TOWARD A QUEBEC MINISTRY OF IMMIGRATION, 1945 TO 1968

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Plus d'importation

Arrêt quasi complet de l'immigration

Nous retournons à l'artisanat

*[Translation] No more imports./An almost total stop to immigration./ We're going back to craft production.

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During the years of prosperity stretching from the end of the Second World War to the oil crisis of 1973, international population movements underwent significant changes - in the nature and size of migration flows as well as in immigrants' points of departure and arrival. Thousands of men and women, full of hope for a better life, came pouring into Canada and Quebec, their dreams encountering those of their new compatriots in the host societies.

An important event took place in Quebec during this period: members of the host society came face to face - in a political sense - with the Stranger who appeared in the guise of the Immigrant. That moment marked the beginning of a dialogue. In order to give meaning to the new environment, each side created an image of the other. Each revised its own values and perceptions, its categories of inclusion and exclusion, its feelings of belonging, its community identity. From this initial dialogue and these changing reference points, each side later developed new strategies better suited to the circumstances.

Slowly, the dialogue in Quebec between the immigrants and the host society was restructured. Because it signified “otherness,” immigration concerned the entire political community (the polis) as expressed in the nation, civil society and the State. The Quebec State became an object of particular attention to those political actors whose imaginations had come to grips with the Immigrant. Operating within Quebec's civil society and the State, these actors included people who exerted various degrees of power, from members of the intelligentsia to elected or appointed political figures, special interest groups such as the Catholic Church, unions and employers' associations. They also included the political parties, mediators of civil society's demands.

From 1945 to 1968, the image of the ideal immigrant changed for these groups. They abandoned ethnic and religious criteria in favour of a model based on homo oeconomicus endowed with characteristics that could be assessed and quantified such as the ability to communicate in the language of the majority, investment potential, and professional qualifications. Not only was a new image of the immigrant created but major aspects of the groups' political imagination also underwent profound change. Territory, that locus of relations between citizens and members of the ethnic groups, was redefined, its boundaries now coinciding with Quebec. The nation, civil society and the Provincial State took on new identities and different roles, especially in the production of norms and symbols. The development of new objectives and strategies reflected a transformation in the way Quebec's political community perceived society. In the minds of many people, the organic community gradually gave way to the contractual one.

The organic community, based on the image of the body, organized the polis vertically, giving the elites a pre-eminent position over the masses. It gave primacy to a hierarchical order where each individual had his or her place, function, duties, and responsibilities. This community possessed two transcendent attributes - ethnicity and religion - and it also was infused with a historical
life and destiny. Its advocates believed it was vital to regulate the Stranger's inclusion in and exclusion from the organic community because the presence of foreign elements might upset the internal order and, in doing so, threaten the survival of the body politic. The contractual community, for its part, gave primacy to the autonomy of the individual, endowed with rights and freedoms and able to negotiate contracts with others and with the community. This representation of the community was based on a horizontal organization of the polis, on the value of individual freedom and pluralism, as well as on the primacy of the economy in the management of human relations. Transcendent references to law and democracy ensured the continuity of the contractual community. Law provided the foundations and language for contracts; democracy extended participation to all citizens. To reduce the number of conflicts leading to anomie - that is a lack of norms which could be very damaging to the future of the contractual community - the inclusion and exclusion of the Stranger had to be regulated by means of rational, practical criteria, arrived at through consensus among all members of the society.

From the immediate post-war period to the Tremblay Commission and its aftermath, from the parliamentary debate on the motion of Union nationale MLA Gabriel Loubier in 1965 to the establishment of administrative structures to deal with newcomers, steps were taken leading to the creation of the Quebec Department of Immigration in December 1968. This marked an important milestone in the development of the overall configuration of the norms and symbols of the Quebec State. This study examines the trends underlying immigration to Quebec between 1945 and 1968. It also examines the values and perceptions of the political actors involved as well as the strategies they used to achieve their goals. Their understanding of immigration went through several phases, conditioned as it was by a perceived hostility of Quebeckers toward immigrants and the need for political action.

**IMMIGRATION FROM 1945 TO 1968: THE FACTS**

Beginning in 1945, a wave of international migration flowed from various sources according to different pressures. It included among others the victims of war, refugees from a world conflict that was coming to an end, as well as the exiles of a Cold War that was just beginning. Fleeing devastation and persecution, they became DP's, the displaced persons of the late 1940s. Then the situation changed, and with it the immigration of the next decades. The West came out of the Great Depression bruised and battered, but invigorated by the wartime industrial effort and the early development of mass consumer society, fuelled by technological progress. There began a period of unprecedented prosperity that relied, among other things, on immigrants. This state of abundance fascinated and attracted immigrants. With the help of technology, the means of communication and transportation improved, facilitating exchange and travel. Finally, in a world of constant communication and interaction, liberalism flourished in practice and in thought. Individuals gradually came to perceive the Nation-State as a place in which they could achieve their pursuit of happiness and with which
they could make temporary agreements of mutual interest. These contracts could be terminated when they left the territory in question. From that point on, the State, with its permeable borders, felt itself torn between maintaining the status quo and observing the rule of law, which is its raison d’être and the basis for the individual’s adherence to the State.

Canada was not left untouched by these global trends. Its post-war economic structure changed radically. As a result of mechanization, farming and mining came to rely less on human resources. In industrial and urban areas, such as in the Great Lakes area, the manufacturing and service sectors grew rapidly. This required a work force that was less captive, more autonomous, and more skilled. Immigrants who had capital or were able to generate it were in demand.

The Canadian State, which according to political scientist Alan Cairns is fully embedded in society, was well aware of the needs at hand. Motivated by a desire to ensure internal security, it was both proactive and reactive in immigration matters. In May 1947 Mackenzie King’s government announced a policy to increase the Canadian population through selective immigration that would ensure smooth and harmonious integration into the economic structure and social fabric of the country. There was now no longer any basis for the formal criteria of ethnic discrimination that had previously guided Canadian immigration policy. The federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration first relaxed these criteria in 1948, then abolished them in 1962. In 1967 the Canadian government rationalized its standards for inclusion and exclusion by setting up a point system that quantified an immigrant’s worth in terms of education, skills, and resources. At the same time, Ottawa encouraged the establishment of a sponsor system that would reduce the cost of integrating immigrants into Canadian society. These actions along with existing trends in civil society changed the face of Canadian immigration. Coming initially from eastern and southern Europe, then from Asia and the Americas, immigrants formed large minority groups, concentrated in urban centres with solid support networks to facilitate their integration.

Quebec immigration fitted the same pattern. The origins of immigrants, which differed more and more from the two dominant cultures, their professional qualifications, and the way they integrated into society were similar to those observed elsewhere in Canada. However, some differences were apparent. Despite the overall increase in the number of immigrants and a pattern of migration flow similar to that in Ontario and Canada as a whole, Quebec lagged behind in both relative and absolute terms (see tables and statistics at the end of this study). As well, the geographical and linguistic choices of new citizens reflected their search for a better life and the improvement of their economic situation. Upon arrival, the vast majority of immigrants opted for the most important economic area, Montréal. They adopted English, the lingua di pane of North America, rather than French. Finally, immigration had important demographic, socio-economic, and political consequences: it changed the delicate balance within Quebec. The urban, ethnic, and linguistic make-up of the population was transformed. Economic development was also affected since immigrants were a source of labour and investment. Moreover, since the province received proportionally
fewer immigrants than did other regions of Canada, in the long run immigration threatened to upset the balance of political power between Canada and Quebec.

REALITY, PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES

Throughout this period, points of reference began to emerge for many political actors. They were guided by two assumptions considered to be objective truths. First, they believed that the general public had a definite view of immigration - a generally negative one - especially among French Canadians who were thought to display a hostile indifference, if not outright xenophobia, towards immigrants. But there was nothing to back this view up. Between 1945 and 1968 there were no elections or referendums in Quebec specifically dealing with immigration. Gallup polls and opinion surveys, such as those conducted in 1952 by the Institute of Social Psychology at the Université de Montréal and by sociologist Paul Cappon during the language crisis of 1968-69, were the only tools available for gauging attitudes and their consistency. These studies had many shortcomings. Developed from standardized samples and using questionnaires based on pre-established hypotheses that elicited simplistic responses, they viewed the population as an amorphous block and assumed that all people were capable of forming a relevant opinion on issues on which a consensus was assumed to exist. Moreover, they relied heavily on current circumstances to draw long-term conclusions. Finally, they did not take into account evidence from the actual experience of co-existence which provided much more telling evidence of the inclusion of the Stranger - for example, the adoption of new cultural behaviour, interethnic marriages, or the existence of formal and informal social and support networks.

Whether the population really displayed xenophobic attitudes matters little. Much more important is the fact that the political actors were convinced that such sentiments existed. The sincere belief that their fellow citizens were hostile and indifferent became an authoritative argument to justify their own perceptions and behaviour. According to this analysis, all French Canadians were influenced by a traditional nationalism, symptomatic of a closed, minority society. Worse still, because of their economic inferiority, French Canadians were thought to fear competition from the immigrant who was misrepresented as a “job thief.” Reflecting a condescending and elitist attitude toward the “masses” trapped by obscurantism, these prejudices were presented as truths and remained unchanged throughout the period.

From 1945 on, based on these beliefs and on their own feeling of urgency, political actors gradually convinced themselves that the Quebec State had a corrective role to play in the matter. Section 95 of the British North America Act recognized the respective powers of the two levels of government. Accordingly, for a growing number of political actors, Quebec could and should set norms to deal with what they saw as the highly destabilizing effects of immigration.

On the basis of their own values, perceptions, and priorities, they adopted two different strategies. Some opted for inertia and laissez faire, true to a certain
notion of liberalism and distrustful of the State’s power. For them, other major issues made immigration a low priority in the political agenda. They felt that Ottawa, not Québec, should take the initiative, given immigration’s relation to individual rights and freedoms. The problem, they argued, would take care of itself naturally, without unwarranted, excessive meddling by the Quebec State. Moreover, intervention would risk damaging other political objectives by awakening the general public’s xenophobic attitudes.

A second group put all their energies into calling for action by the Quebec State that would fit in with their objectives and attitudes. Sometimes more sensitive to collective rights because of their nationalist or religious background, sometimes driven by their pursuit of economic success, these *policy entrepreneurs* (to use political scientist John Kingdon’s expression) were alarmed by a perceived imbalance and its disastrous consequences. They felt it was necessary to force nature, to harness it through rules and regulations. Any indifference or hostility among the population could be eradicated with adequate sensitization to the Stranger. It was abundantly clear to them that the Province of Quebec had to act quickly to establish selection, recruitment, reception, and integration policies. To do this, it had to create administrative infrastructures, an immigration service, or even a ministry. The Quebec State would fulfill a twofold mission of prescribing and enacting norms, ensuring that immigration was in tune with the host society, its values and its needs, and educating the population in the modern virtues of pluralism and economic progress.

Conflict between these two strategies and their advocates developed in two stages. From 1945 to 1965, the advocates of a plan of State action came mostly from civil society - members of the intelligentsia and pressure groups. The political parties and leaders preferred inaction. The Loubier motion, debated in February 1965 in the Legislative Assembly, was a turning point. Thereafter, provincial involvement became a more popular option among Quebec political leaders. Quebec governments first created a service and then a branch to deal with immigration. In December 1968, in the context of new power relations at the constitutional level, and in the wake of the language crisis that broke out because of the Saint-Léonard case, Jean-Jacques Bertrand’s government created the Quebec Ministry of Immigration.

**IN ITS OWN IMAGE. THE IDEAL IMMIGRANT IN THE ORGANIC COMMUNITY, 1945–1965**

At the end of hostilities in 1945, immigration still seemed to be an abstract idea and it ranked low in the political priorities of the day. In fact, few articles were written on the subject before 1948. After that date, however, the increasing number of immigrants who landed in the ports of Montréal and Québec challenged the political imagination of interested members of civil society. Given their organic and elitist view of the body politic and their perception of the masses, they labelled immigrants as needy and changeable individuals. Lacking
solid leaders, these rootless people, it was thought, could destabilize the social order and undermine common values. An image of the ideal immigrant emerged from these stereotypes. The ideal immigrant, it was thought, would possess the same values, characteristics, ethnic background, and religion as the dominant culture. For French-Canadian nationalists, the ideal immigrant would be a French or Belgian Catholic.

Already in June 1945, the nationalist journal *L'Action nationale* set the tone with an article by Jean-Paul Fugère who somewhat condescendingly deplored what he saw as opportunistic immigration that "lacked leaders" and was hardly made up of "the cream of European society." Fugère was of the opinion that "understanding" French Canadians should provide leadership for immigrants in order to forge an alliance with them to "make sure that the grievances of the French-Canadian nation would be addressed." Regarding Montréal, he wrote, "unless there is a flood of immigration, the danger of a shift in the ethnic make-up of the population is remote." In his view, therefore, the services of the Provincial State would not be needed.

Between 1945 and 1965, Fugère’s reassuring words were not shared by all. In the minds of many, immigration caused problems; it was a destabilizing force. Since the Quebec State was not prepared to intervene, they turned to the Federal State as the authority primarily responsible for setting norms of inclusion and exclusion. Between 1921 and 1949, leaders of the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada [Canadian Confederation of Catholic Labourers], or CTCC, fearing the "invasion of American union leaders," communist infiltration, and competition from the immigrant workforce, sent twenty-one resolutions to Ottawa urging the suspension of all but agricultural immigration. Similarly, the executive of the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec [Quebec Federation of Labour], or FTQ, passed two resolutions at its 1960 conference asking Ottawa to "restrict immigration in order to end unemployment and the exploitation of immigrants by employers." Employers’ associations, however, adopted a different, more liberal position. They supported the introduction of a new workforce because it contributed to their pursuit of profits. But their position did not rule out norms for regulating immigration based on an organic concept of community. An example of this is the Chambre de commerce du district de Montréal (Montreal and Area Chamber of Commerce) in its promotion of French immigration. In 1947, before the Senate Committee on Immigration, the Chambre de commerce asked the Federal State to extend the definition of preferred immigrant to the French. Ottawa acceded to this request in 1948. Four years later the Chambre de commerce presented a brief to federal minister of Citizenship and Immigration Walter Harris, asking for joint management of French immigration by the two levels of government, Ottawa and Québec. However, this request was categorically rejected.

Faced with immigrants who were different from themselves, other political actors also reacted strongly. For them, the demographic and cultural imbalance caused by immigration reflected the betrayal of the pact between the two nations that shared the Canadian territory. This territorial pact was one of the driving
forces behind their concept of the organic community. Concerned nationalists such as Dominique Beaudin of *L'Action nationale* in 1948, saw immigration as "the invasion of the hordes from northern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean." According to Beaudin, the federal government was responsible for this "ill-considered immigration," by "giving the country away to foreigners of all races," it was destroying "this greatly desired national unity." Political leaders such as the nationalist René Chaloult and the Liberal Adélard Godbout shared these concerns. In 1947 Godbout denounced the federal government’s "unreasonable immigration policy" because it did not give "preference to people who speak our language and practise our religion." As well, the myth of a conspiracy to assimilate French Canadians was greatly exaggerated in the minds of a handful of nationalist and antisemitic ideologues. From 1948 to 1951, the highly symbolic case of French collaborator and militiaman Count Jacques de Bernonville served to confirm allegations of conspiracy for Robert Rumilly, Philippe Hamel, and Camillien Houde. They concluded that even if he were a war criminal, this French Catholic aristocrat was closer to their conception of the ideal immigrant than the miserable DPs who, in their worse case scenario, might turn out to be Jews or Anglo-Saxon communists. They violently condemned federal authorities for deporting de Bernonville and accused them of trying to bring about assimilation.

Other members of civil society were unconcerned about occasional cases involving French collaborators. In the late forties and early fifties they were much more concerned with the daily reality of immigration, and became actively involved in the immigrants' arrival, settlement, and integration. The CTCC created an immigrant aid service in order to recruit new members and in 1960 it cut its ties with the Catholic Church in order to represent non-Catholic workers, many of whom were immigrants. In the fifties private charitable organizations such as the Accueil franco-canadien, the Société catholique d’aide aux immigrants, the Association des immigrés français and the Société d’assistance aux immigrants [the Franco-Canadian Reception Agency, the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society, the Association of French Emigrants, and the Society for Aid to Immigrants] made up for the lack of State action by providing services to immigrants. In 1947 the Montréal Catholic School Commission created a committee on new Canadians directed by René Gauthier. Policy entrepreneurs mobilized to win the province's help for these efforts. In order to be effective, however, such support would have to be coupled with State norms on immigration. In the absence of cooperation from the political parties whose centralized power structures limited the possibility of participatory decision-making, they attempted to make the voters aware of the urgency of the situation.

Their campaign found its way into the press. The journal *Relations*, published by the Jesuits of the École sociale populaire, called for greater co-operation between French Canadians and new Canadians in order to fulfill the mission given to Catholics to establish a "Christian social order in our country." Between 1947 and 1956 the journal devoted many cover pages to immigration, encouraging co-operation by making readers more aware of the *Stranger*. Using arguments based on the encyclical *Exsul familia*, that "charter of human rights" written by Pius XII,
Relations advocated a spirit of charity toward "our immigrant brothers in Christ." According to the journal and its collaborators, including Richard Arès and René Gauthier, this generosity and empathy should go hand in hand with respect and justice "for the two great races of the country." The State, they felt, should not play an interventionist role in this matter. Quebec should adopt a cautious yet appropriate policy, choosing immigrants who were "family-oriented, farmers, and Catholics of French or Latin origin." These ideas were also current among Catholic organizations. For example, Caritas-Canada, a group of Catholic charities, presented a brief to the Tremblay Commission in April 1954 and then passed two related resolutions at its conference in May 1955. Emphasizing the Christian values of charity and acceptance, the organization reminded the provincial State of its constitutional powers and urged it to implement a "realistic" immigration policy. However, as the influence of religion waned in Quebec after 1957, Catholic institutions became silent on the issue. Their attention shifted instead to the need to adapt the Church to modern society.

Without neglecting the religious aspect of the issue, some members of the intelligentsia who supported provincial intervention focused on the ethnic dimension of the organic community. Prior to the report of the Tremblay Commission in 1956, articles in L'Action nationale and Le Devoir by Fernand Dansereau, Gérard Filion, Pierre Laporte, André Laurendeau, Camille L'Heureux and especially Jean-Marc Léger dealt with the ethnic imbalances caused by immigration. For them, the theory of the assimilationist plot did not on its own explain the situation. The traditional indifference and hostility of French Canadians toward immigration, an attitude derived from what Filion called French Canadians' "bee-hive" mentality, was at the core of the problem. In their view, the lack of interest was such that immigrants would opt for English over French, thus threatening "the development of the French fact" and even the "French presence in America." Laurendeau sounded the alarm in 1956: "Unless French Canada wakes up, we are heading toward a catastrophe." In order to produce norms of inclusion and to eradicate the supposed indifference of the population, these writers followed the example of Léger and insisted on the moral obligation of "the only French provincial state in Canada." They argued that the constitutional rights of the province went hand in hand with certain duties. By taking decisive action, Quebec could establish a population policy that would be the driving force behind "rational and selective immigration" and which would provide financial and technical support for organizations helping new Canadians, especially those working for the ideal French, Belgian, or Swiss immigrant. Until 1956, they were uncompromising in their advocacy of such action. The inaction of the Quebec State was therefore seen as nothing less than gross negligence. There was bitter criticism of "the champions of provincial autonomy" who, they claimed, wanted to leave it up "to the federal government to shape Quebec's ethnic make-up."

After 1956, in light of the meagre response from political leaders, these policy entrepreneurs abandoned the strategy of appealing to public opinion through articles in L'Action nationale and Le Devoir. The ethnic issue then faded slowly
from view, even though some continued to be guided by it. In 1960 Martial Picard discussed the "threat to French Canadians' survival as a unique ethnic group in America", in *Le Canada français face à l'immigration* [French Canada Confronts Immigration]. For reasons of both religion and nationalism, he proposed a "policy of far-sightedness" based on informing, welcoming, and integrating immigrants. The provincial and federal States would have to assist institutions within civil society in implementing this policy. Picard's program was never adopted, even though the Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec (FSSJBQ) endorsed his recommendations. Since the political context was changing under the influence of new social conflicts, policy entrepreneurs had to change their way of looking at things. They began to see immigration in another light and changed their idea of Quebec State action and their strategies for reaching their objectives. Joseph-Giuseppe Turi was one of the first to express this new perspective. In his briefs to Minister of Cultural Affairs Georges-Émile Lapalme in October 1961 and again before the parliamentary committee on the Constitution in the spring of 1964, he deplored the "indifferent and sometimes hostile behaviour of Quebec," which was causing the anglicization of immigrants and the eventual "balkanization" of the province. He called on Quebec to act "without restructuring the current Canadian system." There were two new elements in his approach. First, the ethnic origin and religion of immigrants were no longer important as long as they adopted French as the language of communication. Second, a modern bureaucratic State was the architect of immigration policy through a "provincial immigration commission" composed of experts. Recruiting new Quebec citizens "from all the countries with high rates of emigration," the commission would integrate them through "education, cultural policy, and job placement." In 1964, Turi's proposals caught the attention of political leaders Maurice Bellemare, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, and René Lévesque, and they all drew on them a year later.

Before 1965 and the Loubier motion, the immigration issue was not a priority for Quebec politicians. The stand taken by political parties reflected the limited attention the issue received. The Union nationale was silent on the matter, except for an election promise made by Maurice Duplessis. During the 1944 campaign he stated that he would fight "all immigration proposals until such time as all Canadian-born citizens had been reintegrated into civilian life and paying jobs". As for the Liberals, it was not until 1956, through the efforts of their leader, Georges-Émile Lapalme, that they recognized "the right and the obligation of the province to have and implement an explicit policy in all areas in which the Canadian Constitution gives it responsibility." In 1959, in *Pour une politique* [Toward a Policy], Lapalme was more specific, suggesting "a massive importation of French teachers" and the recruitment of "craftsmen, industrial, and agricultural technicians, experts, skilled labourers, teachers," and industrialists. He even proposed a Quebec Ministry of Immigration, but his idea was not included in the 1960 and 1962 programs of the Liberal party.

This is not to say that during this period Quebec political authorities were not aware of the importance of the problem. Antonio Rivard, solicitor general in
several Union nationale governments, showed his interest in and his sympathy for Italian immigrants on many occasions, while Duplessis expressed reservations and even suspicion regarding immigrants who, because they were different, did not conform to his view of the organic community. Until 1944, Duplessis's comments varied according to the audience he was addressing and were designed to court favour with the electorate. He either expressed sympathy toward immigrants or indulged in xenophobic demagoguery. Afterwards, as premier between 1944 and 1959, le Chef had little to say on the subject. In 1946, he made a distinction between “good” and “bad” immigrants according to their ability to become an integral part of the organic community. The first recognized the importance “we sincerely and without fanfare place on religion.” The others, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and communists, rejected Catholicism and threatened the established order. In a letter to federal Minister W. Harris in 1952, Duplessis acknowledged “that immigration can be supported” if “the needs and rights of the population” were respected. According to Duplessis, the ideal immigrant would have to “completely adapt to Canadian traditions and the Canadian way of life.” Moreover, the ideal immigrant should not support “subversive or communist ideals” because such ideas “had no place in Canada, particularly in Quebec.” But this refusal to accept the Stranger did not in itself explain Duplessis's reservations. He preferred to put his energy into fighting federal centralization and consequently refused to participate in joint immigration programs proposed by Ottawa.

Since the Legislative Assembly was a forum for the political community and a place where legislative norms and major symbols were established, its debates reflected certain concerns about immigration. Several times between 1945 and 1965, its members examined the issue without establishing a framework for a full-scale Quebec initiative. In February 1948 a motion by independent MLA René Chaloult condemning the federal government’s immigration policy was passed unanimously. Once again, Chaloult tabled a motion on 15 January 1952 urging the province to encourage French immigration by setting up agencies in foreign countries and reception organizations within Quebec. Duplessis opposed this on the grounds that international affairs fell outside the province’s purview. His position, however, did not prevent him from getting Bill 38 approved at the request of the archbishop of Montréal, Paul-Émile cardinal Léger. The Bill established a provincial committee to aid Hungarian refugees who were fleeing the Red Army’s brutal attempt to “normalize” the situation in their country. The legislation became part of Cold War rhetoric. Eager to come to “the aid of the unfortunate victims of Bolshevism,” Duplessis seemed to be driven by an almost visceral anticommunism, by a desire to please Léger, but also by a belief in the value of Christian charity. In March 1961, despite a stormy debate on the appropriateness of state intervention, a majority of members of the Legislative Assembly passed a law creating the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. According to Premier Jean Lesage, who was largely unopposed on this point, one segment of the ministry, the Service du Canada français d’outre-frontières [French Canada Overseas Service], would be in charge of the “voluntary integration” of immigrants. Finally, following the Évian accords of 1962, nearly one million pieds-noirs [Algerian-born French men and women] left the newly independent Algerian
state. Since they were both French and Catholic, they seemed to be ideal immigrants. On 11 June 1964 opposition leader Daniel Johnson questioned the Lesage government on the possibility of provincial action to recruit these refugees. Lesage referred the question to Alcide Courcy, minister of Agriculture and Colonization, whose ministry, a vestige of the division of powers at Confederation in 1867, retained a certain jurisdiction in immigration matters. Courcy approved the decision of his deputy minister, Ernest Mercier, who preferred to encourage the settlement of Quebec farmers rather than pieds-noirs. He then turned down the recruitment plans drawn up by advisors at the Quebec delegation in Paris.

The State not only created norms and symbols through legislation, but also used consultative processes to create voluntary, consensual norms. Once again, such processes did not provide common and cohesive parameters for provincial action in immigration matters. During this period, the most important consultative exercise was the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems under Judge Thomas Tremblay. Between 1953 and 1956, the Commission, with members Richard Arès and Esdras Minville in the forefront, held meetings, discussed the issue with representatives of civil society, and reflected on the role and nature of the provincial state according to their interpretation of the constitution and the nation. Immigration did not escape their notice. In presenting their briefs, two policy entrepreneurs, the Société d’aide aux immigrants and the Montréal and District Chambre de Commerce, focussed on one point in particular. Following in the footsteps of the nationalists of Le Devoir and L’Action nationale, the Société considered immigration to be an “unavoidable issue.” “The Catholic nation” and “French State of Quebec” should pay attention to the question. Consequently, in repatriating powers from the federal state, the province should adopt a “realistic policy,” developed by a “standing advisory committee” and based on the integration of immigrants into civil society and on the presence of Quebec abroad. The Chambre de Commerce made the same recommendations, although it did suggest more of a decision-making administrative infrastructure and closer co-operation between the two levels of government. However, the positions of these two bodies differed in certain ways. For the businessmen of the Chambre de Commerce, who were very sympathetic to French immigrants, “immigration must in the end depend on the country’s capacity to absorb” in light of such implications as economic growth and demographic balance.

The commissioners reacted differently and in a somewhat contradictory way to each brief. First, they rejected out of hand the proposals of the Société d’aide aux immigrants. In their opinion, natural growth, since it did not cause any imbalances, remained the preferred means for the organic community to reproduce itself. Therefore, “history could continue” as before and “the province could do without immigration.” However, at the last minute, when their report was nearly finished, the commissioners received the Chambre de Commerce brief and were almost entirely converted to its point of view. This shows how much influence this employers’ association exerted. In their view, state intervention now
became essential to ensure the stability of the French-Canadian nation within Confederation. Unfortunately for them, their call for vigorous action by the Quebec State was turned down by the premier. As soon as the report was presented in February 1956, Duplessis shelved it. As a result, the main policy entrepreneurs put off plans for political action on immigration indefinitely.

Throughout this period, the issue of immigration challenged the provincial bureaucrats responsible for enforcing norms and promoting State symbols. The management of migration flows and their effects was paralysed by obsolete administrative structures, a reluctance to take action, and a lack of consensus on the path to follow. The Ministry of Agriculture and Colonization was in charge of immigration, but it was neither prepared for nor interested in managing what was essentially an urban phenomenon. This reluctance was evident during the debate in 1961 on the Commission des écoles catholiques de Montréal's proposal of a bilingual curriculum for immigrant children. Faced with the English-speaking Quebeckers' vehement objection to the project's emphasis on French, the school board backed down, much to the displeasure of nationalists such as Jean-Marc Léger. Despite the pressure put on the provincial state, neither the Ministry of Public Instruction Branch nor the Ministry of Youth wanted to become involved. Until 1965, the international relations sector of the Quebec State was the only one that intervened. And even then, the Service du Canada français d'outre-frontière, despite the mandate given by the premier, preferred to cultivate relationships with Francophone communities in North America rather than oversee the integration of new citizens. Thus the only real contribution to the question was the counselling work done by Charles Lussier, the Quebec delegate to Paris, who in 1964 admitted spending a considerable amount of time directing prospective French immigrants "toward the appropriate offices in the Canadian Embassy."

A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1965 - 1968

In the Quebec of the Quiet Revolution, the constant presence of the Stranger, the Immigrant, became a daily point of reference - one which gradually undermined the concepts of organic community, the nation, civil society, and the State. The political players in Quebec now re-established harmony with their surroundings and found new ways of perceiving and doing. Giving their views and actions new meanings based on the values and principles of rational inquiry, they integrated new representations into their imagination. They conceived a model of the immigrant as \textit{homo oeconomicus}, with assessable, quantifiable characteristics such as language of communication, investment potential, and professional qualifications. Quebec political actors now saw the ideal immigrant as a tool for economic and national development and redirected their objectives and strategies accordingly.

The new language and action concerning immigration were signs of a more profound change occurring during the Quiet Revolution. A period crucial to the
elaboration of the norms and symbols of the provincial State began. The Quebec State became a catalyst for development and an integral part of a nation now defined by its territory. It assumed as well the role of co-ordinating efforts to catch up with other industrialized societies. To do this, the State reassessed its constitutional powers and the boundaries of its territory that no longer coincided with French Canada but with Quebec. It needed new norms of inclusion and exclusion, new symbols to ensure the adherence of all its citizens. In attributing to the State the task of catching up, many players in civil society submitted to its authority. Yet according to philosopher Michel Foucault, “there is no power relationship without the concomitant establishment of a field of knowledge.” A symbiotic relationship emerged between the knowledge produced by the members of civil society and that produced by the Quebec State, knowledge concerning its territorial and democratic points of reference as well as the use of its code, the law. Not only did these political actors influence the objectives and strategies of the State, but in a way they also adopted the values, symbols, and representations which were those of a democratic State. In doing so, they abandoned the organic trappings of ethnicity and religion. A new, more contractual vision of community emerged through changes in values and representations. The new political community became organized around a basic principle, the voluntary adherence of its citizens.

A single event, pivotal in its content and effects, reflected the Nation-State’s new approach to immigration. On Wednesday 3 February 1965, in the Legislative Assembly, Gabriel Loubier, young firebrand of the Union nationale opposition, tabled a motion proposing the “immediate” creation “of a service or ministry of immigration.” Recalling the province’s constitutional powers and referring to the American example, Loubier outlined his strategy. In order that immigration no longer be “a way for the federal government to alter the cultural make-up of Quebec,” provincial involvement was required. Quebec’s actions should always be based on “economic interests” and serve to welcome and integrate new citizens so that they could “preserve their legitimate differences” and “contribute to Quebec life.”

On 10 and 17 February members on both sides of the legislature, including the new minister of Cultural Affairs, Pierre Laporte, reacted favourably to Loubier’s motion. Of course, some MLAs did some finger-pointing. Jean-Jacques Bertrand denounced “the serious negligence of federal authorities in this area.” Gabriel Loubier accused Quebec of having “never done anything to control immigration in the province and of having never encouraged it in a logical manner.” Nevertheless, following the example of Daniel Johnson, who maintained that “immigration may not be an option, but a necessity for Quebec,” members agreed that the situation was urgent.

Discussions focused on the guiding principles behind the provincial initiative. Members identified economic concerns, such as the development of natural resources for Pierre Laporte, the planning of human resource requirements for Daniel Johnson, and the creation of a domestic market for René Lévesque. But there was more. According to Lévesque, the principal reason for intervention was
demographic, given the fact that the vast majority of immigrants became angli-
cized. Laporte added, “we need to take action if we want to maintain a balance
between people of French culture and the others in Canada.” Moreover, the
symbols of the Nation-State would be enhanced by a new ministry. Loubier spoke
of the prestige Quebec would enjoy in the eyes of foreign countries and the status
it would gain in the eyes of the federal state. To enable Quebec to be “on an equal
footing with Ottawa in this area,” Johnson linked the Quebec initiative and the
constitutional question. Since the State had to act in conformity with ethical
norms and especially with the need to maintain unity, any state initiative would
need to respect certain moral and humanitarian imperatives. Thus René Lévesque
saw the human and social problems facing new citizens as a call to action. Jean-
Jacques Bertrand invoked Catholic doctrine as set out in the papal encyclical
Pacem in Terris, which recognized the individual’s right to immigrate. “Charity is
a duty,” said Bertrand, and therefore “it is incumbent upon the government to
welcome immigrants and, to the extent that it is compatible with the best interests
of its citizens, encourage those who wish to become members of the national
community.”

On the basis of these principles, members argued, without reaching an agree-
ment, over the norms governing a citizen’s inclusion in the community. Reflecting
his belief in an organic community, Liberal MLA Ernest Godbout advocated the
concept of jus sanguinis (rights based on origin), because the French-Canadian
nation was deeply attached “to its language, its religion, its mores, its culture.”
Immigrants, he contended, “found it hard to become members of the nation or to
identify with it”. Others favoured the concept of jus solis (rights based on
territory). According to René Lévesque, “the right to justice and social equality
was not reserved for those who were fifth-generation Quebeckers.” On the
contrary, those rights would be enjoyed “by anyone living in the province, paying
taxes, and raising a family.”

After an amendment delaying the creation of a department of immigration, the
Legislative Assembly adopted Loubier’s motion. The dynamic and enthusiastic
Pierre Laporte immediately announced the cabinet’s decision. As of 1 March
1965, the province would have an immigration service, connected to the Service
du Canada français d’outre-frontières. The technical advisor in charge of the
project, Juliette Barcelo, was to “determine procedures for developing an effective
immigration policy” in order to make newcomers “full citizens.” On the initiative
of Pierre Laporte, Deputy Minister Guy Frégault, and Juliette Barcelo, an
interdepartmental committee on immigration met from June to October 1965.
Dovetailing with the white paper on cultural affairs, the committee drew up a list
of recommendations promoting the attraction and integration “of immigrants in
accordance with Quebec’s economic and cultural requirements”. The committee
also proposed the negotiation of a federal-provincial agreement under which
Quebec could contribute to the development of Canadian policy. At the end of
her mandate in March 1966, Barcelo recommended that the public service assume
responsibility for Quebec’s immigration initiative, as this would ensure greater
coopération and co-ordination between government bodies. Laporte and
Frégault pursued this recommendation, and on 1 April 1966, the minister of Cultural Affairs created an immigration branch with greater responsibilities than those of a simple immigration service. However, the election of the Union nationale in June 1966 pushed Laporte out and broke the previously created momentum.

The willingness of political leaders to take action paralleled the Zeitgeist, the spirit of the times. New actors and the need to create harmony with the new context gave rise to a host of projects conveying new values and representations. In 1965 several policy entrepreneurs in civil society reopened the immigration file. They developed a framework of norms for the inclusion of immigrants and helped draft the provisions of a new social contract. Their modern concept of the contractual community took on one of the paradoxes of modernity, encompassing an order that was both normative and rational and provided both freedom and discipline.

The liberal norms were essentially those of business people. Loyal to the values of liberalism, progress, and rational thought, they created an ideal model of the immigrant whose contours were instrumental and utilitarian. For them, the immigrant was an asset, a tool for generating wealth, especially if he or she possessed marketable skills. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce believed that immigration should be promoted naturally. Minimal rules would be established by a leader, the Canadian State, and its subordinates, the provinces. Following the example of United Aircraft in Longueuil, a number of companies recruited such immigrants overseas. The Montreal Board of Trade, for its part, stated that norms of inclusion such as those governing language, should not hinder the immigrant’s freedom, lest they harm the sacrosanct objective of economic development. The Canadian Italian Professional and Businessmen’s Association (CIPBA), composed of the prominenti of the Italian-Quebec community, insisted that the provincial state establish “standardized norms of skill” to facilitate “the professional and social integration of the immigrant.”

Other policy entrepreneurs in civil society subscribed to liberal norms as well as to a view of the Quebec State’s role that was non-coercive and non-discriminatory. In search of a “balance between the workforce and immigration,” the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) [Confederation of National Trade Unions] felt the immigrant should become an integral part of the host society. “Work,” it stated in 1967, “is the best way for an immigrant to integrate.” The State’s job would be to provide the worker with greater access to the job market without any occupational discrimination. The Eleventh Conference on Social Life, held in June 1965 under the sponsorship of the Catholic Semaines sociales du Canada, defined a humanitarian mission for the State with respect to immigrants. In April 1966 the Conseil des œuvres de l’archidioèse de Québec [Quebec Archdiocesan Committee on Works] urged the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to act: the province of Quebec should respect immigrants’ right to integration by abolishing restrictive regulations and by creating new administrative structures to manage the process of settlement. Yet in the midst of this restructuring, Catholic groups were losing their influence in society. Following the
example of the journal *Relations*, they became less vocal - a sign of religion's declining importance in the organic community.

Advocates of disciplinary norms, for their part, wanted the Quebec State to take on a more directive role through more effective and rational government involvement and planning. The political parties became the advocates of immigrant integration through economic means. For them the State had to show the way. In its 1966 election platform, the Liberal Party of Quebec maintained that the province should “effectively assume and exercise” its responsibilities for the integration of immigrant workers. The Union nationale proposed the creation of a national centre for demographic studies, the main function of which would be “to provide the necessary tools” for properly planning the integration of new citizens, especially in the economic sphere.

The resurgence of interest in immigration and Quebec’s initiative paralleled developments in the nationalist movement which also favoured disciplinary norms. Several of its advocates were coming to accept a contractual representation of the community. But the transition was not a smooth and even one. For Michel Brunet and Rosaire Morin, the *Genius* of the French-Canadian nation would always direct the integration of the *Stranger*. In his 1966 pamphlet, *L’immigration au Canada* [Immigration in Canada], Morin condescendingly described the immigrant as a wanderer “whose understanding of Canadian life was based on natural, respectable, but foreign sentiments”. Others preferred rational criteria. For them, it was the immigrants’ linguistic choices, not their ethnicity, that threatened the demographic balance. According to Pierre Bourgault, head of the Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN) [Party of National Independence], it mattered little “that the immigrants which we need are English, German, Italian, or French, as long as circumstances force them to integrate with the French-speaking majority in Quebec”. Language thus replaced the innate criterion of ethnicity as a norm of inclusion. As a result, an instrumental representation of the immigrant would dominate. In this perspective, the new citizen became a tool for national development, thus ensuring the re-establishment of a demographic balance.

The interventionist role of the Quebec State in immigration should follow rational, linguistic norms. The November 1967 resolutions of the États généraux du Canada français [Estates General of French Canada] were along the same lines, advocating the integration of immigrants within the territory of a democratic, French-speaking Nation-State. In the same year, proclaiming his belief in independence, Jean-Marc Léger ascribed to a sovereign State the “total control over immigration policy” and the power to make French “the required language, that is, the only language.” Also in 1967, constitutional expert Jacques Brossard presented his study *L’immigration; Les droits et pouvoirs du Canada et du Québec* [Immigration. The Rights and Powers of Canada and Quebec] to the Quebec parliamentary committee on the Constitution. The conclusions of the study, begun in 1965, outlined the parameters of a legally constituted State’s sphere of action. Brossard focussed mainly on the naturalization, citizenship, selection, recruitment, and integration of immigrants. For Brossard, the immigration issue
remained subordinate to the need for constitutional recognition. Until the province acquired more powers, its action would remain limited and it would be unable to select immigrants on the basis of economic, social, and cultural usefulness. Because of its legal content and its conclusions, Brossard’s work became the main reference point for Quebec’s political leaders.

Yet such leaders were slow to act after the election of Daniel Johnson’s government. From the start, there was no co-ordination or consensus on the norms of inclusion for the Stranger. The government set aside a small, symbolic budget for immigration. The immigration branch was preoccupied with its own transfer from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to the Provincial Secretariat. Furthermore, the ministers responsible for immigration, Jean-Noël Tremblay of Cultural Affairs and Yves Gabias of the Provincial Secretariat, showed no interest whatsoever, preferring to leave the matter to other government bodies. As a result, Quebec’s economic affairs bureau in Milan, under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, recruited skilled technicians. The Ministry of Education, for its part, set up immigrant orientation and training centres in May 1967, under the leadership of Minister of State Marcel Masse. Tremblay and Gabias made the situation even worse by derailing initiatives of several senior officials. In January 1967, inspired by Brossard’s work and sensitive to the urgency of restoring a demographic balance in Quebec, director general René Gauthier submitted a draft provincial policy on immigration. Quebec should, he wrote, pursue two objectives: “the creation of new economic wealth” through resource planning and management, and “the integration of immigrants into Quebec’s French-speaking community” through the promotion of voluntary adherence rather than coercion. Put off by its provocative nature, Jean-Noël Tremblay rejected Gauthier’s report, which nevertheless came back to haunt the Union nationale government in the midst of the subsequent language debate. In the summer of 1968, a report by Charles-Émile Couture was published on the economic impact of immigration. Emphasizing economic progress and rational thought, Couture conceived of an ideal immigrant based on the homo oeconomicus model, a tool for generating collective wealth. The economic value of immigrants, in meeting “predetermined human resource requirements,” would become the essential condition of their integration into the community. This criterion would be the one to guide the Quebec State’s actions. Gabias, however, put Couture’s conclusions on the back burner. For the minister, short-term expediency must prevail over long-term plans, however rational they might be.

Political developments on the constitutional and language fronts finally led to a breakthrough. Even if in the winter of 1967 Jean Marchand, the federal minister responsible for immigration, said he was sympathetic to the province’s desire for a greater role in immigration, the Canadian State as a whole was more reluctant to accept Quebec’s demands. The constitutional conference of 5 February 1968 reflected this attitude, with the emergence of Pierre Elliott Trudeau who was radically opposed to Quebec’s objectives as a Nation-State. From that point on, relations between Québec and Ottawa soured on two fronts. On the one hand, two opposing interpretations of the Canadian constitution clashed, one looking
for a recognition of the two nations principle, the other insisting on the pre-
eminence of individual freedoms. On the other hand, radically different views of
the law and the mediation of conflict in liberal societies confronted each other.

Daniel Johnson believed in a concept of law based on judicial precedent (nomos).
This notion provided for flexible rules that could be modified as a result of a
better understanding of their effects in relation to those of other rules. The con-
cept of nomos regulates relations within a pluralistic, liberal society, organized on
the basis of the primacy of the community’s quality of life, while at the same time
ensuring the basic rights of minorities. In March 1965, in his manifesto Égalité
ou indépendance [Equality or Independence], Johnson proposed a rewriting of the
Canadian constitution “on the basis of the recognition of two nations” as cultural
entities, French Canada and English Canada. According to Johnson, “a forced
unity, which would go against nature, would be a constant source of quarrels and
conflicts.” “What is possible and desirable,” said Johnson, “is national union and
harmony, based on respect for legitimate differences.” The new constitution
should contain not only “a charter of human rights” but also “a charter of nation-
al rights” establishing “definite legal guarantees for members of both cultural
communities who constitute a minority in a given area.” The constitution should
have “enough flexibility to allow us to develop in our own way while allowing our
English compatriots to do what they feel is necessary to develop their own
culture.” Johnson’s subsequent performance during the constitutional negotia-
tions reflected his belief in the flexibility of the concept of nomos.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau championed a concept of law - that laid down by the
legislator (thesis). This concept claims to set precisely the rules of general, uni-
versal application. The notion of thesis places great importance on procedure in a
liberal, neutral society where all citizens, no matter what their differences, are
treated equally. Its supporters care little about the adverse effects of these rules,
which they interpret as resistance on the part of their opponents to their own
political agenda for social change. In April 1965, before members of the Quebec
parliamentary committee on the Constitution and after in Federalism and the
French Canadians, Trudeau expressed his opposition to what he viewed as the
“dangerous” idea of “two nations” and the “preferential treatment” inherent in the
proposal to give Quebec “special status”. Stating that he was “in a frantic hurry
to change reality”, he advocated that the new constitution contain a “Bill of
Rights,” with clauses that would “limit the powers that legal authorities have over
human rights in Canada”, “protect traditional political and social rights”, and “put
the French and English languages on an equal basis before the law.” As “it would
not be very realistic to rely upon good will or purely political action,” Trudeau
supported reforms that would be “irrevocably binding upon both the federal and
provincial governments.” His political agenda would not tolerate half-measures.
He emphasized that “this essential, however modest, implies an immense trans-
formation of attitudes and of what I have called the social rules of the game.” He
concluded on a pessimistic note that “if, on the other hand, the essential is not
achieved, there is really no point in carrying the discussion any further; for this
will mean that Canada will continue to be swept periodically by the storms
of ethnic dispute, and will gradually become a spiritually sterile land, from which both peace and greatness have been banished." His convictions unshakable, Trudeau became the federal minister of Justice in 1967 and threw himself wholeheartedly into the constitutional arena.

Following the constitutional conference in February 1968, the power relations between Canada and Quebec reflected these two conflicts which strongly influenced the development of norms for the inclusion of the Stranger in Quebec society. In order to establish the legitimacy of Quebec's demands in the face of Trudeau's doctrinaire arguments against them, Daniel Johnson, true to the spirit of section 95 of the Canadian constitution, wanted to establish some jurisprudence. So he revived the old idea of creating a Quebec Ministry of Immigration, and on 20 February its creation was announced in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Quebec Legislative Assembly. On 31 March, in Montréal, the premier outlined the shape of the future Ministry in a speech to the Colonie du Moyen-Orient [an association of members from the Middle East], presenting a framework of norms for the inclusion of the Stranger that fitted in well with the character of the nation. For Johnson, nationalism was not a “reaction of isolation or withdrawal,” or “a racist or tribal feeling” since it allowed for both the nomos as a factor of cohesion and the preservation of “cultural pluralism, a key factor in the Canadian identity.” Immigrants were thus “adoptive sons,” and were among “our best citizens.” Before an audience comprising members of cultural minorities, he added, “you must accept that Quebec is as much your land,” while emphasizing that newcomers should make “the necessary effort to learn our beautiful French language.” Drawing on the flexibility of the concept of nomos, Johnson gave the future Quebec Ministry of Immigration a twofold mission: to promote the recognition of the Quebec Nation-State and “to help immigrants adapt to their new homeland.” Essentially the Ministry had to recruit immigrants “whose education and experience would meet” the economic needs of Quebec and to facilitate their integration into the workforce. It would do “its utmost to reduce to a minimum the number of disadvantages still facing immigrants in the area of technical and professional qualifications.” But on 26 September 1968, before his intentions could become reality, Johnson died.

His successor, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, faced a major crisis as soon as he took office. In Saint-Léonard, a suburb on the island of Montréal, the Jérôme-Le Royer School Commission touched off a crisis by trying to resolve the sensitive language problem. The supporters of bilingual education, Italian-Quebec parents in particular, and French-speaking activists confronted each other in court. In the fall of 1968, the situation grew worse and the groups took their dispute into the streets. The Quebec State intervened to calm things down. Bertrand reacted quickly, sometimes awkwardly. With Bill 85, he merely inflamed emotions by trying to guarantee freedom of choice in the language of instruction. On 22 October 1968, in an already tense climate, he tabled Bill 75, creating the Quebec Ministry of Immigration.

The members of the Legislative Assembly justified the need for the new ministry. Yves Gabias saw it as a strategic element in the constitutional debate that
signalled the Quebec State’s intention to discuss constitutional matters with its Canadian counterpart. When Marcel Masse raised fears about the threat to Quebec’s linguistic balance, Bertrand pointed to the province’s act of “solidarity” with those endeavouring to make Quebec civil society truly French-speaking. Maurice Bellemare emphasized the administrative effectiveness and the “international status” of the new ministry. Above all, members debated the provisions of this new social contract, the norms of inclusion that the department would have to define and apply. The first norm was based on territory. Repeating Gabriel Loubier’s evocation of the “inspiring adventure of the American people,” Yves Gabias argued that the Quebec State would protect the jus solis of all citizens living or wanting “to establish themselves within the geographical area of Quebec.” The second norm was related to the model of the homo oeconomicus. Members of the Legislative Assembly shared Jean Lesage’s instrumental view of the immigrant as “an asset to the Quebec economy,” especially when trained in the “modern processes” of “production, marketing, administration, and consumption.” The third norm was cultural. While there was a consensus on the role of the state, the Assembly could not find any common ground on a cultural normative policy. Bertrand who valued individual freedom both in general and in the Bill itself, did not establish any specific parameters for cultural pluralism. Excluding “discrimination based on unspeakably racist, repugnant criteria,” René Lèvesque pushed for immigrant recruitment and selection procedures that took into account the need for a specific, distinctive Quebec identity embracing French-speaking culture. That culture had the right and duty “not only to endure, but also to grow stronger all the time.” In an effort to pinpoint the Ministry’s cultural mission, Levesque proposed an amendment to the Bill. But he met with no success as the majority of members of the Legislative Assembly voted to adopt the Bill as it stood, without major changes.

On 4 December 1968, Bill 75 creating the Ministry of Immigration of Quebec received royal assent. As a result, the Quebec State had an infrastructure to deal actively with immigration issues and produce norms and symbols of inclusion into the Quebec polis. The interface between the Quebec State and the Stranger, the Immigrant, was symptomatic of the profound changes that swept over the Quebec political community after the Second World War, especially in the way it viewed the Provincial State, civil society, and the nation. Through its Ministry of Immigration, but also through its own Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Charter of French Language, the Quebec State showed its support for the modern values of reason, economy, secularism, law, and democracy. At the same time, it began a struggle against the Federal State for the conquest of a symbolic political space. In the decades to follow, Quebec’s normative models collided with the more levelling and exclusive models represented by Canada’s multiculturalism policy and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Civil society remained true to the idea of liberalism, but at the same time it revised its disciplinarian norms, entrusting the State with a more interventionist role. The nation
exchanged the *jus sanguinis* of ethnicity and religion for the *jus solis* of cultural pluralism and citizenship based on voluntary adherence. These transformations signalled the passage from an organic to a contractual community.

Discussing the birth of the Czech Republic and European integration, novelist Milan Kundera stated that the challenge is "to protect oneself from the global trend toward uniformity and create a community where diversity is respected as the pre-eminent value." Since the end of the Second World War, in its own way, the interface between the Quebec State and the *Stranger* has reflected this challenge.

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A specialist of historical anthropology and the political culture of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Quebec, Martin Pâquet completed his doctorate on the Quebec state and immigration at Laval University in 1995. He has taught history at Laval, at the Université du Québec at Rimouski, and at York University's Glendon College in Toronto. Currently at the Université de Moncton, he is writing a book on the stranger and the Quebec state from 1627 to 1981.
### Table 1
Number of Immigrants in Canada, Quebec and Ontario: 1945-1965.

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**Sources:** *Annuaire du Québec 1968-1969 / Quebec Yearbook*  
(Quebec, Éditeur officiel, 1969), p. 239
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<td>52.35</td>
<td>28.74</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>22.84</td>
<td>52.34</td>
<td>28.77</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>23.60</td>
<td>50.94</td>
<td>28.84</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>25.65</td>
<td>49.89</td>
<td>28.90</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>24.97</td>
<td>52.83</td>
<td>28.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>23.07</td>
<td>54.59</td>
<td>28.91</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.68</td>
<td>54.31</td>
<td>28.91</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20.51</td>
<td>52.43</td>
<td>28.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>52.27</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A): Number of immigrants in Quebec as percentage of immigrants in Canada.
(B): Number of immigrants in Ontario as percentage of immigrants in Canada.
(C): Quebec population as percentage of total Canadian population.

Graph 1
Number of Immigrants in Canada, Quebec and Ontario
Graph 2
Number of Immigrants Living in Quebec as Percentage of the Total Canadian Population. Quebec Population as Percentage of Canadian Population, 1945–1968.
Suggestions for further reading

There are some scientific studies on the events that led to the creation of a Quebec Department of Immigration. Anyone interested in new political history, particularly as it relates to political culture, may consult Martin Pâquet, *Le Fleuve et la Cité, Représentations de l'immigration et esquisses d'une action de l'État québécois, 1945-1968* (Université Laval, doctoral thesis in history, 1995). Ricardo Hill uses a structuralist approach, drawing on neo-Marxist doctrine, in *Politiques d'immigration et reproduction sociale : le cas du Québec* (Montréal, UQAM, doctoral thesis in sociology, 1987). Written for public servants, a number of administrative reports describe the events that have marked Quebec's immigration policies. These include legal expert Andrée Lavoie-Robichaud's *Politiques et attitudes à l'égard de l'immigration depuis la Confédération au Québec* (Ottawa, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965); René Marleau's *Historique du ministère de l'immigration* (Québec, Ministry of Immigration, 1976); and Micheline Albert and Marc-André Bédard's *Historique du Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’immigration* (Québec, Library of the National Assembly, 1985).


Relations between minority pressure groups and Quebec political leaders have been the subject of a number of studies, in which the language issue has often been a focal point. For Quebec as a host society represented within immigrant communities, read *Le Québec de demain et les communautés culturelles*, under the direction of Jacques Langlais, Pierre Laplante and Joseph Lévy (Montréal, Méridien, 1990). Also Micheline Labelle and Joseph Lévy, *Ethnicité et enjeux sociaux. Le Québec vu par les leaders de groupes ethnoculturels* (Montréal, Liber, 1995). The Italian-Quebec minority is the primary subject of many studies, including Paul-André Linteau’s “Italians of Quebec: Key Participants in Contemporary Linguistic and Political Debates”, in Roberto Perin and Franc Sturino (ed.), *Arrangiarsi. The Italian Immigration Experience in Canada* (Montréal, Guernica, 1989); Claude Painchaud and Richard Poulin, *Les Italiens au Québec*, (Hull, Critiques/Asticou, 1988); and Donat J. Taddeo and Raymond C. Taras, *Le débat linguistique au Québec. La communauté italienne et la langue d’enseignement* (Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1987). For an analysis of immigration and Jewish minorities, read Pierre Ancil’s “Forging a Viable Partnership: The Montréal Jewish Community vis-à-vis the Quebec State” in Alain-G. Gagnon, *Québec, State and Society; Jacques Langlais and David Rome, Jews and French Quebecers: Two Hundred Years of Shared History* (Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1991); and Harold W. Waller and Morton Weinfeld, “The Jews of Quebec and ‘Le Fait français’” in Morton Weinfeld et al., *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* (Toronto, John Wiley and Sons, 1981.)