were, however, many regional variations to this pattern. In Alberta, for example, the newcomers were absorbed into the Conservative party as the Philippinos, Chinese, Sikhs, West Indians, and Lebanese were anxious shape the course of Alberta politics. In 1985 their insecurity was revealed by their desire to be on the winning side; in the struggle for the party leadership of the provincial Conservative party, the majority supported the front-running Don Getty over Ukrainian lawyer Julian Koziak and Jewish lawyer Ron Ghitter, both of whom had been closely identified with ethnic and human rights issues.

As urban politicians became aware of the strength of new "visible minority" immigrant groups, fierce battles emerged during nomination meetings and at election time in municipal, provincial, and federal elections in large urban centres to capture the "ethnic vote". Newcomers often played a particularly prominent role in delegate selection meetings for national and provincial party leaderships since the Canadian system of leadership selection places a premium on signing up members and getting them out to a single delegate selection meeting. This process means that disciplined, well-organized ethnic groups can exercise a great deal of influence in the delegate selection process. Politicians consequently traded charges of corrupt practices in "rounding up" ethnic voters with free meals and transportation, and promises of future influence, grants for ethnic activities, or (in the case of federal politicians) help in immigration cases. Despite much talk of growing ethnic power, leaders of new immigrant groups, wary of prejudice and insecure in their status, usually served as brokers for Anglo-Canadian politicians rather than running as candidates themselves.

The growing concern about racism in Canada during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s had important implications for one of Canada's oldest ethnic groups, the Blacks. Though attempts to form a continuing and stable national association for Blacks floundered for most of the 20th century on the facts of dispersal, poverty, and regional differences, Blacks were able to make many political gains in these decades. Canadians gradually became more aware of racial discrimination as a member of the Commonwealth and a neighbour of the United States. The passage of human rights acts across Canada during the 1950s and 1960s occurred in part because Canadians felt both the injustice and the dangers of racism in the United States. Growing political attention to Canadian Blacks during the late 1960s came from fear about the possibilities of racial violence and from guilt over past injustices. Some Blacks in Nova Scotia, who until the 1960s had been largely church-centered and apolitical, looked to assertive American models of black pride and black power. Young community leaders such as Rocky Jones challenged the black community and white power structure and
worked to free Blacks from habits of deference. White politicians in Nova Scotia responded with support for new Black organizations such as the controversial Black United Front which promoted community development.

At the same time, Blacks in Ontario also began to have more political influence. There had been occasional Black politicians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but examples of Black political power were few. During the 1960s and 1970s, aided by American Blacks such as human rights activists Dan Hill and Wilson Head and by the sizeable influx of West Indians to Toronto, Blacks became a significant lobby through organizations such as the Urban Alliance on Race Relations and community newspapers such as Contrast and Share. Their growing political power was symbolized through the political career of Black lawyer Lincoln Alexander who was first elected as member of Parliament for Hamilton in 1968, appointed to the federal cabinet in the Conservative government in 1980, and then chosen as lieutenant-governor of Ontario in 1985. Because of small numbers, Blacks outside of Nova Scotia and Ontario have not made the same political strides. The one exception is West Indian immigrant Rosemary Brown, who emerged during the 1970s as a powerful radical voice in the New Democratic Party in British Columbia and almost captured the NDP national leadership in 1975.

By the 1980s, ethnicity had lost much of its political salience in the rural prairie regions among third, fourth, and fifth generation Canadians but it continued to play an important role in immigrant-receiving cities and in a few of the larger, established ethnic groups. Among predominantly Canadian-born groups, Jews and Ukrainians continued to flex their political muscle at all levels of government. Occasionally this political influence led to conflict between groups; the establishment of the Deschênes Commission in 1985 by the Mulroney government to inquire into the subject of war criminals in Canada helped turn the Jewish and Ukrainian communities against each other as long-standing prejudices and misunderstanding were compounded by continuing slights and slurs, real and imagined. The political influence of ethnic groups was also evident in formulating Canadian foreign policy, as, for example, in the ill-fated undertaking by the Clark government in 1979 to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem. Prominent public issues such as the vocal support of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians in Canada for powerful independence movements in the Baltic states in the Soviet Union continued to show that Canada was a polyethnic country, where developments in other parts of the world were watched intensely by many Canadians who had close ties with those areas.

Past government treatment of ethnic minorities also emerged as an issue. After a long battle, in 1988 Japanese-Canadians finally won compensation from the Mulroney government for injustices during World War Two. Chinese and Ukrainians have made similar claims for compensation based on the discriminatory Chinese head tax, and mistreatment of Ukrainians during World War I.
The interplay of public opinion on ethnic relations, immigration policy (particularly refugee policy), multiculturalism, and foreign policy provides an ongoing dynamic tension. Public hostility toward Sikhs surged in the mid 1980s as a result of the activities of a tiny group of Sikh extremists who were willing to use violence to promote an independent Sikh state in the Punjab. In 1986 and 1987, there was also a public backlash against the growing number of immigrants who arrived claiming refugee status. While Tamils fleeing civil war in Sri Lanka and Central and South Americans fleeing repressive right-wing regimes had strong reasons to seek political refuge, some Canadians felt immigration laws were lax, and that undesirable immigrants were flooding the country masquerading as political refugees. Canadians were torn between a humanitarian impulse to help victims of political persecution, and a fear that homeland politics would be fought out on Canadian soil, thus compromising Canadian foreign policy and undermining Canadian unity. Constantly changing immigration patterns, including the arrival of growing numbers of non-whites and political refugees, and shifts in the socio-economic status of minorities continue to re-shape ethnic politics in Canada.

VI — CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it is apparent that the early post-World War II era was a watershed in the relationship between ethnicity and politics. After the Second World War, as their numbers and social and economic power increased and as the larger society and economy changed, immigrants and ethnic minorities gained a more prominent role in Canadian political life. As more and more new immigrants went to the cities of central Canada, the major national parties engaged in a determined battle to win their support. The Conservatives at both the national level and in several provinces gradually realized that they had little chance of achieving power unless they appealed to the growing number of immigrants and their descendants. As the two major parties competed fiercely for new voters, ethnic politics was no longer relegated to the margins of Canadian political debate. Changing immigration patterns and the growing power of non-British, non-French minorities eventually led to a totally new conceptualization of Canada as a multicultural society.

Thus, the nature of the relationship between ethnicity and politics has changed significantly since the turn of the century. Political parties now usually strive for the support of non-whites rather than catering to racist public opinion. Though often politically weak or powerless before the Second World War, many ethnic minorities have now gained considerable political power. Individuals of non-British, non-French origin can now achieve the highest political offices in the land. Dave Barrett, premier of British Columbia (1972 to 1975), David Lewis, the national leader of the NDP (1971 to 1975), and Joe Ghiz, elected premier of Prince Edward Island in 1985, two of them Jewish and one a Lebanese Canadian, have shown that ethnic barriers to high public office have declined significantly.
In 1986, Dutch-Canadian Bill Vander Zalm in British Columbia became the first immigrant of non-British origin to become premier of a province. The federal cabinet of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney is also thoroughly polyethnic. At the highest level of political symbolism, the choice of German-Canadian Ed Schreyer as Governor General in 1979 and of Ukrainian-Canadian Ray Hnatyshyn in 1989 represented a reaching out to include people of non-British and non-French background. Schreyer, who had previously helped forge an ethnic coalition in Manitoba that brought the NDP to power in that province in 1969, used many languages in his official speeches to recognize the multicultural nature of Canada.

The political integration of non-British and non-French groups has reached the point that only rarely are individuals seen as representatives of individual groups. The needs and concerns of the “other ethnic groups” are increasingly at least a part of the consciousness of all federal government departments from External Affairs to the military. Provincial and federal civil services now more closely reflect the diversity of Canada’s population, though many ethnic minorities are still underrepresented in relation to their numbers in the population.

During the 20th century the non-British and non-French groups have significantly affected public issues and the fortunes and policies of Canada’s political parties and continue to do so. From the short-lived success of radical labour politics in the West to the strength of the protest parties in the prairies during the 1930s and 1940s, to the weakness of the Conservative party among those of non-British origin until the 1950s, to the long-standing strength of the Liberal party throughout the 20th century, ethnicity has affected the Canadian political process in a myriad of ways that historians and political scientists are just beginning to explore.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY


